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# **Perception and Judgement**

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## Abstract

In this thesis, I am arguing for a single claim, namely that perceptual experiences are judgements, and I am arguing for it in a very specific way. This has not been a popular theory, although some have defended similar theories. One main reason that this has been a historically unpopular theory is to do with the problems of conflicting beliefs. I can see (strictly speaking, experience) the Müller-Lyer lines as being of different lengths, they *look* different lengths, and yet I *know* that they are the same length. Hence, I have explicit contradictory judgements on a judgement-theory of experiences. However, despite this being the major historical obstacle, two widely held theses in the philosophy of perception in recent times also stand as an impediment to this theory, namely the theses that experiences have a *phenomenal character* which individuates them from judgements, and that experiences, unlike judgements or beliefs, have *non-conceptual content*.

I seek to offer an "incremental defence" of the judgement-theory of experiences by arguing in stages against the competing theories, and defending the judgement-theory from the objections that arise from the motivations for these other theories. As regards the phenomenal character of experience, I argue that once the representational theory is accepted, the path is open, should a range of individuating conceptual contents for experiences be found, to analyse the psychology of experience in terms of this content. I define this conceptual content, and then I motivate and defend the theory that experiences are judgements.

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## Chapter 1 Background: The Sense-Data Theory

### 1 Introduction

The theory that I am defending is an analysis of perception in terms of judgement. Perceptions are, according to this analysis, a class of judgements. The initial analysandum is "*s* perceives *y*", where *s* is the subject and *y* the object perceived. In "looks" terms, the analysandum can be stated as "*y* looks some way to *s*". "Some way" is a property, *F*. In the most simple of cases, this "some way" will concern at least, e.g., "yellow", "red", "over there".<sup>1</sup> The basic analysandum with respect to vision is (1).<sup>2</sup>

$$(1) \quad y \text{ looks } F \text{ to } s.^3$$

"Perception" is often taken to be a success notion, and I will adopt this terminology: a perception is a successful experience in that in undergoing the experience, *s* is perceptually related to an external object which is the way that it looks.<sup>4</sup> If *y* is an external object, or something "real" or "actual", then (1) reports an aspect of a perception, the aspect whereby *s* sees the *F* of *y*.<sup>5</sup>

The *experience* merely *as-of* something *F* ("it looks to me as though", or "as if there is an *F*") may or may not be veridical.<sup>6</sup> Illusion is only partially successful, and hallucination is fully unsuccessful. If there is a *y* which looks some way to *s* and *is, actually is*, this way, then the experience is veridical in this respect; if it is all of the ways that it looks, then it is fully veridical (and, of course, it will be some ways that it does not look). If *y* is only partially the way that it looks to *s*, the experience is an illusion. If there is no external *y*, then the experience is a hallucination, and, I argue, the object which looks some way is a *merely intentional object*.

Whether one is really entitled to say that anything looks this way if there is only a merely intentional object is an interesting question. Compare this to a child afraid of the monster under

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1 I am not enquiring here into which properties can be represented in perception, whether they are "low" or "high" level as discussed in, e.g., Siegel (2005).

2 As is standard in the literature, I treat vision as the central case.

3 For example, *y* looks red to *s*. This is a simple case of a monadic property, but whatever is said of this will generalise to properties of any adicity.

4 I do not enquire in detail as to whether, say, an after-image is "external" or not. I think that it probably is, but I do not argue for this.

5 If one wishes, one could read "*F*-ness" instead of "*F*" here, should one worry about a slight hint of grammatical awkwardness.

6 *Y* may be, say, green, and yet look blue to *s*. Does *s* see *y*, i.e. does the green object look blue to *s*? This depends. If an object has no properties which are said to be of an object which looks some way to *s*, then *s* is not seeing that object. See below.

their bed. They are afraid of something, namely "the monster", but there is no monster. There is nothing that is *responsible* in any way for frightening them.<sup>7</sup> Likewise, if the child hallucinates the monster, then it feels natural to say that nothing *actually* looked like a monster, because there is no monster, nor anything else, that appeared as a monster. And yet the child had an experience *as of* a monster. This is something that is common to hallucinations of a monster and, if there could be such things, perceptions of a monster. It is also common to having an illusory experience of, say, a sheet on the floor as a monster. In each case, the child could describe and identify what they took to be "the monster", even though there is nothing to identify in the success-sense of identify. Nothing *exemplifies* the property *monster*, despite the fact that the experience is as-of a monster.

Relatedly, as thoughts are like this in that "*s* thinks that there is a monster" does not entail that there is a monster even though *s* is taking there to be a monster, I am arguing that experiences are also propositional as in: it looks to *s* that *p*.<sup>8</sup> This is also an intensional context.<sup>9</sup> *p* is the completion of a looks-report, how *s* would propositionally report how things look.

On the theory I am defending this is the subjective element of the experience, the psychology of the experience, and not a mere *description* of it. Consider a perceptual experience of a red square, and consider everything that one automatically comes to judge about the red square. Let the propositional content that one can glean from the experience of the red square be the content of a judgement. The standard view is that the difference between these two mental acts resides in the way that the experience but not the judgement is sensational, qualitative, or *phenomenal* in some sense.

I am denying this, and defending the position that the look of the red square in the psychological sense, i.e. what is subjective, is the propositional content. Further, I am arguing that the experience is a judgement.

According to the theories I will discuss in chapter 1, experience has no propositional component to it, no *representational* component at all. This leaves experiences as being merely

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7 The child may be responsible for being frightened in some way, e.g. they might be an overly-nervous child, but this is not the same thing.

8 For example, it looks to *s* that there is a red square over there. This is the propositional analysis of it looking to *s* as if there is a red square, *s* seeming to see a red square and so on. The *that*-clause signifies the propositional nature of things looking some way, and the context of looking is in this way the same as the context of, e.g., judging. Whether or not one finds a slight grammatical awkwardness in this construction - myself I do not - this should not tell in any way against the point. After all, we do not say such things as "it is judged to be that *p* by *s*" but this certainly does not tell against the correctness of "*s* judges that *p*".

9 Strictly speaking only linguistic contexts are intensional. And so the report of the experience is an intensional. Intensional contexts do not allow *salva veritate* substitution, and are not existentially committing. If *s* believes that Superman flies, substituting "Clark Kent" for "Superman" will not preserve the truth value, and it does not follow from this that Superman "exists". Intensional contexts also are ambiguous between *de re* and *de dicto* readings. After Quine (1956), a *de re* reading of "Quine believes that someone is happy" would be that Quine believes of a particular person that they are happy, and the *de dicto* reading that Quine believes the general proposition that someone is happy.



qualitative, sensational, or phenomenal. The relation between these two components of perception is the subject of chapters 2, 3, and 4. In chapters 5 and 6, I extend this to a defence of conceptualism about content and then to the judgement-theory of perception.

The theory that I am defending is an analysis of (1) in terms of a three-place relation between the subject, *s*, a propositional content which is identified with the way that the object looks, *p*, and the object, *y*. The way that the object looks, in the subjective sense, is the representational content of the perception, what is conveyed to the subject. On a rival theory, the notion of experiential consciousness is (partly at least) analysed in terms of the subject being in a phenomenal experiential state, or bearing a *phenomenal* experiential relation either to an object or to a proposition.

A common way of precisifying the contrast is to begin with Jackson's distinction between three uses of "looks", the comparative, epistemic and phenomenal.<sup>10</sup> An example of the first is the following content of a thought: It looks like a dog.

As Jackson points out, the full form of this is: It looks the way that a dog normally looks. It is a relative notion, not the use of "looks" in (1) which expresses an experience and is not relative in this sense. The dog would have to look some way for this way to be compared to the normal way. The subject (grammatical object) here is "the way a dog normally looks". The comparative use of "looks", e.g. "It looks like a dog", invites the question about what that look is which is being compared to another look. This can be read in two ways. Either it is a question about the visual properties, or it is a question about the how the experience *subjectively* is for the subject.

"The look of a dog" is ambiguous between the way that a dog looks to *s*, in the sense of what is *conveyed* to *s* about the dog, and on a rival theory the phenomenal aspect of the experience of the dog, and the *visual properties* that the dog has. The visual properties of the dog are the properties of the dog that are experienced. At least, e.g., its colour, texture, shape and so on. These are not the look of a dog in the subjective sense of the *way* in which the dog looks to *s*, or *how* the dog looks to *s*. On the epistemic understanding of "looks", this is the propositional content of the experience, and on the phenomenal understanding of "looks" it is a phenomenal state of *s* or relation *s* is in. These are not the visual properties, the properties presented as being of the dog. For example, on the sense-data theory the visual properties are those which, canonically, cause the sensing of the sense-datum. These latter properties, or, rather, the sensing of them, is, on this theory, how the dogs looks in the subjective sense.

The theory that I am defending is that the look of the dog in the sense of how things subjectively are when the dog is experienced is the propositional content of a judgement about the

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<sup>10</sup> See Jackson (1977) Chapter 2, after Chisholm (1957) Chapter 4.

dog in terms of which the experience is analysed. Jackson calls this the epistemic use of "looks". A rough example, lacking in the detail which will have to wait until later, is the following: It looks to *s* that there is a dog there. Or, another example: it looks that the tree is green. How things subjectively are for the subject is what I will call the *psychology* of the mental act. This term is meant to be as neutral as possible. The psychology of a judgement is exhausted by the content of that judgement, the proposition *p*, in addition to the attitude of judgement. The psychology of a judgement that *p* is different from the psychology of hoping that *p*, or desiring that *p*, because the attitudes are different. This is a different notion from that of what the judgement is about, the *object* as opposed to the *content* of the act. The visual properties are properties of the object, partially the way that the object is when it is experienced, and not the *way in which* the object is experienced.

In it looking to *s* that there is a dog there, there is no mention of *s* undergoing any *phenomenal* experience at all. The standard position is that there is obviously a difference between *s* perceiving the dog and *s* merely judging that there is a dog. Analysing perception in terms of the epistemic use of "looks" is not the standard theory. The standard theory is that experiences have the phenomenal element, an element which Jackson (1977) accounts for with the phenomenal use of "looks". Jackson's arguments are for the sense-data theory on which the look of the dog in the subjective sense is analysed as the subject sensing a sense-datum, an object of experience which is necessarily distinct from an external object which may be perceived.

In this chapter, I argue against the sense-data theory, and the other two classical twentieth-century theories of perception, the adverbial theory and the theory of appearing. In doing so, I defend the epistemic understanding of "looks" in terms of its propositional nature. Sense-data, however, are but one way of cashing out the notion of phenomenal nature of experience, and in chapters 2, 3, and 4 I argue against these other notions: I defend the reductive representational theory on which the subjective element of experience, the psychology of experience, is identified with the representational content. In chapters 5 and 6 I defend the conceptual nature of experiences and the thesis that experiences are judgements.

In this chapter, in §2 I introduce the sense-data theory, and in §3 and §4 I discuss some classic arguments for the theory before in §5 the adverbial reaction to it. In §6 and §7, I define "direct" and "indirect" and discuss the theory of appearing. In §8, I introduce the representational theory in contrast to the difficulties faced by the sense-data theory.

## 2 Sense-Data and the Phenomenal Principle

The main precursor to the representational theory was the sense-data theory. According to the sense-data theory, experience is a phenomenal relation between the subject and a sense-datum.<sup>11</sup> Although sense-data are standardly defined as mind-dependent entities, Moore introduced them such that it is a question whether or not they are (sometimes) identical to the surfaces of external physical objects. The purpose of this neutral introduction was to define the direct object of perception. The introduction of the notion was meant to be the naming of an uncontroversially ostensible feature of perception. Similarly, Price argues as follows.

The term sense-datum is meant to be a neutral term ... The term is meant to stand for something whose existence is indubitable (however fleeting), something from which all theories of perception ought to start.<sup>12</sup>

From this observation, the proponent of sense-data takes it that whenever there is a visual experience this visual experience is to be analysed in terms of a relation to a sense-datum which exemplifies the properties it is presented as having (compare, in contrast, those mental relations that are expressed in terms of intensional linguistic contexts). It is then further taken that this relation is a "real relation" in the sense that if it holds between two terms then these two terms must exist. This is made explicit by Robinson as the Phenomenal Principle.

P     If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware of which does possess that quality.<sup>13</sup>

According to P, when we have phenomenal impression, or sensing, of, say, a brown sense-datum, as, for example, in the case of accurate perception of the colour of a brown table, there is something actually brown before the mind. Exploiting the very same method of introspection, is it not equally natural to hold that when I look away from the desk lamp there is equally an after-image, a coloured shape that, although not (but not necessarily not) presented to me as external, is likewise presented? Certainly, one wonders *where* the after-image is, and *what* it is. But it feels peculiar to wonder *if* it is. This is not an argument but the statement of a very powerful intuition. Price makes this clear as

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11 Versions of this theory are defended by, e.g., Price (1932), Broad (1925), Russell (1912), Moore (1965a), (1965b), Jackson (1977), Robinson (1994), and Lowe (1981). Lewis (1929) defends a similar theory.

12 Price (1932) p. 19

13 Robinson (1994) p. 32. Also see Broad (1965), and Pitcher (1971) Chapter I Section C.

follows.

When I say "This table appears brown to me" it is quite plain that I am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness (or equally plainly with a pair of instances when I see double). This cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable.<sup>14</sup>

We also find that something like P (although not formulated explicitly) was something like a pre-theoretical observation for other proponents of sense-data.<sup>15</sup> Here, for example, is Russell.

When I look at my table and see a certain brown colour, what is quite certain [is that] "a brown colour is being seen" ... Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty. And this applies to dreams and hallucinations as well as to normal perceptions: when we dream or see a ghost, we certainly do have the sensations [perceptions] we think we have, but for various reasons it is held that no physical object corresponds to these sensations. Thus our certainty of our knowledge of our own experiences does not have to be limited in any way to allow for exceptional cases. Here, therefore, we have for what it is worth, a solid basis from which to begin our pursuit of knowledge.<sup>16</sup>

On this theory, if  $s$  has a phenomenal experience as of an  $F$ , then there is an  $x$  which is  $F$  of which  $s$  is *phenomenally aware*.<sup>17</sup> Russell called the relation that  $s$  bears to this sense-datum 'acquaintance' and Broad called it 'sensing'.<sup>18</sup> Recall (1).

(1)  $y$  looks  $F$  to  $s$ .

The sense-data analysis of what is expressed in (1), (2), breaks down into two elements: a sensing of a sense-datum,  $x$ , which accounts for the phenomenal, conscious, experience; and a second element which accounts for a relation between the sensing and the object of perception (assuming the experience is not hallucinatory),  $y$ , which, depending on the features of the relation, renders the experience veridical or non-veridical.<sup>19</sup>

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14 Price (1932) p. 63

15 Martin (2000) Section 5 makes this point.

16 Russell (1912) p. 8. This is an example of sense-data being used epistemology as a secure foundation for knowledge. I am concerned with what Crane (2000) calls their "metaphysical" use in analysis of perception.

17 See Martin (2000) and Crane (2000) for historical discussion of the origins of this theory.

18 Russell also argued that we were, in his sense, acquainted with universals. I will use Broad's 'sensing' instead.

19 I will sometimes suppress the way in which  $y$  looks to  $s$ , i.e.  $F$  in (1), where it is not strictly relevant. There is a slight problem in exposition here in that if the experience is hallucinatory, there is no  $y$  which looks any way in any sense, i.e. which is seen to be any way. I note this here, and context should make it obvious when there is this looseness in exposition in this respect. To repeatedly make this qualification would be very cumbersome.

- (2)  $s$  senses  $x$ .  
 $s$  sensing  $x$  either bears  $D$  to  $y$ , or not.

The first clause in (2),  $s$  sensing  $x$ , expresses the experience on the sense-data theory. The experience is a relation of sensing between  $s$  and  $x$ .  $x$  *exemplifies* the properties which according to P are transparently in front of the mind in experience. For example, the phenomenal look Price took to occur in cases of double vision is analysed on the sense-data theory as a sensing relation between the subject and two sense-data.<sup>20</sup>

The second clause in (2) expresses a relation  $D$  which may or may not hold between the sensing and some object by definition distinct from  $x$ . This relation is either a causal relation, a matching relation, or a combination of both.<sup>21</sup> It determines the object of perception and the veridical status of the experience. If there is some  $y$  which caused the sensing of  $x$  and which matches the properties of  $x$ , then the experience is an element of a veridical perception which is a complex of these relations. If there is some  $y$  which causes the sensing but only partially matches the properties of  $x$ , then the experience is an element of an illusory perception, which is a complex of these relations. If there is no  $y$  which is (appropriately, I do not go into this here) caused the sensing, then the experience is a hallucination, as it forms no part of a complex in which the subject could be said to be (relevantly) related to an object which could be the object of a perception. This is the manner in which the sense-datum theory distinguishes the object of perception from the object of experience.

In his discussion of sense-data theories and his arguments against them, Pitcher makes the following point.

Whatever disagreements there may be amongst different sense-datum philosophers as to the nature or status of sense-data, most of them would, I think, be willing to assert some form or other of the following unclear principle: that the term "sense-datum" refers to what is "immediately" or "directly" given or presented to someone's consciousness in all sense experience; that is, to what is immediately and directly before one's consciousness in sense perception (whether "veridical" or not) when the work of the mind or the imagination, which usually and automatically performs the act of interpretation (or inference, or "taking for granted") is stripped away.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Or two sensing relations between the subject and two sense-data. This is not something into which I enquire.

<sup>21</sup> There are well-known difficulties in specifying how  $D$  can be formulated in terms of causation. I do not discuss this here, as I am not defending this theory.

<sup>22</sup> Pitcher (1971) p. 10

I will take this as a canonical statement of the sense-data theory as I am concerned with it. It is important to note that I am setting aside the question of the interpretation of the sense-datum, i.e. the representational content of the experience, until subsequent chapters. Pitcher continues as follows.

the source of whatever evil the notion of sense-data has inflicted on the philosophical world ... is the idea that sense-data are ontologically distinct from physical objects, and even from the surfaces of physical objects, where "physical object" is construed in the realist's sense, namely, as designating an extended object whose existence is not dependent upon its being perceived. Since only some physical existents are objects and only some have surfaces, however, the claim might be better generalized as follows: no sense-datum is identical with anything in the physical world. I consider this non-identity thesis to be absolutely essential to any view that can properly be called a sense-datum theory.<sup>23</sup>

I concur with this.<sup>24</sup> My purpose is to defend the theory that perceptions are judgements. Hence, it is necessary to ward off sense-data and the arguments in favour of sense-data (as sense-data are not the object of judgements, and nor do they accompany them or feature in any way in judgement). Robinson defines sense-data as having the following features: they are something of which we are aware; they are non-physical; they are logically private objects, in that only one subject can be aware of each sense-datum; they exemplify sensible [experienced, *not perceived*] properties, they are not intentional [representational].<sup>25</sup> They are by definition non-identical with external objects and do not feature in an analysis of judgement.<sup>26</sup> On the sense-data theory, the sensing of a sense-datum, is a purely phenomenal (or 'sensible') experience common to perceptions, hallucinations and illusions. Furthermore, to sense the sense-datum is not for that mental act to intend or represent the sense-datum. Phenomenal experiences are not *about* anything in this sense. Let me now consider the arguments for sense-data.

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23 Pitcher (1971) pp. 10-11

24 Even if "evil" and "inflicted" seem a bit strong.

25 Robinson (1994) pp. 1-2. On this standard view, the sense-data do not have intentionality in themselves even though it may perhaps be put that the sensings of sense-data, and by extension perhaps the sense-data themselves, somehow stand in some kind of a representational relation to those objects that cause them. For *s* to sense a sense-datum *x* is not representationally transparent to *s* in the sense that in virtue of this relation alone an object other than *x*, and which is the intentional object, is represented to *s*. One could not "read off" the external cause or matching object, or the fact that there is or might be one, from the sensing of a sense-datum alone. And the sense-datum itself is not the intentional object of the experience.

26 Judgements have intentional objects, which may or may not be external objects and may or may not have, i.e. *exemplify*, the properties they are represented as having. Sense-data exemplify the properties they are presented as having.

### 3 *The Argument from Perspectival Change and the Notion of the Visual Field*

Consider the following argument from Russell.

If our table is "really" rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If the opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator, if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were longer. All of these things are not commonly noticed in looking at the table, because experience has taught us to construct the "real" shape from the apparent shape, and the "real" shape is what interests us as practical men. But the "real" shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table.<sup>27</sup>

An earlier version comes from Hume.

The table which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image which was present to the mind.<sup>28</sup>

The argument here is that what we sense changes as we change our perspective. As, by hypothesis, the object *perceived* does not change, it must be concluded that the object *sensed* is not identical to it. A reconstruction of the argument is as follows.

- P1  $s$  senses an  $x$  which changes its intrinsic properties as  $s$  moves relative to  $y$ .
- P2  $y$  itself does not change, or at least not systematically in the intrinsic manner of  $x$  as in  $s$ 's sensing of  $x$  in P1.
- P3 If  $x$  changes in respect of property  $F$  under conditions  $C$  and  $y$  does not, then  $x$  and  $y$  are non-identical.
- C  $x$  and  $y$  are non-identical.

I think that this is a fair reconstruction of the central thrust of the argument.<sup>29</sup> It was pointed out by Reid that the table looks to get farther away. To point this out is to argue that the change in the

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<sup>27</sup> Russell (1912) p. 3

<sup>28</sup> Hume (2008) p. 13

<sup>29</sup> See Heumer (2001) Chapter V Section I for an extensive discussion of various formulations of the argument.

experience of the table does not licence P1. This is, in my opinion, correct, and nothing, I contend, in any sense, looks, appears or is sensed to get smaller. We are not *aware in experience* of anything which changes in intrinsic size; nothing is *sensed* which changes size. This, I submit, is true as a point of fact. The table does not look to get smaller: it looks only to get *farther away* or to be egocentrically positioned and/or orientated differently.<sup>30</sup>

However, a proponent of the argument might concede that it does look to get farther away in the *epistemic* sense, but that the object that constitutes the phenomenal appearance of the table, namely the sense-datum, *does* get smaller as it takes up less space in the visual field.

But it seems to me that nothing in vision, and nothing in the visual field, "gets smaller". There is a tendency of philosophers to introduce a notion of the visual field as an object of, or salient element in, experience, construed as, or based on, a two-dimensional field of coloured patches.<sup>31</sup> On the simplest of this type of view, the visual field is like a sensed mosaic of coloured patches of card, and as the subject moves around, every change in the visual field is analogous to the replacement of one or more pieces of card by another, differently shaped, piece of card. The idea that the visual field is two-dimensional has appealed to many people since Berkeley, despite the fact that it looks to be an introspectible fact that this is not the case.<sup>32</sup> Here, for example, are two passages from Broad.

whenever a penny looks to me elliptical, what really happens is that I am aware of an object which is, in fact, elliptical. This object is connected in some specially intimate way with the round physical penny, and for this reason is called an appearance *of* the penny. It really is elliptical, and for this reason the penny is said to look *elliptical*.

When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware of *something*; and it is certainly plausible to hold that this something is elliptical in the same plain sense in which a suitably bent piece of wire, looked at straight from above, is elliptical. If, in fact, nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny should seem *elliptical* rather than any other shape.<sup>33</sup>

However, this seems to me to be questionable as a reporting of the facts. The penny does not look elliptical, it looks to be a circle (a very short cylinder) that is turned from face-on. There now arises

30 If sense-data are taken to be three dimensional, then I think that this argument will still not go through. The sense-data will be described so as to match exactly the behaviour of a real three dimensional table in the visual field, with the exception that they will be changing in intrinsic shape and not in extrinsic properties. But there would be no reason that I can see to conclude, on the basis of this argument, that there are such sense-data. Why should three-dimensional sense-data persuade me more of P1 than do two-dimensional sense-data?

31 See, e.g., Peacocke (1983) Section 1.

32 This is conceded even by many proponents of sense-data, e.g. in Price (1932) and Jackson (1977). However some, e.g. Foster (2000) and Robinson (1994), hold that the visual field is two-dimensional.

33 Broad (1965) pp. 89-90



immediately another question: if that is so, and nothing looks to be elliptical, then how is it that the penny looks like *this* when face-on and like *that* when turned from face-on? One ought to be careful here, for a statement like this can be erroneously taken to indicate that "this" and "that" are naming appearances in the visual field.

Rather, the penny looks to be orientated in a particular way, and then orientated in a different way. The use of "looks" invoked here, i.e. the phenomenal use which refers to an elliptical object, is illicit. This is partly motivated by the fact that a three-dimensional object can be occluded from each perspectival point by a two-dimensional shape projected onto a plane along the points of intersection of the outward edges of the object as they meet the perspectival lines emanating from the point, and where the plane is drawn perpendicular to the central perspectival line at the first point of contact with the edge of the object. In the case of a circle, this shape is an ellipse.

As an illustration of this line of thought, consider Peacocke's introduction of primed predicates which we can apply to properties of the visual field.

If a particular experience *e* has the familiar sensational property which in normal circumstances is produced by a white object (such as a tilted plate) which would be precisely obscured by an opaque elliptical region (*r*, say) of the imagined interposed plane, let us express this fact in the notation "elliptical'(*r*, *e*) and white'(*r*, *e*).". These primed predicates "elliptical'" and "white'" should not be confused with their unprimed homonyms. In using the notation, we are not thereby saying that experiences have colour properties or spatial properties. With this apparatus we can express what would more traditionally have been expressed by saying: "There is a yellow elliptical region of the visual field next to a white square region".<sup>34</sup>

Peacocke holds that the prime properties are not exemplified. However, the argument is otherwise the same: although they are not exemplified, they are *manifest in perceptual experience*. However, it is not true, at least so far as it seems to me, that there is anything *experiential* corresponding to this notion. Peacocke's argument is not that these are objects of sensing, but that they are salient elements of experiences which are not analysable in terms of the spatial and orientation properties of objects. This is a subtle difference, but I reject the underlying observation in both cases.

The introduction of these properties seems to me to be an intellectual act of a fairly high level, and not something that is manifest in experience.

This generalises to all of the cases purported in various specific examples of P1. In the cases explicitly under discussion, the penny and the table are seen to be at different positions relative to the axes of the visual field of the perceiver. This renders the change identified in P1

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<sup>34</sup> Peacocke (1983) pp. 20-21

relational change. And this is compatible with P2, so C is blocked. To get from the tilting of the coin, and thus a different relational property of the coin being seen, to "the coin looks like an ellipse" or further to "an ellipse is sensed", requires *assuming* something like P1.<sup>35</sup> And this is to assume P.

The "visual field" is only the field of things seen, or, in general, the notion of the extent over which the eye can range. We are not perceptually aware *of* the visual field in experience in the sense that we are aware of it as we are aware of the objects, including empty space, in it. The visual field is the area *in which* things are visible, but it itself is not visible (similarly, the eye is the organ through which things are seen but itself is not seen). My desk is currently in my visual field because it is currently something that is seen by me. The objects I currently am seeing comprise my current visual field. But the visual field is not an entity in experience over and above this. If I have a bag with two cans of soup in it, the contents of the bag are the two cans of soup (and the empty space), and not two cans of soup (and the empty space) plus a "content field". Likewise for experience: there is no experiential field in the sense over and above the things seen.

It is certainly true that I can *conceive* of something like the visual field in terms of a mosaic of pieces of card for every scene such that the shapes and colours are perfectly matched to the objects seen in the way that the elliptical piece of card is matched to occlude the penny at some point. We are very good at doing this. It must, of course, be granted that this scene may completely take me in, as in the case of a trompe l'oeil. However, this enforces on us an account of illusion (assuming that one takes this to be an illusion), and not necessarily sense-data. It can be further granted that there could in some sense be a visual field very much like this mosaic of pieces of card, except that the mosaic is of sense-data which are two-dimensional colour-patches. There is nothing incoherent about this position, and there may be no way of actually proving it false.<sup>36</sup> However, it seems to me that the argument from perspective is not a good argument in favour of it. That it is possible to adopt "the painterly view", so to speak, of the visual field and *consider* the "visual field" *as introduced in thought* as two-dimensional does not show that there is a visual field and that it is two-dimensional, or that it has any of Peacocke's primed properties. It is not possible to literally adopt the "painterly view" within experience.

Noe, similarly to Peacocke, argues that we actually do see what he calls 'occlusion properties', but Noe thinks that these properties are 'features of the world', and not features of our experience.

But O-properties [occlusion properties] are not merely visible qualities, such as shape, size and

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<sup>35</sup> See Pitcher (1971) Chapter I Section C for discussion of this.

<sup>36</sup> This is so, that is, if depth is not accepted as an experiential fact.

colour. They are the look of things, visual appearances. It is this fact that enables us to see what is true in the two-step approach to vision. Vision is a process of learning how things are from how they look. To see a round plate from an angle, for example, is to see something with an elliptical occlusion shape. We see its roundness in the fact that it looks elliptical from here.<sup>37</sup>

But the penny has no occlusion property in the same sense that it has the property of circularity. The way in which it looks is either the way in which it looks to *s* or the visual properties available to be seen by *s*. The visual properties available to be seen by *s* include its shape, size and position. Noe seems to be attributing the occlusion properties to the object in the way in which the circularity is attributed to the face of the penny. If these are the look of the penny, then either they are the visual properties available to be seen, or Noe is asserting a version of the sense-data theory on which the (phenomenal) look of an object is analysed as the sensing of the occlusion properties and the perceptible as opposed to the sensible properties are related via some relation other than the sensing.

If one was inclined to accept that the occlusion properties are literally properties of the perceived objects, then to block C one could make another move. This move would be to give a relational metaphysics for external objects: elliptical-from-*a*; circular-from-*b*; and so on. These would be something very much like Noe's occlusion properties. This relational metaphysics is very similar to that which Broad and Price call the 'multiple location theory' of external objects. Either objects are full complexes of first-order fully relational properties which are seen, or they have a first-order intrinsic core with (classes of) second-order relational properties of each of these first-order properties which are (directly) seen. Noe's occlusion properties look rather like these second-order properties. This would revise our ordinary conception of objects to a greater or lesser extent, but would not enforce a sense-datum theory of the sort objected to by Pitcher. However, it is not necessary to accept it.<sup>38</sup>

I conclude, therefore, that the argument from perspective is not a compelling argument for sense-data.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Noe (2002) p. 61

<sup>38</sup> See Robinson (1994) Chapter II Section 2 and Price (1932) Chapter 1 for the multiple-location theory. I do not think it necessary to adopt this theory, but it seems to me more defensible than Robinson at least take it to be. One technical argument Robinson gives against the theory is that an elliptical surface cannot be identical with a round one. This argument might hold if the theory was given in a form which asserted this identity. But this need not be so, as the elliptical property, or the smaller could be a second-order property of a first-order intrinsic property. If it is a first-order intrinsic property, then no identity is actually asserted for the object is full relational. Another argument is that it redefines our conception of external objects. This is true, but it was also great surprise to find out that external objects are actually comprised mostly of empty space.

<sup>39</sup> And this argument does not fare better, in my opinion, with respect to three-dimensional sense-data. If anything, it is even weaker for three-dimensional sense-data, as it trades on purported two-dimensional features of the visual field. Indeed, Jackson (1977), who argues for three-dimensional sense-data, does not rest his argument on these classical arguments.

#### 4 *The Argument from Illusion*

In illusion, an object is experienced in a way that the object is not. In hallucination, there is no object which has any of the properties that are experienced.<sup>40</sup> Thus, hallucination could be seen as a kind of limit-case of illusion.<sup>41</sup> There are two types of illusion, I think, which can be distinguished. In discussing a response like the one above to the argument from perspective, typified by the "elliptical" penny, and the argument from illusion, typified by the "bent" stick which I will explain in more detail below, Robinson says the following.

Austin ... claimed that a stick in the water did not look like a bent stick, but like a straight stick *in water*. Similarly, a penny from an angle does not look elliptical, it looks like a round object viewed from an angle. This strategy can be generalised to many, if not all, cases of illusion. If one were taking "looks" in this judgemental sense, then, given that one has no serious tendency to be deceived, then the stick does not look bent and the penny does not look elliptical, and this response to the argument would be powerful. Once, however, one accepts that there is a phenomenological sense to "looks" which is not analysable in terms of a tendency to make judgements, then the situation is more complicated.<sup>42</sup>

The claim that there is such a purely phenomenological, i.e. phenomenal, sense, and that this is analysable in terms of sense-data, is the first premise of the argument. The argument from the illusion, e.g. that of the bent stick, is of the same form as the argument from perspective. One has to grant the equivalent version of P1, and the underlying principle, in order that the argument get off the ground. One has to grant that there is a sense in which the stick in water "looks bent". It is alleged that it looks bent and not just that it looks as if it is in water in precisely the way that it is alleged that the penny "looks elliptical", i.e. a purely phenomenal sense. Broad has the following to say about the "bent stick".

We say that it looks bent. And we certainly do not mean by this that we mistakenly judge it to be bent; we generally make no such mistake. We are aware of an object which is very much like what we should be aware of if we were looking at a stick with a physical kink in it, immersed wholly in air. The most obvious analysis of that facts is that, when we judge that a straight stick *looks* bent, we are aware of an object which really is

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40 It will also be necessary, within this definition, to account for "veridical hallucinations", where there is an object which exemplifies the properties of the object seen but which is in fact not seen. I do not go into this here, but some causal condition is the usual manner of doing this. However, see also Lewis (1980) for an argument against this. Note that this causal condition will tell us which object is, or is not, seen, but not in virtue of this *what it is* to see the object.

41 One certainly need not say this, of course, but I lack the space to argue in detail for this as against other theories.

42 Robinson (1994) p. 55

bent, and which is related in a peculiarly intimate way to the physically straight stick. The relation cannot be that of identity, since the same thing cannot at once be bent and straight, in the same sense of these words. If there be *nothing* with a kink in it before our minds at the moment, why should we then say that the stick looks bent? No doubt we can quite well mistakenly believe a property to be present which is really absent, when we are dealing with something known to us indirectly, like Julius Caesar or the North Pole. But in our example we are dealing with a concrete visible object, which is bodily present to our senses; and it is very hard to understand how we could seem to ourselves to *see* the property of bentness exhibited in a concrete instance, if in fact *nothing* was present to our minds that possessed that property.<sup>43</sup>

This is the same line of argument that I objected to in the previous section. I think it untrue that we are aware of an object which is 'very much like what we should be aware of if we were looking at a stick with a physical kink in it, immersed wholly in air'. Is it the case that there is something "bent" in the visual field? This may be true in a sense, if the subject is taken in and they judge there to be a bent stick. But in this case, the subject *mistakes* the stick as it is in the water for an object that it is not, namely an *actually* bent stick. This would be a form of illusion, certainly, for some property has been attributed in experience to an object which does not have it, namely the property *bent* to "that brown thing". But, as Austin argued in the central case, nothing does look bent. Nothing is experienced *as bent*, rather it is experienced as being in the water.<sup>44</sup>

Experience of the stick changes when the stick is submerged. The light reflected from the stick and through the water into the air and eventually into the eye is refracted through two mediums, the air and the water, with different refractive indexes. This accounts for the change in experience of the stick, because what is experienced changes, i.e. there was a stick in the air before, and now there is a stick in the water. If I look through the bottom of a glass, the room "looks warped", but this is, as Austin pointed out, not because there is a warped room. However, if I paint the stick white, there is a difference in what is seen. The stick is now white. I can no longer see the brown of the stick when it is painted white, and I can no longer accurately see the shape or the position of the stick because it is in the water.

However, these are not faults on *my* side. Nothing has gone wrong experientially: it is not as if I am in the position of the child who mistakenly sees (experiences) a monster under the bed.

Compare the reflection of an object in a circus mirror. We may say that the circus mirror does not accurately represent the object that it reflects. But this is too hasty. The circus mirror does not accurately represent the object that it represents if "accurate" here means a representation in reflection of the kind given by a plane mirror. The circus mirror gives an accurate representation of

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<sup>43</sup> Broad (1965) pp. 90-91

<sup>44</sup> 'We may perhaps be prepared to agree that the stick looks bent; but then we can see that it's partly submerged in water, so that is exactly how we should expect it to look'. Austin (1964) p. 26, and Chapter III in general.

the object that it reflects relative to its own standard. Consider now the refractive index of air as compared to water. The way that the stick appears, in the sense of the way in which its visual properties are available to be seen, is determined by the refractive index of air in the same way that it is determined by the refractive index of water.

In terms of the visual properties being available to be seen, it does not in fact matter whether the subject is taken in or not; indeed the subject only suffers an illusion in the sense of erroneously taking there to be something there, which in fact is not, if they actually take there to be a bent stick.

The particular point at issue here is whether experience in itself conflicts with reality. Kalderon defines the standard conception of illusion as follows.

On the standard conception of illusion, if *o*'s appearing *F* in *S*'s experience is illusory, then appearance and reality *conflict*. So *o* must appear in *S*'s experience in a way that conflicts with *o*'s not being *F*.<sup>45</sup>

Is a change in the refractive index of the medium, and/or range of mediums, through which the stick is seen is enough to introduce a conflict between appearance and reality? If this is so, why then is it not that a refractive index of anything other than one (even air is does not have an index of one) is enough to introduce such a conflict? Indeed, why should any refractive index, be it one or otherwise, be identified as setting the veridical standard?

Kalderon makes the following point about experiential phenomena pertaining to experiences of colours and edges.

Surfaces can be seen to be flat and edges seen to be straight. But flat surfaces and straight edges viewed through a microscope are neither flat nor straight ... If perception is partial, then an object need not display all of its colours from a given perspective. Even if it is possible to view the entire surface of the drop of blood through a microscope, the drop of blood may not reveal all of its colours to that perspective. Similarly, even if it is possible to view the entire surface of the painting and see it as composed of yellow and blue dots, the painting may not reveal all of its colours to that perspective.<sup>46</sup>

In each of the cases here, there is an explanation of why the object perceived looks the way it does. This explanation pertains to matters external to the subject, independent of, and prior to, their experience. The refractive index of water explains the experience of the stick; the perspectives on

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<sup>45</sup> Kalderon (unpublished)

<sup>46</sup> Kalderon (unpublished)

the penny, the edge which "looks straight", and the pointilist painting, explain the respective experiences. Likewise, the experience of the stick through a vacuum would explain the experience of the stick. In each case, the object seen is seen through some medium.

It could be put, I think, that the "bent stick" is the stick-in-water. The stick-in-water *looks* different from the stick-in-air, or the stick simpliciter, because it *is* different in the sense that its visual properties are different; how it is available to be seen is different; and the reason for this is that it is now in water, whereas previously it was in air. What I am now looking at is the laptop-in-air, but if I look at it through the bottom of the glass, what I am looking at is the laptop-in-air-through-the-glass. In none of these cases does the experience conflict with reality, and nothing interposes itself between my mind and the world.

"Interposing" here is the crucial notion. The contention is that there is a particular type of object, a sense-datum, which is a relatum in experience, and which (in a sense to be defined) interposes itself in experience between the mind and the object of perception. In the language of neutral sense-data, the question is: Is the sense-datum identical to anything external?

A somewhat crude, but not misleading, statement of direct realism would be that things stay exactly the way that they veridically look when they are not being looked at. The complex of the stick in the water really is "like that" whether or not someone is looking at it. It follows from this, I think, that there is nothing non-veridical about the experience of the stick in the water. The comparison sense of veridical is that of the child experiencing a monster under the bed. In this case, the experience has "gone wrong". Nothing went wrong in experience of the bent stick, unless the experience is genuinely as-of a bent stick and not of a stick in water. And, as with the perspectival case, the proponent of sense-data is not entitled to assume that there really is, in the standard case, i.e. where the subject is not taken in, such an experience.

If the reflection of an object is seen in a mirror, it cannot be said that the object itself is seen directly, or immediately. Rather, the reflection of it is so seen. However, if the stick is seen in the water, then the stick is seen directly, so far as the complex of the stick and the water is seen directly and the stick is a part of this complex. The seeing of the stick cannot be separated from its being seen as it is presented in the water. But, equally so, the seeing of the part of the stick that is not submerged cannot be separated from the seeing of this part of the stick as it is presented in the atmosphere.<sup>47</sup>

It could be put that the complex of the stick in the water represents, in some natural sense,

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<sup>47</sup> Is the complex stick-in-water seen, or is the stick seen through the water? This is an interesting question, but not one that I think that I need answer here. The central point is that the visual properties of the stick, i.e. the properties of the stick available to be seen in the way in which the world makes them available to be seen, are changed by the way that the stick is in the world, i.e. submerged.

the position and size of the stick incorrectly in the similar manner in which a circus mirror incorrectly represents the object which it reflects. However, this is the world "misrepresenting itself", so to speak, relative to some standard which we impose (based on standard conditions of experience), and not the *subject* misrepresenting the world in the sense that there is a mismatch between experience and reality. This only occurs when I take there to be a bent stick.

The central issue here is that the argument from illusion is an argument against a direct realist theory of perception. In this case, the negation of direct realism involves the invocation of a sense-datum in experience, an entity not invoked in thought. This direct realist view of perception is very well described as the "window model" of perception. Maund, when discussing Austin's attack on the arguments from perspective and illusion, says the following.

In one passage, Austin directed his criticism against traditional epistemologists who drew radical conclusions from the observation that circular objects looked differently under a variety of circumstances. Austin asked what he took to be a damaging question: 'If something is straight does it jolly well have to look straight at all times and in all circumstances? Obviously no one seriously supposes this'. Well, as M. Burnyeat has pointed out, there have been many philosophers who have supposed that, and not just scholastic philosophers. He argues that it is an assumption underlying an influential model of perception, one no less influential for often being a tacit model: what he calls the 'window model of perception' ... On this model, physical objects are thought of as directly revealed by the act of perception. In perception, we perceive the object simply as it is. Like opening a window and looking out, the act of perceiving reveals the things perceived as it really is.<sup>48</sup>

This "window model" is the pre-theoretical view of perception that we all have, and which is the theory that Hume famously stated was 'destroyed' by the 'slightest' philosophy. When we open our eyes, the world is presented to us as if we had opened a window to throw light over the dark room. Perception makes us aware of the external world, without making us aware of an intermediary.

On the classical view of this kind of theory, one which is found in the modern disjunctive literature as well as in the sense-data literature, experience of an object is analysed as something like a sensing relation between the subject and the external object.<sup>49</sup> This theory is the target of the classical sense-data theory of the type to which Pitcher objects and which I am here

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<sup>48</sup> Maund (2003) pp. 102-103

<sup>49</sup> Actually, this is not exactly clear on many disjunctive theories, but experience has to be a relation of some sort on this theory, for there is no other way that the external world be before the mind. It cannot just "be there" to be seen, for it is there to be seen when I have my eyes closed: opening my eyes has to result in some sort of relation over and above "being receptive to", or something like that. Being receptive to is not the same as receiving, and perception is certainly reception of the world. What happens when I open my eyes is that I take it in, and "taking in the world" must be a relation of some sort. Alston (1999) and Langsam (1997), for example, present the disjunctive theory as the theory of appearing.



arguing against. However, one does not have to think of the window model in terms of a sensing relation. The theory that I am defending, as it takes experiences to be three-place relations between the subject, a content, and the object, is direct in the sense in which I define below. In judging correctly of external objects, and coming to know thereby, of those objects and their properties, we are equally as well directly aware of them as we would be on a theory on which the relation is a two-place relation. The difference between the sense-data theory and the theory that I am defending with respect to direct realism is that the propositional content is not an object *of* experience in the way that the sense-datum is.

I conclude, therefore, that the argument from illusion is unsuccessful as an argument for the sense-data theory. There is no compelling case for the acceptance of anything *bent* in the visual field in the case of the "bent stick", and in the case of, say, the white wall with blue light shone on it, there is no compelling case for any conflict between experience and reality, and hence no need for a sense-datum which interposes itself between the mind and the world which explains this.<sup>50</sup>

I conclude from the above discussion that the the arguments for sense-data are not compelling.

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50 This also undercuts any argument that there is no way of choosing which experience is the veridical one, as there is no "privileged" perspective: there is no non-privileged perspective in this sense, as there are no sense-data to consider. Jackson (1977) Chapter 4 Section 10 rejects this argument. There are two other common arguments for sense-data, one being the argument from certainty. As I am certain of sense-data, but not certain of external objects, they must be distinct. This is dubious on independent grounds. There is no need to accept that certainty of the presence of an *F*, and uncertainty of a *G* means that *F* and *G* apply to different metaphysical classes of object, or that certainty that *p* and uncertainty that *q* means that *p* and *q* are propositions of different metaphysical types, or refer to different metaphysical types of entity. See, e.g., Austin (1962) Section 3, Pitcher (1971) Chapter II Section B. There is another classical argument for sense-data, the causal argument from hallucination, presented in, e.g., Robinson (1994). This argument is like the argument from indistinguishability in that it makes use of what Maund (2003) p. 120 calls the 'continuity principle' in addition to P. The continuity here is between proximally causally sufficient brain-states for an experience with a given psychology (merely internal indistinguishability would not entail identity of object experienced: internally identical experience of two indistinguishable scenes does not allow us to conclude that the very same thing is seen in each case). In conjunction with P, this results in an internalist sense-datum theory of experiences in that the psychology of an experience is determined by the internal state of the subject, and not by any factors external to the body. Lowe (2008) calls this the 'cut-off argument': cutting off the causal chain at the proximal brain-state leaves the experience, i.e. sensing of a sense-datum, unaffected. As an argument for *sense-data*, this fares no better than the above arguments in respect of its assumption of P. Questioning the argument in general as an argument for internalism about the psychology and content of experiences, is central to the disjunctive literature. Martin (2004), Langsam (1997), Johnston (2004), Foster (2000) Part II Chapter 2, and Snowdon (2005), for example, discuss or advance ways of questioning the argument. Fish (2009) Chapter 5 questions whether or not it is empirically true that fixing the brain state results in a fixed experience. I would like to defend an externalist theory of experiences in the sense that the relata of veridical experiences are external objects, and hence perception is direct. However, to discuss this in detail with respect to the argument would take me far too far afield given space-constraints. The theory that I am defending is compatible both with the acceptance and denial of the argument (without P). Indeed, and importantly, in defending a judgement-theory, and denying that there really is any notion of experiential phenomenal character in chapter 4, the position that I am defending is that experiences have the same types of contents as thoughts. Externalism about thought content is not universally, but widely, accepted since Putnam (1975) and Burge (1986). The relation between the theory that I am defending and disjunctivism is also not altogether clear, and, again, to enquire into this would be to broaden the scope of this thesis too widely.

## 5 Adverbialism

The adverbial theory denies P, denies the sense-data theory, but denies in general that experience is to be analysed as a relation between the subject and an object.<sup>51</sup> Rather, experience is analysed as the exemplification of a monadic property, an "adverbial modification", which may or may not stand in some causal relation to an external object which would hence be perceived.<sup>52</sup> The adverbial modification is a monadic phenomenal property exemplified by the subject and in terms of which the phenomenal aspect of experience is analysed. Instead of analysing "*y* looks *F* to *s*" as on the sense-data theory, the adverbial analysis is (3).

(3) *s* senses-*F*-ly.

Sensing-*F*-ly is an adverbial mode of sensing. This mode of sensing is a purely qualitative monadic property of *s*. If the adverbial mode of sensing is undergone by the subject as a result of standing in *D* to *y*, then the experience is a perception of *y*. The adverbial mode of sensing is itself not a relation, although it may stand in one, unlike the sensing of a sense-datum which is itself a relation.

As well as the fact that experiences seem introspectibly to be relations to objects (which, of course, the representational theory can account for), and not to feature monadic properties of the mind, a central problem for this theory is Jackson's famous many-property problem.<sup>53</sup> Another, related, problem is that of integrating the adverbial experience into thought.

Jackson's many property problem is that the adverbial theory, as it treats the adverbial modification as unanalysable, cannot account for certain relations between experiences. For example, let it be that *s* is experiencing an *F* and a *G*. The adverbial theory will analyse this as sensing-*F-G*-ly. However, this is itself simple and has no elements. Thus, this has nothing in common with merely sensing-*F*-ly. Further, sensing *F-G-H-I*-ly cannot distinguish between sensing an *F G* and an *H I*, and a *F I* and a *H G*. But we would want to say that experiencing a green circle and a yellow square is different from experiencing a green square and a yellow circle.<sup>54</sup> If the adverbial theory holds only to simple sensings, say, sensing *F*-ly, *G*-ly, *H*-ly and *I*-ly, this decomposes the overall sensing from qualified elements within the sensing and thus technically avoids the problem of suppressing semantic complexity. But this rendering of the theory still cannot cope with the seeing just given as an example unless there is some way of explaining the

51 See Chisholm (1957) and Ducasse (1942). Latter day defenders include Tye (1984).

52 It would not be possible to analyse this in terms of a matching relation, as the property exemplified is unstructured.

53 See Jackson (1977) Chapter 4.

54 And introducing spatial elements, e.g. to-the-right-of, will not help as these will either fall foul of the original problem or introduce a non-adverbial element (e.g., to the right of, instead of to-the-right-of).

sensings' relations to each other. And this regimentation reintroduces an object of the sensing, or a field of sensing, as the element that orders the sensings.

Tye (1984), for example, responded to this argument by arguing that the sensings are individuated by their causes. However, unless the causes of the sensings, and thus what they are about, is made manifest to the subject in experience, which must involve the subject in a relation other than that of the unstructured adverbial sensing, this cannot account for the structure internal to the experience.<sup>55</sup>

Relatedly, in addition to these difficulties pertaining to matters internal to the experience it is very difficult to see how experience construed as the exemplification of a monadic property with a purely qualitative nature could stand in the required logical relation to judgements and other mental acts based on perception. How could the subject interpret the qualitative element in a fashion that allows them to relate experiences to thoughts? On the sense-data theory, although there are notorious problems here, there is a more or less plausible story about how a qualitative relation to a structured field of objects could be logically related to thoughts about such things.<sup>56</sup>

Despite adverbialism in its classical form having its defenders, I conclude, as do most, that adverbialism as classically conceived is dealt a fatal blow by Jackson's many-property problem.<sup>57</sup> I move on now to discuss the notions of "direct" and "indirect" perception, before discussing the theory of appearing. From there I will firm up some commitments that I draw from features of the theories discussed in chapter 1.

## 6 *Direct and Indirect Perception*

The theory that I am defending is that when *s* perceives *y*, *s* judges that *p*, where *s* judging that *p* directly relates *s* to *y* because the content *p* determines or picks out *y*. It would be a mistake to interpret this as the claim that *s* is related to *p*, and as a result of this *s* bears a logically independent relation to *y* as on the sense-data theory. Rather, it is what it *is* for *s* to judge that *p* that *s* is directly related to *y* in the veridical case, as *p* is, to put it in this way, giving structure to the relation that obtains between *s* and *y* not *interposing* itself as an entity between *s* and *y*.

The theory that I am defending is a direct theory. As I define this, a direct theory of *s* perceiving *y* is that *s* and *y* are both terms in the relation in terms of which the perception is

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<sup>55</sup> See Robinson (1994) Chapter VII Section 7.

<sup>56</sup> For a vivid description of this difficulty see Foster (2000) Part III Chapter 6 Section II.

<sup>57</sup> And it seems very much at odds with introspection, to say the least.

analysed, where this relation is simple and does not decompose into further parts.<sup>58</sup>

The structure of the sense-data analysis of  $s$  seeing  $y$  is a conjunctive analysis with two clauses. In the first  $s$  senses  $x$ , the sense-datum, and in the second,  $s$  sensing  $x$  stands in  $D$  to  $y$ . We can call any conjunctive analysis of this sort, whereby  $s$  is related to  $y$  in virtue of being related to some  $x$ , which is further related to  $y$ , an *indirect* theory. I define direct and indirect realism as follows.<sup>59</sup>

Direct Realism:        The object of  $s$ 's conscious relation in an experience is an external object when the experience is veridical.

Indirect Realism:      The object of  $s$ 's conscious relation in an experience is never an external object, but either this conscious relation or the object which is a term in this relation is related to an external object when the experience is veridical.<sup>60</sup>

On the indirect theory, the external object of perception,  $y$ , is only related indirectly to the  $s$  in the sense that  $s$  does not bear a simple conscious relation to  $y$ ; rather,  $s$  bears a simple conscious relation to  $x$ , and this relation itself is caused by the object of the perception, or the object of the conscious relation bears a relation to the object perceived, or a combination of both. By a "conscious relation" I mean a mental relation. Causation and matching are not such relations. Examples of a mental relation include hoping, desiring, judging, etc. Thus, as the object of the conscious relation is not external, it can be said that the object interposes itself between the subject and the external object. This relation, causation or matching, is not a conscious relation. Compare a direct perception of  $y$ , (4), and to formulations of an indirect perception of  $y$ , (5).

- (4)     $s$  bears  $R$ , the sensing relation, to  $y$
- (5)     $s$  bears  $R$  to a sense-datum,  $x$ , and this was caused by an external object,  $y$
- or,
- $s$  bears  $R$  to a sense-datum,  $x$ , and  $x$  matches an external object  $y$
- (or some combination of causation and matching)

<sup>58</sup> Schematically, one would write this as  $R(s, p, y)$ .

<sup>59</sup> Cornman (1975) Chapter 1 formulates matters like this.

<sup>60</sup> Or experiences are not relations to objects, in which case as external objects are objects, the experience is trivially indirect. Note an adverbial theory on which an experience is the exemplification of a monadic property, which accounts for the "phenomenal" element, and a relation to an external object would count as direct. However, as with sense-data, the arguments for the adverbial theory are not compelling, and this would not get around the problems raised in this section.

A mental act  $M$  of  $s$  involving an object  $y$  is direct with respect to  $y$  if " $s$  is in  $M$ " can be analysed in terms of a simple relation, irreducible into logically more simple relations in which  $s$  and  $y$  are both terms. For example, " $s$  desires that glass of wine on the table" can be analysed as a direct relation between  $s$  and the glass of wine.  $s$  does not bear a relation to some intermediary in order to desire the glass of wine. That  $s$  and  $y$  are both terms in a simple relation means that this relation takes these as terms and not, as on the sense-data theory, relations in which these are terms. On the sense-data theory,  $s$  perceives  $y$  if the experience, i.e.  $s$  sensing  $x$ , is related by  $D$  to  $y$ .

I reject the sense-data and adverbial theories, but not just on the basis that they are indirect. For one could argue that to sense a sense-datum *is* to perceive the object and that sensing a sense-datum which belongs (to use Price's terminology) to an object can be interpreted as a three-place simple relation and so therefore is not indirect. The proponent of this view is quite entitled to this position, but that there are sense-data would need to be established independently of this, and I do not think that this need be accepted.

However, there is another problem with this view, and that is that it is rather unclear how consciousness of a sense-datum could be said allow us to be conscious of the object to which it belongs. If I look at a signpost in a language I do not understand, I am conscious of the words on the sign. But I am not conscious of their meaning, of the states of affairs, commands, etc., which are signified. I am in a sense indirectly related to these meanings as I am conscious of words and sentences that are related to these meanings, but I am not *consciously* related to these meanings. The relation to an external object via the sensing of a sense-datum is at least somewhat analogous to this, for the sense-datum would give *us* no information about the object to which it belongs in the same manner as the foreign writing on the sign. It looks to me as though this similarity better fits the indirect view than it does the triadic direct version, for on the triadic direct version ought it not to be that sensing the sense-datum does give us information about the object to which it belongs?<sup>61</sup> This matter comes up again in §7 where I discuss the theory of appearing.

On the representational theory that I will defend, to represent that  $p$  is to represent the object that  $p$  determines. It is much more clear on this theory than on the sense-data theory how, say, judging of the piano that it will be delivered tomorrow is to be conscious of the piano. The proponent of sense-data, of course, would hold that sensing the sense-datum that belongs to the

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<sup>61</sup> It is not really plausible, in my opinion, to hold that the sense-datum could provide us with information about, or bring before the mind, the object to which it belongs because it, say, resembles it as on the antiquated mimetic theory of representation. And given that the sense-datum exists in some peculiar space or in the brain it is exceedingly unlikely that it would resemble in any way the object to which it belongs. And even if it did, its resembling, like its belonging, is not, so to speak, stamped on the sense-datum in a way in which it makes manifest the object to which it belongs in any way within the experience.

piano is a non-conceptual way of being conscious of the piano and no less indirect. However, it is much less clear that sensing a sense-datum can really be a way of being conscious of the object to which it belongs as it is hard to see how any information about the object to which it belongs could be gleaned from sensing the sense-datum. It is more difficult to see how sensing the sense-datum brings the object before the mind.

And in judging of the piano that it will be delivered tomorrow, the proposition does not even look like it interposes itself between my mind and the piano: in thinking this, I am thinking of the piano. But the sense-datum seems not to be like this. The sense-datum seems ill-suited to the role it would be being asked to play on a direct theory.

There is another interpretation of directness which concerns an object as opposed to its surfaces. Moore (1965a) raises the question of whether we are only directly aware of the surfaces of objects. Armstrong (1968) and Jackson (1977) discuss the direct-indirect distinction in similar terms. Armstrong says that 'it is clear that it is not the apple as a whole which acts upon the eyes to produce perceptions. If, for example, the back half of the apple had been cut away, this would have have no effect upon the resultant perception'.<sup>62</sup> Jackson elucidates this with the 'in virtue of location: 'I see an opaque physical object in virtue of seeing a part of it'.<sup>63</sup>

It is intuitive that *in some sense* of "the strictest sense" we see the surface of the apple. This is the only part of the whole apple to which, as Jackson argues, we bear a conscious relation with a specific counterfactual profile. Nevertheless, to accept this is to accept a direct realism in another important other sense: what we are directly conscious of is a *part* of an external object. This is different from the standard sense-data case, where the sense-datum is a wholly distinct entity from the perceived object.<sup>64</sup>

When the light reflects off the apple, it is correct that in some modal, causal sense it actually reflects off the surface of the apple; but it seems also to be true that it reflects off the whole apple because the surface is a surface of the apple. After all, as a comparison, when I touch the keyboard, we do not want to say only that my fingertip touches the keyboard. This is because of the type of relation that touching is. *I* touch the keyboard using my finger which is a part of me. My finger is touching the keyboard in that it is directly adjacent to it. This is not the relation of touching that is meant when I say that *I* touch it. There is a distinction here between the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of perception. With regard to this distinction, consider Snowdon's definition of direct perception.<sup>65</sup>

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62 Armstrong (1968) p. 87

63 Jackson (1977) p. 19

64 Unless some version of the multiple-location theory is adopted, but this is not really a sense-datum theory in the strict sense.

65 As in Snowdon's discussion, the epistemological understanding of "direct" often pertains to whether or not a

$x$  [directly] perceives  $y$  iff  $x$  stands, in virtue of  $x$ 's perceptual experience, in such a relation to  $y$  that, if  $x$  could make true demonstrative judgements, then it would be possible for  $x$  to make the *true* demonstrative judgement 'That is  $y$ '.<sup>66</sup>

That we can make demonstrative reference, where this is understood in intuitive contrast for the moment to thought about an object under a *de dicto*, non-referential, description, to external objects is denied by Moore, as well as Russell.<sup>67</sup> I am defending the position in later chapters that experiences are the applications of perceptual demonstratives. So, to say that  $s$  perceives  $y$  is to say that  $s$  applies a demonstrative to  $y$ . But there is still the distinction between the demonstrative link to the object in the metaphysical sense, i.e. which object is the relatum, and the epistemological sense of how it is before the mind. The object is directly perceived, but epistemologically this does not entail that the rear of the apple is perceived in the same way as is the front.

But this distinction, between different parts of the apple being before the mind in different ways, one explicitly in content of the experience and the other not, however it is cashed out, does not render the perception of the whole indirect in any troublesome way. For these are two different relations. If I touch one brick of the house, I am touching the house, even though I am not touching the whole of the house: touching in this sense is transitive over the part-whole relation. In contrast, if I build one wall of the house, I did not build the house, but only a part of the house: building has no sense which is not transitive over the part-whole relation. The metaphysical relation of perception is like the former, and the epistemological relation like the latter.<sup>68</sup>

## 7 The Theory of Appearing

I turn now to the last of the classical triumvirate of early to mid twentieth-century perceptual theories, the theory of appearing.<sup>69</sup> Alston, in defending the theory of appearing, makes a

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proposition is inferred or not. See, e.g., the discussions in Fumerton (1985) and Heumer (2001). On my theory the experience is a judgement and so not inferred.

66 Snowdon (1992) p. 56

67 See Moore (1965a). Bermudez (2000) distinguishes between the 'immediate' perception of objects, which is an epistemological notion, and 'direct' perception, which is a metaphysical notion. The object of immediate perception is the surface, and direct perception the whole.

68 The representational theory of perception can render the epistemological/metaphysical distinction neatly. The facing surface of the apple is represented under a content as being located at certain positions, coloured, textured, and so on. The rear surface of the apple is not *explicitly* represented in this way in the content. If  $s$  sees of  $y$  that  $p$ ,  $s$  need not see of  $y$  that  $q$  even though  $p$  and  $q$  are both true of  $y$ . I do not enquire into the independent matter of how to draw this distinction in detail with respect to, e.g., facing and rear surfaces.

69 See, e.g., Barnes (1965) and Paul (1965).

distinction between an 'internal' and an 'external' theory of perception in terms of how the object of perception is specified within the analysis of perception. On the internal theory, it is specified within the clause which deals with the conscious relation, and on the external theory in another clause. This is closely related to the matter of directness. The sense-data theory, and the adverbial theory are external theories. The theory of appearing is an internal theory. Consider his following discussion of the external theory and the requirement for “extra conditions” over and above the specification of the “sensory”, for which we can read “conscious”, element of perception.

"Obviously", one might say, "it is not enough for my genuinely experiencing the tree that I merely have certain kind of experience". How could that be sufficient? Obviously, it could be sufficient only if a perceptual relation to the tree is built into the nature of the sensory relation itself. And the apparent obviousness of the need for extra conditions is just the apparent obviousness of the supposition that sensory experience cannot be so characterized, that it is "all in the head" or mind, something purely subjective and confined to the perceiving subject. Opposed to this intuition is the view that sensory experience is essentially a relational affair, a matter of something "appearing" or being "presented" or "given" to the subject as such-and such ... Where the something in question is an external physical object, e.g., this tree, then this relational state of affairs that is constitutive of the sensory experience ensures that the subject perceives this tree.<sup>70</sup>

This is the picture that the direct realist has of perception: veridical perception is a matter of a conscious direct relation to an external object. This relation, as it has the external object as one of its terms and the subject as the other, allows for an analysis in terms of a direct relation between the subject and the object, as I described above. Alston argues against external theories, i.e. theories that specify the object of perception via a relation to the conscious experience, by arguing that the necessary and sufficient conditions given by such analyses, exemplified best by the well-known causal analyses, fail to capture the nature of our concept of perception due to the possibility of cases of what we would count as perception that do not meet these necessary and sufficient conditions. This is underwritten by a general argument, however, namely the fact that our concept of perception necessitates that any analysis directly relate the subject to the object perceived in a particular way. Recall my discussion in §6 of the direct/indirect distinction and in §5 of the notion of a "conscious" or "mental" relation. Alston's following point can be extended to a matching relation.

No matter how *x causally* contributes to the production of an experience, I do not see, or otherwise perceive, *x* in having that experience unless *x* presents itself to my experience as an object. How

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70 Alston (1990) p. 74



could the fact that *x* plays a role in *bringing about* that experience make it true that I *see* *x*? The experience itself is, by hypothesis, either an awareness of some sense-datum distinct from *x*, or it is simply a way of being conscious. *x* is not presented or given to my awareness in the experience. That being the case, no causal relation of *x* to the experience could make it true that I *see* *x* or, indeed, that I am *aware* of *x* in any way at all. Causality is no substitute for awareness; there is no magic by which an item becomes an object of awareness just by virtue of standing in a causal relation to the experience.<sup>71</sup>

The proponent of an external theory will argue that, for example, sensing a sense-datum or exemplifying an adverbial modification is which stands in a particular relation to the external object *is* what it is to have the object presented to the subject, or for the subject to be conscious of it, and that this is not "magic". Nevertheless, I think that Alston raises a very subtle point.

If I look in a mirror, the object seen is the reflection, and not the object reflected, any more than I see a thumb which made a print in wax when I see the wax.<sup>72</sup> In having to look in the mirror at the reflection to come by knowledge of the reflected object, my relation to the reflected object is certainly indirect as it is mediated by a direct relation to the reflection: I need be conscious of no other object than the reflection in order to see the reflection, but not so for the reflected object. The relation that the reflection has to the reflected object is analogous to a causal relation between a sense-datum and the object to which it belongs. It is really a rather remote relation that I bear to the reflected object in seeing the reflection. What I am seeing is a distinct object, namely the reflection (or state of an object, namely the mirror), caused by another distinct object. It seems inaccurate to say that I am *conscious* of the reflected object in virtue merely of seeing the reflection.

Consider the classical indirect sense-data theory. It is clear that the subject is conscious of the sense-datum, and a criterion for this can be given, namely that the subject can acquire concepts of the sense-datum and its properties, or acquire knowledge of the sense-datum without inference. The object which belongs to the sense-datum, however, is much more problematically an object of conscious awareness. In what way is the subject really conscious of it at all? Generally speaking, I am not conscious of some *y* which caused an *x*, or some *y* which matches an *x*, simply in virtue of looking at the *x*. Alston seems to me to be quite correct in this point. How could something be brought before the mind via a matching or causal relation to an object which I am experiencing?<sup>73</sup>

Alston's preferred theory is the theory of appearing on which the appearing (perceiving)

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71 Alston (1990) p. 95

72 Sometimes people deny this and hold that we do see the objects of reflection when we see the reflection in precisely the way in which we do not see a thumb which made a print in wax when we see the wax. But why, for example, should the increased detail in the reflection or continued causal link, even a causal link of a particular kind, which sustains the ongoing reflection and not the thumbprint, allow for this?

73 Foster (2000) pp. 32-33 also makes a similar point.

relation is fundamental. For  $s$  to perceive  $y$  is for  $y$  to appear some way to  $s$ .<sup>74</sup> Mentioning now the properties in experience, recall that the sense-data theory analyses (1) as (6).

- (1)  $y$  looks  $F$  to  $s$ .
- (6)  $s$  senses an  $x$  which is  $F$ .  
 $s$  sensing the  $x$  which is  $F$  stands in some relation  $D$  to  $y$ .

In opposition to this, the theory of appearing analyses (1) as (7).

- (7)  $y$  stands in the *appearing- $F$*  relation to  $s$ .

The *appearing- $F$*  relation is a direct relation between the subject and the object. However, the nature of the relation is mysterious. Alston says of it that it is a non-conceptual primitive relation which directly relates the subject to the world. Alston and Langsam argue that there is a fundamental relation of appearing- $F$  that holds between subjects and objects. Just as the sensing relation on the sense-data theory is inherently "phenomenal", so is the appearing- $F$  relation, the appearing- $G$  relation, only differently so, and so on. In arguing that the relation is fundamental, and not analysable into further (specifically conceptual) terms, Alston makes the following argument.

With my eyes shut I think about the scene before me. I remember the trees in my yard. I wonder whether there are squirrels and robins out there at the moment. I hypothesize that my neighbour across the street is working in his garden. That is, I form various propositional attitudes concerning what is or what might be in front of me. Then I open my eyes and take a look. My cognitive condition is radically transformed. Whereas before I was just thinking about, wondering about, remembering the trees, squirrels and the houses, and so on, these items are now *directly presented* to my awareness. They are *present* to me, whereas before I was merely dealing with propositions *about* them ... The difference cannot lie in the conceptual aspect of perceptual experience; there was plenty of that before I opened my eyes.<sup>75</sup>

This argument only goes through if it is granted that propositional attitudes cannot account for the difference in what is before the mind, or more accurately the *way* in which those things are before the mind, between perceptual experience and other thought. I, of course, will argue against this in subsequent chapters.

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<sup>74</sup> See Alston (1999) and (2005), and Langsam (1997) for recent defences.

<sup>75</sup> Alston (1999) p. 186

But there is also a specific argument against the theory of appearing, despite the points of agreement I have with Alston. Robinson and Jackson pose a dilemma for the theory of appearing.<sup>76</sup> Either the relation is an unanalysable two-place relation as in the analysis of "*s* perceives *y* as *F*" and "*s* perceives something *G*" in (8), or it is a three-place relation as in (9).

- (8) *s* stands in the appearing-*F* relation to *y*.  
*s* stands in the appearing-*G* relation to *y*.
- (9) *s*, the property *F*, and *y* stand in the appearing relation.  
*s*, the property *G*, and *y* stand in the appearing relation.

If the two-place analysis is offered, then the relation appearing-*F* is fundamental in that it cannot be analysed into components common to other relations. Thus, the appearing-*F* and appearing-*G* in (8) are wholly distinct. Likewise, appearing-*F* has no element in common with thinking of *y* as an *F*. But if the three-place analysis is offered, the analysis is, as Robinson puts it, 'too generic' and something that no one will disagree with. What is required is an analysis of *y*, *F*, and *s* standing in the appearing relation, not a statement that they do stand in that relation.

The sense-data analysis is that *s* senses an *F*, where sensing is, as Robinson calls it, a 'sensible' mode of consciousness, by which he means a non-propositional sensational or qualitative mode of consciousness. If the theory of appearing offers a *sensible* mode of relational consciousness of *F* in an experience of *y* where *y* is not *F*, Robinson argues that the theory looks like it collapses into a version of the sense-datum theory or some other more fundamental theory. What does it mean to say that *y* sensibly appears *F* but is itself not *F*? What does it mean that a *y* which is *F* may appear *F*, *G*, *H* etc., to *s*? Is the property involved exemplified or not? If so, it looks like a version of the sense-data theory, and if not, a version of something like Lewis' (1929) qualia theory. The theory seems to say only that there is a reducible relation, i.e. a relation which can be analysed into more fundamental relations, but this is merely a precursor to giving a theory.

Thus, the theory faces a dilemma: either admit that *y* appearing-*F* to *s* has no part in common with *y* being believed to be *F* by *s*, or admit that the relation is a three-place relation. However, to admit this is then not really to say anything at all, for everyone will agree that for *s* to see *y* as *F* is for *y* to appear *F* to *s*. If *y* can appear *F* but not be *F*, what does this mean? It looks as though the theory is a statement of a problem, rather than a solution to it. Furthermore, I think that it does submit to analysis, and that the notion of the phenomenal nature of experience invoked can

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<sup>76</sup> See Robinson (1994) Chapter II Section 2 and Jackson (1977) Chapter 4.

be rejected, as I argue in subsequent chapters.

## 8 *Representationalism*

Drawing on the above difficulties with the sense-data theory, the theory of appearing and the adverbial theory, let me introduce the representational theory. The sense-data theory is unmotivated, I think, and the appearing and adverbial theories inherit the problems that the sense-data theory has with its indirect nature as well as their own difficulties.

On the representational theory, experiences are, as I have been tacitly arguing, propositional. They are representational in that they represent objects, properties, states of affairs, facts, whatever one's ontology is comprised of, to the subject.

They are the takings in of things, rather than the facing of a mute sense-datum, adverbial modification or featuring in an appearing-relation. This is the understanding inherent in Jackson's epistemic use of "looks": in saying that it looks to me that the cup is on the table, I am saying just this; it looks to me *that* the cup is on the table, not that "I am sensing a sense-datum". This is unfair to a degree as we shall see, for the sense-datum may only accompany the representational aspect of experience. However, I will argue that just as sense-data are unmotivated by the arguments above, so sense-data or sense-data like accompaniments to representational experiences are also unmotivated.

In experience, it seems to me that I am undergoing a mental act which is like judgement. It is propositional, and it has force. This is the theory that I am defending here by first arguing against sense-data, and then against the phenomenal notion as it pertains to the discussion of the representational theory. Finally, I argue against non-conceptual content, and for the thesis that the attitude in experience is judgement. However, does experience being a relation to a proposition not fall foul of any of the objections to the sense-data theory that I have advanced? Particularly, as a proponent of the "direct" or "naive" realist theory might argue, does it not fall foul of the criterion of directness? Consider Johnston's argument, for example, that the 'Fact-Directed View', as he calls it, does not 'earn the right to the metaphor of the sense taking in concrete reality'. He continues as follows.

According to the View, the relation between what we sense and what we sometimes go on to judge is particularly intimate. It is identity ... The objects of judgement are bearers of truth values, and when their subject matter is contingent those bearers can either be true or false. Since the truth about

the scene is mostly contingent, most perceptual judgements are directed at truth-value bearers that might have been false. *But concrete reality does not consist of items that could have been false.* Concrete reality consists of items whose existence accounts for the truth of what is true and the falsity of what is contingently false.<sup>77</sup>

But it need not be on the representational theory that the *objects* of perception, as opposed to the contents, are not concrete things.<sup>78</sup> Concrete things (or obtaining states of affairs) are the objects of some true contingent propositions, namely those propositions which could be the contents of veridical perception.

In defence of this, consider Evans' interpretation of Frege. On this interpretation, to grasp the sense, which is a specific way in which a mental act having a content is analysed and which generalises to all types of mental representation, does not *indirectly* relate the subject to the object of the content, and nor is it that the contents grasped become the object of the act.

Frege's idea was that to understand an expression, one must not merely think of the reference that is the reference, but that one must, in so thinking think of the reference *in a particular way*. The way in which one must think of the reference is that expression's *sense*. No substantial, or positive theory of the way of thinking of something is presupposed by this conception of sense.<sup>79</sup>

This point applies to all accounts of representation, conceptual or non-conceptual. Evans continues.

we can appreciate how wrong-headed it is to consider a Fregean sense as necessarily *intermediary* between thinker and referent, as something which must, from a certain point of view, *get in the way*, or anyway render indirect what might be direct. A way of thinking of an object is no more obliged to get in the way of thinking of an object, or to render thinking of an object indirect, than is a way of dancing liable to get in the way of dancing, or to render dancing somehow indirect.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, if experiences are representational, then on this understanding, which seems to me to be the correct one, they are three-place relations, as on the theory of appearing. Only the relation is analysable: it is the representation relation holding between the subject, the content, and the object determined by the content: to experience that *p* is to experience the *y* picked out by *p*.<sup>81</sup> My

<sup>77</sup> Johnston (2006) p. 270

<sup>78</sup> See the end of chapter 2 §2 for more on this.

<sup>79</sup> Evans (1981) p. 282. See also Evans (1982) Chapter 2.

<sup>80</sup> Evans (1981) p. 288

<sup>81</sup> Let me here note two related features of the theory that experiences are judgements and that they are three-place relations that I do not enquire into here. The first concerns whether or not the theory is a disjunctive theory or could turn out to be one. See, e.g., Martin (2004) and (2006) for metaphysical disjunctivism. On this disjunctive theory,

argument here is that this can be taken to be judgement.

## 9 Conclusion

Before summarising my conclusions from chapter 1, let me briefly consider some further objections that some might raise. The first is that in defending a direct realist judgement theory, I am committing to a realist theory of colours, and not to an anti-realist or secondary-quality theory of colours. I grant that this is a difficulty, but all theories come with their difficulties, and this is a widely faced problem.<sup>82</sup> There is also the problem that one might raise of the "time-lag" argument. This argument is that the experience  $M$  takes place at a time  $t$  later than the state of the object  $y$  perceived via  $M$  and so  $M$  at time  $t$  cannot be of  $y$  at a time previous to  $t$ . This enforces on me the position that the subject at  $t$  in  $M$  is directly related to a past state of  $y$ . The subject "sees into the past" in this sense. A final objection that one might raise, in the spirit of Russell and Hume, is that this theory invokes the notion of the subject and that this ought to be analysed away. I think that this is incorrect, and that there is a *bona fide* notion of the subject. However, I hope that I can help myself to this without argument as it would exceed the scope of this thesis. If it turned out that some thick notion of the subject, some Cartesian notion, ought to be analysed away, I think that using  $s$  in the analysans of " $s$  perceives  $y$ " is still harmless.

Let me now draw some conclusions and commitments from the theories that I have discussed. The first conclusion is that there are no compelling arguments for sense-data. Likewise, the unstructured monadic properties invoked on the adverbial theory are also not compelling. The theory of appearing is, to agree with Robinson, too generic (and the other horn of the dilemma leads to similar difficulties as with the adverbial theory).

I do agree, however, with Alston's distinction between an internal and an external theory as

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veridical perceptions are relations to external objects and non-veridical perceptions not, although there is debate as to which side to put illusions, and hence they are different types of mental act: they have no non-trivial common factor. The disjunctive theory was in fact partly motivated by Evans (1982) and McDowell's (1984) theory of judgement, however I lack the space to enquire into this with respect to my theory. Recent representationalist discussions, e.g., Tye (2007) and (2009b), and Schellenberg (2010), have linked the idea of representationalism and relationalism in the sense of there being a different type of experience when there is an object to which the experience is a relation and when there is not. However, again, I do not enquire into this matter. In respect of dealing with veridicality, the judgement-theory is at a significant advantage with respect to hallucinations as these are judgements which fail to pick out an object of judgement. Hence, the experiential problem becomes a sub-problem of the usually more tractable problem of false judgements or beliefs which fail to pick out any object. However, I do not press this, for this is a standard feature of the representational theory. See, e.g., Lycan (1996), Dretske (2003), and Harman (1997).

<sup>82</sup> There are various realist theories of colour. For example, Hacker (1987) defends simple, primitivist, intrinsic, theories of colour, and Byrne and Hilbert (2003) that colours are spectral reflectanceies. There are other options, but I do not pursue this here.

regards the specification of the object of perception with regards to the analysis of the experience and his arguments for an internal theory. This ties in neatly with my discussion of the direct/indirect distinction.<sup>83</sup> It seems that the object of experience is the object of consciousness because the relation that we bear to it is very clearly a conscious relation, and that this is not true of the relations that, on the sense-data and adverbial theories, we are supposed to bear to the objects which cause these experiences (and maybe match them). There does seem to be a difficulty here. Hence, I would prefer to defend an internal theory in this sense. This ties in neatly with my definition of "direct", as a theory on which the subject and object are terms in a simple relation that does not take as a term a relation featuring either the subject or the object.

The form of the analysis that I am defending is similar to the theory of appearing in that perceptual experience is analysed in terms of a three-place relation. Only, instead of a primitive appearing relation, I am arguing that the relation is that of judgement and that it is three-place because the judgements are *de re*. The way that the object looks, in the subjective sense, is, as with Jackson's epistemic understanding of "looks", the propositional content of the judgement.

This theory, then, is not *necessarily* a causal theory of perception. The causal theory of perception specifies as a condition that if *s* sees *y*, then *y* has caused at least some element of this. On the canonical sense-data theory, *y* has caused the sensing of the sense-datum, and this model is repeated for other such Alstonian external analyses of experience.<sup>84</sup> However, one could also hold that *y* caused a *perception* of *y* if one thought that there was a reason for this. The rejection of this comes naturally with a rejection of the sense-data and adverbial theories, as the causal condition (plus, perhaps, a matching condition) is necessary on this theory to specify the object perceived as the experience itself does not specify this, and it is necessary to tie the experience to an external object in a more robust fashion than mere matching (these are Alstonian external theories).<sup>85</sup>

In rejecting sense-data as objects which exemplify properties in phenomenal experience, I am in agreement with the adverbial theory. However, I disagree with the unstructured monadic properties invoked on the adverbial theory. Nevertheless, the theory that I am defending, the judgement-theory, shares the feature with the adverbial theory that there are no sense-data, no *essentially experiential objects* which exemplify the properties they are presented as having in an experiential phenomenal relation. On this theory, there are only *intentional objects*, which may or may not exemplify the properties that they are represented as having, and there are no monadic phenomenal properties either. Indeed, on the theory that I am defending, experiences are a class of

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83 And assumes, given my argument is that experiences are judgements, that the contents of thought are external.

84 The causal theory is that defended in, e.g., Grice (1961) and Pears (1976).

85 I do not make much of this, I just note it as a consequence. Snowdon (1980/1981) rejects of the causal condition on perception as a conceptual truth. Hyman (1992) also rejects it. I make heavy use of experiences being caused in chapter 6, however I am wary of committing to this as a constitutive claim.

judgements and hence do not have any phenomenal qualities to their psychology.



## Chapter 2 Transparency and Representationalism

### 1 Introduction

In chapter 1, I concluded that the case made for sense-data, the adverbial theory, and the theory of appearing were not compelling. The theory that I am defending is an extension of the representational theory which, unlike the sense-data theory, although not as defended by all of its proponents, and the adverbial and appearing theories, takes experience to have a representational content. The representational content of a judgement, in combination with the attitude, exhausts the psychology of judging: there are no sensing relations, or sensory adverbial properties exemplified in judging. No such phenomenal elements as these. However, my task is to argue against *all* such phenomenal elements.

My tactic is first to secure the *reductive* representational theory, and then to argue that once this is accepted, there is no element of the psychology of experience for which an analysis in terms of judgement will not suffice. There may be independent arguments against the judgement-theory, based either on perception conceptualism or on difficulties in analysing certain experiences as judgements, but these are not difficulties that arise because of the difference in the *phenomenal* nature of the psychology of experience, "what it is like", as opposed to thought.

As I am defending a single thesis about the mental, namely that experiences are a class of judgements individuated by their propositional content, there is a clear comparison case, and the meanings of terms such as "phenomenal character" and "qualia", which I introduce below, can be precisified in terms of this comparison.

In §2, I introduce the representational theory, and the other notions involved. In §3, I introduce Moore's transparency argument, which I agree with, and in §4 I compare this to the representational version of transparency, which makes clear exactly what the reductive representational theory is denying.

### 2 Representationalism and Qualia

Recall the ambiguity of the "look" of  $y$ . On one understanding, this is what I called the visual properties of  $y$ , those which  $s$  sees.<sup>1</sup> If  $y$  is a square, then one of the visual properties of  $y$  is its

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<sup>1</sup> These would be the actual visual properties, those seen. Of course, these come from a class of visual properties in another sense, the class of those which could be seen. The difference here is very close to the difference I pointed out with respect to two ways of understanding "visual field". In the general sense, this is the range of things that

squareness. Other visual properties include, uncontroversially, colour and orientation and position.<sup>2</sup> The other "look" of  $y$  is the psychology of the experience. The psychology of experience is the subjective element, how things are for the subject. The theories I discussed in chapter 1 analysed the psychology of experiencing, say, a red square (at least partly) in terms of either a sensing relation to an actual red square, or a phenomenal unstructured adverbial modification to the subject's mind, or in terms of a primitive unanalysable phenomenal relation. I will argue that not only can these theories be resisted, but the notion appealed to, that of a sensation or a phenomenal quality to experience but not to thought, can be analysed simply in terms of the propositional content of the experience.

On the theory being defended, (1) is analysed as (2) where  $y$  is an *intentional object* which may or may not be an external object. In all cases such as (1) I argue that an intentional object is the object of the experience, and (2) is the analysis of (1).

- (1)  $y$  looks  $F$  to  $s$ .
- (2)  $s$ , the content  $p$ , which features the property  $F$  in some way, and the object  $y$  stand in the perceiving relation.<sup>3</sup>

I am arguing here that the difference between perception and thought does not enforce on us an analysis of experience as a constitutively different type of mental act from judgement, one with a *phenomenal* element to the psychology which is, by contrastive definition, lacking in (mere) thought.<sup>4</sup> The phenomenal aspect of perception, that which is analysed in terms of the sensing of a sense-datum on the sense-data theory and the exemplification of an adverbial property on the adverbial theory, is the "phenomenal character" of experience. This is defined in terms of "what it is like" for the subject to undergo the experience.

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could be seen, the range of things over which the eye can be cast, as opposed to an actual visual field which is comprised of things seen.

<sup>2</sup> The contents of experiences is not an area into which I enquire here. See Siegel (2006) for discussion of this.

<sup>3</sup> I have used "perceiving relation" here, which implies that (1) is a veridical look. Some slight rephrasing will be in order to make (2) general to cover illusory and hallucinatory cases of (1). (2) could be put in terms of the "experiencing relation", where veridicality is settled by how many of the visual properties are *exemplified* by the intentional object. Recall my discussion at the beginning of chapter 1 §4. A veridical case will be where all of the visual properties are exemplified by  $y$ , an illusory case will be where only some are exemplified, and a hallucinatory case will be where none are exemplified. This renders the intentional object in the illusory case a complex of (represented) exemplified and *merely* represented properties. I lack the space to go into the details of this, but let me give a brief example. Consider the case where I see, say, a cat as a dog (and allow these kind properties to be admissible as visual properties). I see all of the shape and colour properties accurately, let us say, but I misrepresent the property of being a dog with respect to *this* cat, the one whose shape properties I am veridically seeing. Here it looks like the object of experience not only has the properties which are exemplified, but it also has, in the *merely representational sense*, the property of being a cat.

<sup>4</sup> I am arguing that experiences are thoughts, or judgements, of a certain type individuated by their content but I will omit this qualification ('mere') as context makes it clear what I mean.

Phenomenal Character:       The quality that perceptual experiences possess which accounts for their phenomenal "something that it is like" nature.

On the theories discussed in chapter 1, I focused on this element of experience as analysed on the theories that I discussed. Experience, though, as indeed some proponents of the sense-data theory also held, also has a representational element. Here is Peacocke introducing the distinction between representational content and, as he calls them, "sensations". I am arguing against sensations in perceptual experience, and that perceptual experiences are a class of judgements, where the psychology of judging is exhausted by the propositional content and the attitude.

Historically, the distinction between putative perceptual experiences and sensations has been the distinction between those experiences which do in themselves represent the environment of the experiencer as being in a certain way, and those experiences which have no such representational content. A visual perceptual experience enjoyed by someone sitting at a desk may represent various writing implements and items of furniture as having particular spatial relations to one another and to the experiencer, and as themselves having various qualities, a sensation of smell, by contrast, may have no representational content of any sort, though of course the sensation will be of a distinctive kind. The representational content of a perceptual experience has to be given by a set of propositions, which specifies the way the experience represents the way the world to be.<sup>5</sup>

'Sensations' are elements of experiences which bestow a qualitative conscious character in that there is 'something that it is like' to undergo them, but that do not represent, intend, or bring before the mind, any objects, properties or states of affairs to which the the mental act in which they are psychologically manifest may be a relation to. They are purely "qualitative".

The strongest representational analysis of experience is one which meets Peacocke's Adequacy Thesis.<sup>6</sup> If the Adequacy Thesis is met, then there are no "sensational" elements to perceptual experience; and, indeed, no psychological elements which diverge from those present in judgement, assuming (as Peacocke did) that the propositions are conceptually articulated. This goes against many representational theories on which representing a content in perception is psychologically different from representing a content in judgement as (at least) the propositions are

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<sup>5</sup> Peacocke (1983) p. 5. See Siegel (2010) for a detailed discussion of the ways in which 'content' is defined with respect to experience. Pautz (2010) describes accuracy in terms of 'matching the world', which is roughly the same as Siegel's explanation, only that it does not presuppose a mind-to-world direction of fit, or that the contents are 'committal'. Chalmers (2004) talks of 'satisfaction conditions'. See Searle (1983) Chapter 2 for the introduction of these notions. That experiences are representational to a degree is very commonly accepted.

<sup>6</sup> With some argument over 'physical objects', but this can be set aside for the moment. See my discussion of Byrne (2001) below.

not conceptually articulated.

The Adequacy Thesis states that a complete intrinsic characterization of an experience can be given by embedding within an operator like “it visually appears to the subject *t* at ...” some complex condition concerning physical objects. One component of this condition might be that there is a black telephone in front of oneself and a bookshelf a certain distance and direction to one's left, above and behind which is a window. Such contents can equally be the contents of perceptual or hallucinatory experiences.<sup>7</sup>

This is closely related to Jackson's epistemic "looks": as with judgement, the psychology of an experience is exhausted by the propositional content and the attitude. The arguments in favour of sense-data rest on an assumption of the phenomenal principle, and in arguing against the phenomenal rendering of "looks" in interpreting "*y* looks *F* to *s*", I defended something close to the epistemic use of "looks" as the correct one. Sense-data and adverbial modifications are but one type of phenomenal element, however.

The basic representationalist thesis (of those which accept that there is some representational content) is only that the psychology of experience *supervenes* on the representational content. This is, as Byrne notes, a weak thesis.

the sensational component of a perceptual experience cannot vary independently of its intentional [representational] component: the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the experience's propositional content – that is, by what it represents.

[representationalism] does not take a stand on whether phenomenal character can be *explained in terms of, or reduced to*, intentionality [representation] – at least it doesn't if these claims don't follow from the mere fact of supervenience. And intentionalism is silent on physicalism, functionalism, psychosemantics, and other topics relevant to "naturalizing the mind".<sup>8</sup>

On an anti-representational theory, a 'phenomenist' theory in Block's terms, there are elements of the psychology of the experience which do not supervene on the representational content of the experience.

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<sup>7</sup> Peacocke (1983) p. 8. I argue later for the conceptualist claim about propositional content. As is common, I use 'representational content' and 'propositional content' interchangeably.

<sup>8</sup> Byrne (2001) p. 199; p. 204. I also use 'intentional' and 'representational' interchangeably, as is common in the literature.

Phenomenism:	The psychology of perception does not wholly supervene (if at all: "strong" phenomenism as opposed to a "weak" representationalism/phenomenism) on the representational content.
Representationalism:	The psychology of perception supervenes on the representational content.

And within representationalism, there is the contrast between reductive and non-reductive representationalism.<sup>9</sup>

Reductive rep.:	The psychology of experience reduces to the representational content, or can be wholly identified with it.
Non-reductive rep.:	The psychology of experience does not reduce to the representational content, but it does supervene upon it.

Phenomenist and non-reductive representationalist theories hold that not only is there a genuine *phenomenal* character to perception, but that it either does not even supervene on the content, or that it merely supervenes. Reductive representationalism holds that it not only supervenes on the content but is identical to it. However, even reductive representationalism in this sense is not (necessarily) as strong as the theory that I am arguing for. I am arguing that perceptions are a class of judgements individuated by their content (and some further features which will become relevant in the final two chapters). Hence, I am denying that there is any constitutive phenomenal difference between perception and thought which cannot be analysed in these terms.

On many even reductive theories, as I discuss below, the psychology of perception is identical to the content but these contents (and the attitude of perception as opposed to judgement) are not identical to the contents in thought. Hence there is still an individuating phenomenal aspect of perception. This *phenomenal character* is unique to perceptual experience and individuates it as a different mode of consciousness from non-perceptual thought.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See Chalmers (2004) Section 4.

<sup>10</sup> Theories which clearly analyse out the notion of phenomenal character in this sense include those in Dennett (1991) and (1997), Armstrong (1968), and Pitcher (1971); less clearly Dretske (1995) may take himself to be analysing this notion out. That Dretske analyses out the phenomenal is less clear-cut than in the other cases. Tye (1995) and (2000) also comes close, but as with Dretske, it is not *exactly* clear that this is so. Similarly to Dretske, Tye analyses "phenomenal character" as a *type* of representational content, and thus states with qualia (see below) as states with this content. Looking at things this way, only a judgement-theory of experiences or a "no-experiences" theory, which Armstrong (1968) and Pitcher (1971) arguably are, would count as theories on which there is a full elimination of qualia. Dennett (1991) and (1997) is something of a quasi-behaviourist, and so this is also a clear

There is a further option, namely "inverse representationalism", whereby the propositional content of experience supervenes on this phenomenal character.

Inverse rep.:           The psychology of experience supervenes on the phenomenal character.

Reductive representationalism is the thesis that the psychology *is* the propositional content (of a certain kind),<sup>11</sup> and so entails inverse and non-reductive representationalism. The inverse representational analysis is that experiences have propositional content *because* they have phenomenal character and the former supervenes on the latter.

Reductive representationalism identifies the psychology with the propositional content. Non-reductive representationalism holds only to the supervenience of phenomenal character on content.

Qualia are qualitative elements of the psychology of experience which cannot be analysed out in terms of (identified with, or analytically eliminated) representational content in the strong sense in which I am arguing for; i.e. they are features of perceptual experiences but not of judgements.<sup>12</sup>

Phenomenist Qualia:       Non-representational properties in terms of which experience is (at least) partially analysed and which are not identical with the representational content, and which account for the phenomenal character of experience.

Phenomenist Qualia are introduced in contrast to "representational properties" in experience. A representational property of experience *M* of *s* is defined here as *s* undergoing *M* being analysed as *s* bearing a relation of representation to a propositional content *p*.

Representational property:   The property of an experience in virtue of which something is represented, and which accounts for elements of the psychology of experiences; e.g., the representational property that judgements have of being relations to propositions.

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case of analysing out qualia in the strongest; Pitcher is an avowed behaviourist, about beliefs at any rate, and so this is a stronger theory also than mine. Whether judgements, and hence experiences, are to be analysed further in such a way exceeds the scope of this thesis.

<sup>11</sup> Plus attitude. I will sometimes omit this, but it is implied.

<sup>12</sup> Some philosophers do hold that there are qualia in thought. I reject this position which was, until very recently, the almost unquestioned standard view. See chapter 4.

Hence, we can define *non-phenomenist qualia* of two strengths. Firstly, we have supervening but non-reductive qualia, which supervene on the content but are not reducible to it. Secondly there are *reductive* qualia, which do reduce to the content but which are not features of judgements. On this view, I think that these types of qualia are, essentially, *non-conceptual contents*.

What is, according to the way that matters are being set up, *not* a quale is a *purely functional* difference between experience and judgement. I can desire that *p* and judge that *p*, and the difference between these two mental acts is a functional difference between attitudes. This is psychologically manifest, certainly, but one would not say that this difference is a difference in *qualia* between desiring and judging.

According to Block, qualia are monadic, logically private, metaphysically exhausted by the way in which they are present to the mind, and are non-representational. Qualia are 'phenomenal' properties, that are not 'intentional', 'functional', or 'purely cognitive'.<sup>13</sup> Dennett, a sceptic, defines qualia as 'ineffable', 'intrinsic', logically private', and 'directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness'.<sup>14</sup>

As the claims being made in this area are often difficult to tease apart, I will proceed by directly examining some statements of the central notions in the literature. Qualia are introduced in terms of the "feel" of perceptual experience. Here, for example, is Tye.

The explanation [of the introduction of qualia] typically proceeds along something like the following lines: there is something it is *like* to taste green Chartreuse, to hear a chainsaw, to smell a skunk, to see the clear blue sky. Each of these states has a distinctive subjective character or raw "feel" to it. These raw "feels" - qualia, as they are often called - resemble and differ from one another to varying degrees. The subjective "feel" of the experience of red, for example, is more like the subjective "feel" of the experience of orange than it is like the subjective "feel" of the experience of green. Subjective "feels" or qualia are what make the states possessing them phenomenally conscious.<sup>15</sup>

Lycan defines qualia as follows.

A quale in this sense is a qualitative or phenomenal property inhering in a sensory state: the color of an after-image, or that of a more ordinary patch in one's visual field; the pitch or volume or timbre of a subjectively heard sound; the smell of an odor; a particular taste; the perceived texture of an object encountered by touch. (The term "inhering in" in the preceding sentence is deliberately vague, and neutral on as many metaphysical issues as possible. In particular, qualia may be

<sup>13</sup> See Block (1996) p. 44.

<sup>14</sup> See Dennett (1997) p. 622.

<sup>15</sup> Tye (2006a) p. 139

properties *of* the experiences in which they inhere, or they may be related to those experiences in some other way).

A quale can be thought of as the distinctive phenomenal property of an apparent phenomenal individual. (An "apparent phenomenal individual" is anything of the sort that Bertrand Russell would have taken to be a "sense-datum," such as (again) a colored region of one's visual field, or a heard sound or an experienced smell.) But it is important to see that qualia in this sense do not presuppose the existence of sense-data or other exotica. Sensory fields are pervaded by qualia both in everyday veridical experience and in less usual cases. In our first-order sense of the term, the latter point is the merest common sense, and to deny it would be to take a very radical position.<sup>16</sup>

Chalmers refers to the 'phenomenal properties' of the experience or of the subject.

Consciousness involves the instantiation of *phenomenal properties*. These properties characterise aspects of what it is like to be a subject (what it is like to be me right now, or what it is like to be a bat), or what it is like to be in a mental state (what it is like to see a certain shade of green, or example, or what it is like to feel a certain sharp pain).<sup>17</sup>

Some representationalists, such as Dretske and Tye, occasionally put their view by saying that phenomenal properties are identical to certain *represented* external properties, such as physical redness. As I am putting things, that would be a category mistake: phenomenal properties are by definition properties of subjects or mental states, and physical redness is not (or need not be).<sup>18</sup>

But Dretske and Tye are not, I think, making a category mistake.<sup>19</sup> Rather, they analyse the phenomenal properties in terms of representational content. In experience, the *represented properties*, as Lycan puts it, 'inhere' in the experience in a way in which they do not in thought (by being represented non-conceptually and conceptually respectively, which still leaves us with the difference between perception and thought). The same properties can be represented in thought. The difference is one of *representation*. "Phenomenal properties" is ambiguous between the *representation* of a property in experience and that represented property itself.<sup>20</sup> The phenomenal property in the latter sense is a property of an object experienced and in the former sense is the property that the experience has of (non-conceptually and therefore "phenomenally") representing that property.

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<sup>16</sup> Lycan (2006) Section 1

<sup>17</sup> Chalmers (2004) p. 155

<sup>18</sup> Chalmers (2004) p. 157

<sup>19</sup> Chalmers here is referring to Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995) and (2000).

<sup>20</sup> Recall my discussion of the "look" of the dog.



This individuates experiences from thought, however this difference in representation is playing the same role as are the non-representational qualia properties to a certain degree. The representational properties, in the sense just described, in experience *differ* from the representational properties in thought for Lycan, Dretske and Tye. Hence, although in a sense these are reductive-representational theories, if judgement is the comparison-case, then they are not fully reductive in the sense that they account for the "what it is like" of experience, and do not analyse it out completely. It is this, very strong, position that I am arguing for. I am arguing, essentially, against the very notion of experiential "what it is like".

Here is Levine making this point about the qualitative property being a property of the object experienced.

On one way of understanding the intentionalist [representationalist] thesis, the qualitative character of R [the experience] is identical to R representing [for example] the redness of the fire engine. Thus it is a property of R all right, but not an intrinsic one, since representing what it represents is not an intrinsic property of a symbol. On another way of understanding the intentionalist thesis, however, the qualitative character of the experience just is the redness of the fire engine.<sup>21</sup>

Levine says that he is unsure if anyone actually holds the thesis that the qualitative character *is* the represented property. The qualitative character *of* an experience, though, cannot literally be the represented property. Rather, the qualitative character involves, as Lycan puts it, the property 'inhering' in the experience. There is thus an ambiguity in "qualitative character". Those, like Dretske, who defend in a fashion this second thesis do *in a sense* hold that the "qualitative character" is identified with the visual qualities, i.e. those qualities available to be seen. On this analysis, the experience is a representation of the visual properties. And this representation does not have the qualities of its representata. The *way* in which these properties are represented is not phenomenal in the sense that either the propositional content or the subject's bearing a relation to that content has any properties like the properties of the representata. Experiences are "phenomenal" because the objects are represented in such a way as to, as I will put it, "make manifest" the properties of the object of the experience.<sup>22</sup> However, it does not follow from this that experiences have any special property over and above this.

Consider again the sense-data theory. The (phenomenal) look of an external  $y$ , in the sense of the way that  $y$  looks to  $s$  in experience  $M$ , is analysed as  $s$  bearing  $R$  (on this theory, sensing) to  $x$ . The "look of  $y$ " in this sense is not the visual properties of  $x$ , but the sensing of  $x$ , for the properties of  $x$  must be sensed in order that there be any psychological effect on  $s$ : the psychology of  $M$  is

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<sup>21</sup> Levine (2003) p. 59

<sup>22</sup> See chapter 4.

analysed as "*s* senses *x*". This is a classic quale, albeit a relational quale. Adverbial modifications are monadic qualia with the same features. The look of *y* in the sense of its visual properties, i.e. the properties available to be seen, on the other hand, involve in a way which is convoluted to express the properties of *x* which are sensed and to which the sensed properties of *y* are related.

On the theory I am defending, *M* is *s* representing the visual properties of *y* in relation *R* to content *p* which picks it out or determines *y*, and is the *psychology* of *M*.

If I ask you about your experience, you would report that, e.g., "well, there is something red there"; you would not say "my experience is red", or "I am undergoing a red experience". This is so, *even* if it were to come from the mouth of a proponent of the the sense-data theory. The experience is not red, and neither is the sensing of the sense-datum red. The sense-datum is red. The qualities of the sense-datum which is sensed account for the psychology of the experience in that they are what is sensed when the object is seen. So, the correct formulation is "I am sensing a red thing". "I am undergoing a red experience", or something very much like this, is true only on the adverbial theory, or something very much like it. On a theory like this, sensations are, like a thumbprint in wax, literally monadic modifications to the "substance" of the subject's mind. Judgements are not like this, as they are not the exemplification of qualitative monadic properties, but relations to contents.

The judgement-theory of experiences is that experiences are judgements about the experienced object. Hence, that the visual properties of the object of experience 'inhere', as Lycan puts it, in experience but not in judgement therefore gives rise to an immediate objection to the judgement-theory.

When I think of a particular red square (as opposed to just some red square), I am, speaking very loosely, in a sense "aware" of this red square in that it is before my mind. However, in experience I am genuinely *aware* of it and its qualities in a different way, a particularly *phenomenal* way. The experience "has qualia". According to Lycan, a property is a quale, in a sense, when it inheres in an experience. Qualia, understood as mental properties, on this reading, are the inhering of properties in experience: the property of experiences of having properties presented in a certain way. Sometimes properties are qualia, sometimes not. Being a quale is rather like being an intentional object, except that if *F* is a quale in *M*, then *M* is an experience, but if *F* is not a quale in *N*, even though in *N* *s* thinks of *F*, then *N* is not an experience. On one type of this view, one shared by Dretske and Tye, for example, experiences are non-conceptual representations and for the subject to be in a state with this type of content is for the subject to have an experience with phenomenal character. Although the psychology of experience reductively supervenes on the content, e.g. a non-conceptual representation of a property *F*, experiences still have qualia in the sense that "there is something that it is like" in a phenomenal sense to undergo them.

The objection to the judgement theory is that these qualia, which are really representational contents of a certain type which certain states have, and the "phenomenal character" individuate experiences from thoughts. Langsam makes this argument as follows.

what it is like to have a perceptual experience is very different, is obviously different, from what it is like to have a thought. These differences extend to perceptual experiences and thoughts that have the same contents. For example, what it is like to have a visual experience of a red object is very different from what it is like to have a thought of a red object. Similarly, what it is like to have a visual experience of a red object is very different from what it is like to have a thought of a blue object. But such differences in phenomenal character cannot be accounted for in terms of the differing contents of the experience and its corresponding thought, for ... the experience and thought can have the same content and yet still differ in phenomenal character.<sup>23</sup>

It is not immediately obvious to me that this difference involves non-representational psychological properties or a different type of content in experience. Langsam, arguing the contrary, continues.

We are assuming that the only consciously accessible feature of a thought is its content. We are also assuming a picture of perceptual experience according to which the phenomenal character of an experience is determined solely by its consciously accessible features. Given these assumptions, it seems plausible to me that the only way to account for the difference in phenomenal character between an experience and a thought with the same content is to claim that what determines the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is not its content, but a feature of some other kind. In other words, perceptual experiences have *nonintentional* (intrinsic) features that are consciously accessible and that determine their phenomenal character: qualia. The phenomenal differences between experiences and thoughts with the same contents are naturally described in terms of the presence or absence of certain kinds of *appearances*. In brief, appearances are present in perceptual experiences, and are not present in thoughts. When I have a visual experience of red, something *looks* or *appears* red to me; at the very least, *it is as if* something looks red to me. But when I merely have a thought of a red object, nothing appears any way at all to me, and it is not even as if something appears red to me.<sup>24</sup>

Langsam uses 'phenomenal character' to cover a quality possessed both by perceptual experiences and non-perceptual thought, however the point is clear: there is a difference between experience and thought, namely the presence of the particular phenomenal quality of perceptual experience that is lacking in non-perceptual thought.

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<sup>23</sup> Langsam (2000) pp. 273-274

<sup>24</sup> Langsam (2000) p. 274

In the following famous passage, Nagel ascribes to mental states this quality which resists analysis into other terms. Experience is but one case.

fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to *be* that organism – something that it is like *for* the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analysable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.<sup>25</sup>

The purported failure of such analyses rests on the argument that physical-functional reductions must leave out this quality in the analysans.

Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defence of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness. Without some idea, therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of a physicalist theory.<sup>26</sup>

My interest is in whether there really is this phenomenal quality to the psychology of perceptual experience which resists analysis into representational, or intentional, terms, and if this can then further be extended into an analysis in terms of the notion of judgement. That is, I am not offering an analysis of the notion that Rosenthal identifies as 'creature consciousness', i.e. the concept of a subject being conscious *tout court*. Rather, my interest is in reducing the analysis of one kind of what Rosenthal identifies as 'state consciousness', that of experience, to another, that of judgement.<sup>27</sup> Block makes a precise distinction in this regard, between 'phenomenal' and 'access' consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential properties P-conscious states are experiential states, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are “what it is like” to have it. Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions,

<sup>25</sup> Nagel (1997) p. 519

<sup>26</sup> Nagel (1997) pp. 519-520

<sup>27</sup> Obviously, if *s* is state conscious in that *s* is in *M* and *M* is a conscious state, then *s* is creature conscious. See Rosenthal (1986).

but I would also include thoughts, wants, and emotions ... I take P-conscious properties to be distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property.<sup>28</sup>

A state is A-conscious if it is poised for direct control of thought and action. To add more detail, a representation is A-conscious if it is posed for free use in reasoning and direct "rational" control of action and speech ... An A-state is one that consists in having an A- representation. I see A-consciousness as a cluster concept in which reportability is the element of the cluster that has the smallest weight even though it is often the best practical guide to A-consciousness.<sup>29</sup>

The paradigm A-conscious state is a judgement, and the paradigm phenomenally-conscious state is a wholly qualitative "sensation". The significant contrast is between non-phenomenal thoughts and phenomenal perceptual experiences. The question is, in these terms, whether P-properties can be analysed in terms of A-properties. Mere *supervenience* is not enough for the analytical elimination of P-properties in terms of A-properties. What is required for the complete elimination of P-properties is that experiences be taken to have not only the A-properties that judgements have in this functional sense, but that they *also* have the same type of contents which facilitate these functional properties.<sup>30</sup>

Recall Peacockes' definition of 'a set of propositions, which specifies the way the experience represents the world to be'. In arguing that experiences have contents, I am committing to Pautz's 'identity thesis': '[experiences] are *identical with* relations to contents, somewhat as beliefs and desires are identical with relations to contents. The claim, then, concerns the structure or real definition of experiences'.<sup>31</sup> Pautz contrasts the identity conception with two others, the 'accuracy' and the 'appearance-looks' conceptions, both of which he takes to render the assertion that experiences have contents to be uncontroversial. What is controversial is whether or not experiences are to be *constitutively* analysed in terms of a relation to a proposition.<sup>32</sup>

Representational properties are relations in which the subject stands which render the mental act that has that representational content "intentional of", "intended towards", "directed upon", or "about", the objects picked out or determined by that content. This object is the intentional object,

<sup>28</sup> Block (1997) pp. 380-381

<sup>29</sup> Block (1997) p. 382

<sup>30</sup> Byrne (2009b) neatly distinguishes between *sensory*, *sensational*, and *sensible* properties. A sensible property is a property of an external object. A sensational property is a property of a sense-datum. A sensory property is a property of the *act* of experiencing (i.e. not a second-order property of involving a sensible or sensational property). The reductive representational theory is that the "sensory properties" of *M* are analysed as a relation between *s* and *p* in that what *M* is 'like' for the subject is "that *p*". This is a different question from what the sensible or sensational properties are like: recall the ambiguity of "the look of *y*". With regard to the representational theory, one position is that experiences have sensational properties which themselves supervene on the terms.

<sup>31</sup> Pautz (2009) p. 484

<sup>32</sup> The appearance-looks conception stipulates only that it is true that 'it looks to *s* that *p*' and the accuracy conception that the experience is 'accurate'. Both of these can be accepted as non-constitutive claims. See also Byrne (2009a).

and this intentional, or representational, directedness is famously identified by Brentano as the 'mark' of the mental. If  $M$  can be characterised as having a representational property, then  $M$  is a relation to some content  $p$ .

I am arguing that the representational content exhausts the psychology of experience, and in the experience having this content the intentional object picked out or determined by the content is experienced.<sup>33</sup> The way in which the experience represents the world as being is not identical to that which is represented, for I may represent something square and yet the way in which it is represented is not square, and I may represent the same object in different ways. The way in which things are represented is not identical to the act of representing, for the way in which things are represented can be shared among different acts of representing.<sup>34</sup> In having a propositional content as the content of an experience, it is not that this content is what is perceived; rather, the object is what is perceived, and the content is the way in which it is perceived.<sup>35</sup> The content, the way in which things are perceived, is the *psychological* component of the experience, and the thing perceived in this way is the object of the perception.

On the representational theory, the psychological look, the subjective element, is the propositional content. But the propositional element of the experience does not interpose itself in the way that the sense-datum does, it is not an object of awareness in any sense, but it accounts for the structure of the awareness of the perceived object in a way which does not render the relation indirect. If I lift the bag by one handle, and then by the other, I have lifted the same bag twice but in two different ways. Neither of these two ways of lifting the bag, once by one handle and then by the other, renders the lifting *indirect*, or the interposes some entity *between* myself and the bag in performing the action. Likewise on the representational theory: representing  $y$  respectively under a content featuring the property  $F$  and under a content featuring the property  $G$  explains, is indeed the analysis of, the differing psychologies in respect of these two experiences, but in both cases the same  $y$  is directly perceived, as the representational content is not an object of experience. All this is true of judgement also, and I am arguing that there need be no extra phenomenal element of experiences which judgements lack and which is constitutive of experiences as individuated as a type of mental act from judging. Having elucidated the representational theory, I now turn to discuss one main argument in favour of it, the transparency argument.

<sup>33</sup> This may appear slightly misleading. It is not that  $s$  experiences that  $p$ , and *therefore*  $s$  experiences  $y$  as  $p$  picks out or determines  $y$ . It is that this is the analysis of  $s$  experiencing  $y$  under content  $p$ . There is no logical priority involved.

<sup>34</sup> See Grossman (1974) for a discussion of the introduction of this act, content, object distinction in the Brentanian tradition. There are close similarities between this and Frege's distinction between sense and the reference. See, e.g., Follesdall (1969).

<sup>35</sup> See Crane (2006) pp. 136-137, and Martin (2002a) p. 382 for two different ways of making this point, although neither are sympathetic to the theory being proposed here. Siegel (2007) p. 127 also makes this point.

## 2 Moore and The Transparency Argument

The transparency argument is a standard argument outlined in defence of representationalism. A classic statement of the argument is the following from Harman.

Eloise is aware of the tree [that she is seeing] as a tree that she is now seeing. So, we can suppose that she is aware of some features of her current visual experience. In particular, she is aware that her current visual experience has the feature of being an experience of seeing a tree. That is to be aware of an intentional feature of her experience; she is aware that her experience has a certain content. On the other hand, I want to argue that she is not aware of those intrinsic features of her experience by virtue of which it has that content. Indeed, I believe that she has no access at all to the intrinsic features of her mental representation that make it a mental representation of seeing a tree.

When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colours she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about Eloise's visual experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree, including relational features of the tree "from here".<sup>36</sup>

The intrinsic features of experience which Harman claims are not manifest in having that experience, are the physical-functional features of the brain. This should not be surprising, for these intrinsic features constitute (or realise) the mental state which is a representation to me of other things, and not these features. Call the basic form of this argument 'relational transparency'.

Relational transparency: Introspection reveals only apparent properties of the objectual relata of experience, and not any properties of the experience.

An extension to relational transparency would be that the properties and objects presented in perceptual experience are properties of mind-independent objects. Thus, if sense-data or, say, after-images are mind-dependent then experience of these would not satisfy this stronger version.<sup>37</sup> Relational transparency, I think, is not *quite* true, as introspection reveals that experience is a relation, however this does not undercut the transparency argument, at least insofar as I am

<sup>36</sup> Harman (1997) p. 667

<sup>37</sup> See Stoljar (2004) Section 2 for a discussion of this. Martin (2002a) argues for the stronger version.

defending it, for the same is true of judgement.

In experience, the relata are brought before the mind and introspection will not reveal any *qualitative* features of the experience, but introspection will reveal that the experience is a relation between myself and the relata, whereas this relation is not revealed *in* the experience. Moore famously introduced the transparency discussion in discussion of sense-data.

Though philosophers have recognised that *something* distinct is meant by consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of *what* that something is ... the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough and we know what to look for.<sup>38</sup>

Hellie (2007) argues for an interpretation of Moore which I will now summarise. Moore analyses what we would now call the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, traditionally "an act of sensation", in terms of 'consciousness' and the properties of the objects of consciousness.

The analysans of "*s* has a sensation of a blue object" features *s*, *consciousness*, and (an instance of) the property *blue*. The analysans of "*s* has a sensation of a green object" would feature *s*, *consciousness* and (an instance of) the property *green*. The difference is analysed in terms of the differing properties of the object of experience (for Moore, the 'objects' are properties). The similarity is due to the shared element of '*consciousness*'. *Consciousness* is a relation, *R*, between a subject and an instance of a property. For experience *M* to have a "blue phenomenal character" is for *M* to be *s* bearing *R* to blue. And for *M* to have a "green phenomenal character" is for *M* to be *s* bearing *R* to green. Experiences are instances of the dyadic universal *consciousness*. Moore is arguing that the relation *consciousness* which is exemplified in the case of *s* seeing green and *s* seeing blue is not "psychologically qualified" (my phrase) other than by the difference in relata.

The two competing theories, which Moore argues against by arguing for the 'relational' view, are the 'content' and 'identity' views. On the latter, (in modern terms) the phenomenal character of an experience of blue is itself blue. The phenomenal character of an experience of green is itself green (what Peacocke would call green<sup>39</sup>). Against this, Moore makes the following point.

when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term. The term 'blue' is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have called 'consciousness' - that which sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green - is extremely difficult to fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is

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<sup>38</sup> Moore (1903) p. 442



sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent – we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there *is something* but *what* it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognized.<sup>39</sup>

The element of consciousness is 'extremely difficult to fix'. The reason for this is that the property we are conscious of is evidently manifest in a way that is, it could perhaps be put, stronger or more vivid than the consciousness element.<sup>40</sup> Moore's point is that in experience objects are presented. We are presented with properties and relations, but in introspection what is before the mind is the *appearance*, or the experience, of these objects and properties. This is a relation, and hence these objects are present as the relata of relations which themselves are the objects of introspection. The mistake we ought not to make is to confuse the relata of the relation, and any of their properties, with the relation being introspected. The relation is there, but, to adapt Moore to my own position, it is there in the same way that the judging relation is there when I *introspect* my judgement that *p*, as opposed to merely judging that *p*.

Hellie responds on behalf of the proponent of the identity view that perhaps the phenomenal character associated with experiences of blue and green are different but similar because blue and green, the qualities experienced, are both determinates of the determinable property of consciousness.

However, consciousness is a *relation which I am in* to green and blue. There is difficulty in attributing a property to this relation in the way that we attribute it to an object. To say that the relation has a property in one case and another in another either means, for example, that the relation holds between something green in one case and something blue in the other, or it is to say that, so to speak, the fabric of the relation itself, has some property (is "qualified" as I put it above). And this would be at least *introspectible* and likely *manifest in the relation itself*. On the (now rather unfortunately named) content view, the property (of the object) experienced is either a property of consciousness, which is a substance, and thus an experience with blue phenomenal character is an instance of the property *blue* being exemplified by the substance of consciousness, or both *blue* and also *consciousness* are monadic universals which when co-exemplified result in an experience which can be said to be one which has blue phenomenal character.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Moore (1903) p. 446. The remark about materialists is confusing to me.

<sup>40</sup> It is sometimes put that it is "phenomenologically impressive".

<sup>41</sup> See Hellie (2007) Section 2.4. Something like the former is perhaps Brentano's original view. For example, Smith says the following of Brentano's original theory. 'For at the time of the first edition of the *Psychology* Brentano conceives physical phenomena like experienced colours and sounds as existing in the mind as parts of consciousness, so that the intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the (real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed ... they are *entia rationis*, non-real parts of a real, mental substance ... the mind or soul is windowless; our acts of thought and sensation are directed in every case to what exists immanently within it, i.e. to those acts themselves or to immanent data of

Moore's relational view is that sensations are instance of the dyadic relation *consciousness* which hold between a subject and a property (of an object). As Hellie neatly puts it, the object (or its property) 'saturates the second argument position of [the relation] *consciousness*'.<sup>42</sup>

According to Moore, introspection provides evidence of the relational view as against the content view if one is careful enough in one's introspection. Moore is arguing both for the falsity of the content view and for the logical independence of the object of experience and instances of the relation *consciousness*. Once it has been established, through introspection, that perceptual experience has an act-object structure, idealism, which can be understood as the theory that the property experienced owes its exemplification to the existence of the experience of it, so to speak has the rug pulled out from under it: *why believe in an idealist theory?*<sup>43</sup> However, this observation was also premised on the introspection of the fact that an experience of *F* and an experience of *G* differ not in the substance of the relation, or in a property that the relation has other than its having these different terms.

In the passage preceding the famous diaphanousness passage quoted above, Moore states the following.

A sensation is, in reality a case of "knowing" or "being aware of" or "experiencing something" ... This relation is just that which we mean in every case by "knowing". To have in your mind "knowledge" of blue is not to have in your mind a "thing" or "image" of which blue is the content. To be aware of a sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image - of a "thing", of which "blue" and some other elements are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituent of a bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness in both cases is exactly the same.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, there is a distinction between the awareness of blue, i.e. the awareness that is the undergoing of a sensation, and the awareness is introspecting the sensation. In the former case, there is awareness of the object and its properties and in the latter case there is awareness still of the sensible property in that the object is still experienced, but there is also awareness of the relation of *consciousness*. However, being aware of blue, i.e. undergoing a sensation of something blue, and

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sense'. Smith (1994) p. 41

<sup>42</sup> Hellie (2007) p. 345.

<sup>43</sup> See Hellie (2007) Section 3. For example, in Moore (1903): 'I believe that every argument used to show that reality is spiritual has inferred (validly or invalidly) from "*esse is percipi*" as one of its premises; and that this again has never been pretended to be proved except by the use of the premise that "*esse is percipi*". p437; "I will undertake to show," says Mr Taylor, "that what makes (any piece of fact) real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a *sentient experience*". I am glad to think that Mr. Taylor has been in time to supply me with so definite a statement that this is the ultimate premiss of idealism. My paper will at least refute Mr. Taylor's idealism if it refutes anything at all: for I *shall* undertake to show that what makes s thing real cannot possibly be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience'. p. 438

<sup>44</sup> Moore (1903) p. 449

being aware of the sensation, i.e. introspecting the sensation or being aware of being aware of blue, submits to a univocal reading of "aware".<sup>45</sup>

And in the latter case, I am not aware of anything blue: I am aware of an awareness of blue. There is nothing, as we would put it, qualitative about the relation of sensation as there is about the object of the sensation. As Moore's argument is from introspection, it is of course possible to deny it. However, it seems to me that Moore is correct about introspection, and all I can do is agree with Moore that introspection *does* reveal that experience is relational, and that the experience is not "phenomenally qualified" in any way. It is not qualified in the sense that it has a "qualitative" property in either of the following senses. One, that it has an intrinsic visual qualification common to all visual experiences and absent in other mental acts which have their own modality-specific qualification. Two, that it has a visual qualification that supervenes on the properties of the terms. Three, that it has any psychological qualification which distinguishes it from judgement.

To say that instances of the *consciousness* relation are transparent is to say that they are "diaphanous" in the sense that in all cases I experience the objects presented via the relation, and not any properties of the relation itself when I am in the relation. The relation makes the terms psychologically manifest, and that is all. This is not to say that it is transparent to the mind in the sense that a perfect plane of glass would be transparent in that were I to look through it I would not register its presence. On the contrary, I can register the presence of the relation in introspection, only the registering of the relation reveals in each case instances of the very same relation, *consciousness* but with different terms (i.e. things experienced).<sup>46</sup>

Consider the view that experiences are qualified by their relata. When I am conscious of *F*, and when I am conscious of *G*, it is true that I am in both cases bearing relation *R* to *F* and *G*, only the relation is somehow qualified. However, the relation, i.e. the instance of consciousness, is qualified in both cases by the fact that the terms are different. This could be put as in (3) and (4).

- (3) *s* is conscious of *F*, and *s*'s conscious relation is qualified in manner *F*\*
- (4) *s* is conscious of *G*, and *s*'s conscious relation is qualified in manner *G*\*

Not only do I think that this is shown to be unsupported by introspection, but I do not think that it is likely to be theoretically necessary in a wider context. Consider the following analogy. The number 1 is less than the number 2, and the number 1 is also less than the number 3. Express this as two instances of the *less than* universal in (5) and (6).

- (5) The number 1 stands in relation  $<$  to the number 2

<sup>45</sup> Price (1932) also shares this view. Martin (1998) notes this rarely commented on point.

<sup>46</sup> 'Register' here is neutral and compatible with any theory of introspection.

- (6) The number 1 stands in relation  $<$  to the number 3

Is the universal qualified in its instances by the terms between which it holds? If we were to take as an analysandum the difference between what is expressed as (5) and (6), we would have as resources in the analysans the dyadic universal *less than*, and the terms which it takes in the two states of affairs. That the numbers 1, 2, and 3 are unique particulars with certain properties allows us to explain the difference between (5) and (6) without qualifying the universal in any way. Of course, constitutive questions immediately arise as to the relations between the properties of the numbers, e.g. where they stand on the number line, and the relations that they bear to other numbers as expressed in (5) and (6), and so on. However, I think that whatever is said about this, in this case the difference between (5) and (6) resides in the terms, not in the universal. Experience is another case of this feature of relations. Compare this with the claim that, say, an experience of red has a qualification to the experiential relation, and an experience of, say, green, a different one. Compare this further to the claim that there is such a difference between modalities, and then further to the claim that there is such a difference between experience and thought.

Let me move on now to apply the transparency thesis, and this reading of Moore's argument, to the representational theory.

### 3 *Transparency and Representationalism*

Stoljar (2004) calls an analysis of the kind Moore gives a form the 'relational thesis'.

The relational thesis	The phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by the objects that one is related to in having the experience. <sup>47</sup>
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Subscribers to the relational thesis include proponents of sense-data and the disjunctive theory. On a relational theory, even a sense-data theory, the psychology of the experience, i.e. how things are subjectively for the subject, will not be identical to the properties of the objects. As Stoljar says, it is *determined* by this in that the relation that this element of the experience is takes these objects as terms. He describes representationalism as a denial of the relational thesis in the following way.

According to intentionalism [representationalism] ... to have an experience is in effect to stand in a

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<sup>47</sup> This extends presumably to their properties and to the relations in which they stand.

relation to some intentional object – say a property or proposition. Against the background of that approach, the relational thesis tells us that the phenomenal character of the experience is determined by features of the proposition or property that is the intentional object of the experience.<sup>48</sup>

However, recall my agreement with Crane, Martin and Siegel at the end of §1 about representational contents and represented, or intentional, objects. If we consider the thought expressed by the sentence "my neighbour's dog enjoys swimming in the sea", the intentional object is my neighbour's dog.<sup>49</sup> What is conveyed to in judging this is *that* my neighbour's dog enjoys swimming in the sea, but this content is not something that the subject's mental act is about. My neighbour's dog's enjoyment of swimming in the sea, this state of affairs, is not identical to the content *that my neighbour's dog enjoys swimming in the sea*. Just as Moore cautioned not to identify a sensation of blue with the blue, so there is another distinction necessary here, that between the intentional object and the representational content. We have, therefore, a tripartite distinction between the act, the content and the object.

We can distinguish between two readings of the relational theory. Stoljar's is what could be called the *objectual-relational* thesis, the other could be precisified as the *representational-relational* thesis.

The rep-relational thesis:

The phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by the contents that one is related to in having the experience.

I am proposing an analysis of experience as a three-place relation, and thus as a relation to a content and an object. On this theory, representing that *p* is what it is to experience the object, *y*, as *p* determines or picks out *y*. *p* is the psychology of the experience, the way in which, or how, *y* is experienced. It is the *subjective* element of *M*, the way *y* looks in this sense, and not the way that *y* is when it is seen, namely the visual properties of *y*. There are no qualia: no psychological properties of *M* which do not reduce to *p* (as the proposition of attitude *R*). It does not follow, I argue, from the fact that experiences make psychologically manifest the visual properties in a way that thought does not, that there is a corresponding element of the psychology, i.e. an element of the psychology which features in the analysans of "*s* experiences that *p*" and not "*s* judges that *p*". On the proposed theory, the representational-relational thesis accounts for the psychology, and the objectual-relational thesis refers only to the visual properties: the two are compatible.

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<sup>48</sup> Stoljar (2004)

<sup>49</sup> Or the state of affairs of his enjoying swimming in the sea. Nothing turns on this distinction, and I will talk of the intentional or represented objects rather than states of affairs.

Suppressing the triadic nature of  $R$  and the relation between  $p$  and  $y$ , i.e. the relation between the content and the visual properties, (7) is a paraphrase of (1) using the neutral construction " $s$  experiences as-of an  $F$ ". The reductive-representational analysis of the psychology of the experience in (7) is (8).

- (1)  $y$  looks  $F$  to  $s$ .
- (7)  $s$  experiences as-of an  $F$ .
- (8)  $s$  bears  $R$  to  $p$ .  
 $p$  features in some way the property  $F$ .

The weaker non-reductive theory holds that the psychology is only *determined* by the relation to this content, not exhausted by this relation: there are some other psychological elements involved in (1) and (7) which (8) does not capture.

Kind makes a well-known distinction between 'weak' and 'strong transparency' with regard to the representational theory.

Strong transparency: it is *impossible* to attend directly to our experiences, i.e. we cannot attend to our experiences except by attending to the object represented by that experience.

Weak Transparency: it is *difficult* (but not impossible) to attend directly to our experience, i.e. we can most easily attend to our experience by attending to the objects represented by that experience.<sup>50</sup>

Reductive representationalism rests on Strong Transparency, but Strong Transparency must allow that the fact that the experience is a relation that can be introspected. Kind puts it that one can come to attend to the experience in virtue of attending to the objects presented. I would interpret this as the claim that there are no elements manifest *in* experience other than the objects presented, and, in *introspection*, than this fact *about* experience. Introspecting the experience is considering *how it looks*, the psychological look, and not *taking* it to look that way; i.e., in experience I am related to

<sup>50</sup> Kind (2003) p. 230. Kind, like Tye, is apt to put this that we 'attend' to experiences 'by attending' to the objects of the experience, and that we come to know of the phenomenal character of experience by attending to the objects of the experience. So, in experience I see the blue of the sea and in introspection I attend to the blue of the sea again. However, by introspecting the experience by attending to the blue I come to be aware of the phenomenal character. This seems mysterious to me, as it looks to me like attending to the blue will not reveal any more than that was revealed in the experience, for the experience *is* attending to the blue. Unless 'attend' means something necessarily distinct from this, but I do not see how it can. To experience the blue is to be aware of it, or to attend to it. I can *focus* on it, in the sense of paying careful attention to it, but this again is a type of experience.

something blue, but in introspection I am related to its looking blue. In order to introspect an experience as-of an *F*, one must be having such an experience. I take this to be the point made by the mention of attending to the blue in order to introspect the experience: but these are two distinct mental acts. When I introspect my experience, the experience, and not its objects, are the objects of the experience. Looking at things from within the experience, there are no qualia, and there are no qualia to be discerned upon full introspective consideration of how the experience is from within it, but consideration of the experience "from above" reveals that the experience is a relation.

Carrying this over from Moore, then, if (9) is the content of the experience, then (10) is the content of the introspection.

(9) *p*

(10) I experience that *p*  
(it looks to me that *p*)

A much-discussed defence of transparency was given by Tye as follows.

Standing on a beach ... I found myself transfixed by the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean ... I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience. My experience itself certainly was not blue. Rather it was an experience that represented the ocean as blue. What I was really delighting in, then, were specific aspects of the content of my experience. It was the content, not anything else, that was immediately accessible to my consciousness.<sup>51</sup>

Tye formulates the transparency argument as an argument against being able to 'directly' discern qualities of experiences as follows.

When we introspect our experiences ... we become aware of what it is like for us to undergo them. But we are not directly aware of those experiences ... nor are we directly aware of any of their qualities. The qualities to which we have direct access are the external ones, the qualities that, if they are qualities of anything, are qualities of external things. By being aware of these qualities, we are aware of phenomenal character.<sup>52</sup>

This again contains the curious, to me at any rate, point that by attending to the blue I can come to know of the phenomenal character of my experience. However, this cannot be correct, for the blue is what the experience is of. In attending to the experience, I am attending to the experience of this

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<sup>51</sup> Tye (1992) p. 160

<sup>52</sup> Tye (2002a) p. 148

blue, and not experiencing the blue. 'Directly' here means something that I am aware *in* the experience, and the argument is that in the experience no properties of the experience are made manifest. In another passage defending the transparency argument, Tye makes a similar point.

It seems to me that what I found so pleasing in the above instance, what I was focusing on, as it were, were a certain shade and intensity of the colour blue. I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience. My experience itself certainly wasn't blue. Rather, it was an experience that represented the ocean as blue. What I was really delighting in, then, was a quality *represented* by the experience. It was the colour, blue, not anything else that was immediately accessible to my consciousness and that I found so pleasing. This point, I might note, seems to be the sort of thing G.E. Moore had in mind when he remarked that the sensation of blue is diaphanous. When one tries to focus on it in introspection one cannot help but see right through it so that what one actually ends up attending to is the real colour blue.<sup>53</sup>

Representing the content of the experience by (11), as on the representational theory then (12) would be the content of the introspection.

(11) The ocean is that shade of blue.

(12) It looks to me that: the ocean is that shade of blue

This relation is the *consciousness* relation, as Moore would have put it, and if all there is in experience is (11), then all there is in introspection is the relation that one has to the (11).<sup>54</sup> On the representational theory, this relation is a relation to a content which gives the experience its psychological component. In (11), I experience the blue of the sea: but keep distinct the visual properties, i.e. the blue of the sea, from its looking blue in the psychological sense. Even if by being related to the (11), I am related to the visual properties, (12) will reveal no more than this. In (12), I introspect the experience, i.e. I "look at the experience with my mind's eye". As the experience is not blue, I do not directly introspect something blue: rather, I introspect the content that *the sea is that shade of blue*. This, on the representational theory, is the phenomenal character.<sup>55</sup>

The opposing view, Kind's Weak Transparency, is that there are other psychological elements in experience. Loar characterises this competing position as follows.

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<sup>53</sup> Tye (2003) p. 10

<sup>54</sup> Loar makes this point: '[an intuition is that] visual experience is *transparent*: when you attend to a visual experience as it is going on, you will notice its objects, i.e. the things you see or apparently see, including their apparent properties and relations, and you will notice your (diaphanous) visual relation to those external objects and relations; and, representationalists say, that is all'. Loar (2003) p. 77

<sup>55</sup> Recall that according to, e.g., Tye and Dretske, the content is non-conceptual, and this is why there is a difference between experience and thought.



normal visual experiences of the surface property of being *red*, which may be a primary or secondary quality, have a distinct intrinsic and introspectible property that we may call 'red\*'. This property is the subjective feel of those visual experiences, what it is like to have them. Red\* is a paradigm visual quale; and according to most proponents of qualia we can discern it by reflecting on our experiences, and thereby be aware of it *as* a purely qualitative property of experience and not a property of ordinary objects of experience. Similar intuition, though not so initially obvious, reveals shape qualia: while angularity is a feature of things out there in space, angularity\* and its countless forms are visual qualia.<sup>56</sup>

Normal red is a property of 'ordinary objects of experience', but red\* is a 'purely qualitative property' and not a 'property of ordinary objects of experience'. The present question concerns whether or not (8) ought to make reference to property *F\**. If it ought to, then even if in experience something like (11) is the content, introspection should reveal more than (12). On the above example, (12) should mention the blue\* of experience, however this is analysed.

#### 4 Conclusion

Having introduced the representational theory, and explained what I take to be Moore's transparency argument (and Harman's), I then elucidated this with respect to the representational theory. I agree with (this reading of) Moore. In the next chapter, I outline the commitments that are required to argue against the non-reductive representational theory. I then move on to the reductive theory, and thenceforth to argue that we can, should this be accepted, which I think it should, eliminate the notion of the phenomenal as canonically conceived.

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<sup>56</sup> Loar (2003) pp. 77-78

## Chapter 3 Defending Representationalism: Some More Specifics on Qualia

### 1 Introduction

Although I cannot submit a full-dress defence of representationalism here due to space-constraints, it is important to show exactly what the commitments of the theory are, and to show how the arguments allayed against it can be met. In this chapter, I discuss some of the arguments against the supervenience thesis, and argue that these arguments can be replied to. Thus, after defending the supervenience claim by rebutting the arguments against it, I can move on to the reductive representational theory. In §2, I discuss some standard arguments for phenomenist qualia, and I answer specifically the argument from blurry vision. In §3, I discuss the strength of the thesis required, and in §4 I argue that the inverted spectrum argument can be met. Thus, I am in a position in chapter 4 to argue from the position that there are no elements in the psychology of experience which deviate from the content. From there, I go on to argue that we can eliminate the notion of the phenomenal as a psychological quality that experiences have, and judgements do not.

### 2 Blurry Vision and Other “Standard” Arguments Against Non-Reductive Representationalism

The first set of arguments that I will discuss against the representational theory are the phenomenist arguments. These are arguments to the effect that there are psychologically manifest elements of experiences which do not supervene on the representational content. These are rather reminiscent of the arguments for sense-data, although they do not presuppose the phenomenal principle and hence sense-data and the sensing relation.

Peacocke (1983) introduced some by now "standard" arguments for elements of the psychology of experience which do not supervene on the content. His most famous example concerns two trees of different size but seen at a distance such that they "take up the same size in the visual field". This latter property is psychologically manifest, and not represented *as a property of the two trees*, for they are represented as being differently sized. However, recall my discussion from chapter 1 of the visual field. This argument is very reminiscent of those for sense-data, and I think that this argument for a visual field, or similar such properties, in this sense succeeds no more than it did before. The trees are seen as being different distances away, and the visual field in the sense argued for by Peacocke is not something psychologically manifest in experience, or

introspection, but, as I argued in chapter 1 with regard to sense-data, an intellectual construct.<sup>1</sup>

Another of Peacocke's examples has fared much better in the literature, that of the Necker Cube and similar aspect-switch cases.<sup>2</sup> According to the argument from aspect-switches, which is a variation on that from attention, there is an element of psychology which varies in experience and which according to the argument does not supervene on a representational difference. The lines on the page remain seen as the same, represented as the same, and yet one can visually switch between the two ways in which the cube "points". Other well-known variations on this are the duck-rabbit, the square/diamond and rows and columns of dots or numbers. According to these arguments, the psychological variation involved in the switch cannot be explained by a difference in representation of the marks on the page for they do not change, and the subject's physical focus, i.e. eyes, remain fixed on a point (and their body does not move). Only their mental attention changes, and this psychological change is then explained by a change in qualia.<sup>3</sup>

The standard rebuttal is that the experience represents some property of the diagram that it does not in fact have, e.g. depth and orientation in the case of the Necker cube, or that it is orientated differently, as with the square/diamond. One could play this game all day, especially if one subscribes to a conceptualist theory of experience with a high level of cognitive penetrability: there will always be some property more or less plausible to either party, especially a relational or orientation property, that one could interpret the psychological change in terms of the representation of, and it seems also plausible that the same type of explanation need not be given for every case.<sup>4</sup> Further, as the representationalist is allowed to hold that properties are illusorily represented of the diagram, there seems always to be a way out. There is a detailed literature of claim and counter-claim with regard to specific examples. Unfortunately, I lack the space to go through this in detail.<sup>5</sup>

Let me briefly make the argument, however, that aspect-switches may indeed provide an argument for representationalism.<sup>6</sup> One way of characterising the representational theory is that experience always presents an interpreted array of objects and properties: experience *is* interpretation. The Necker-Cube type of example results in an experience which switches between

<sup>1</sup> Peacocke's (1983) conception of qualia look rather like sense-data, as they seem to be properties of a private sensed field.

<sup>2</sup> Peacocke's example actually concerns a three-dimensional wire framework.

<sup>3</sup> The idea here is again rather as if there is something like a given sensed field over which the subject can cast their mind's eye, only the claim is reversed: there is an interpreted field which stays fixed in interpretation, and the change in psychology therefore must be a change in a non-interpretative element. Seen like this, one not inclined to accept that there is an uninterpreted sensed field which is interpreted as one casts one's attention over it, will not be inclined to accept the converse.

<sup>4</sup> Macpherson (2006) presents an argument against *non-conceptual* representationalism, and I am defending conceptual representationalism. With a high level of cognitive penetration, this point in favour of the conceptualist is perhaps even stronger. See Macpherson (2012) and Siegel (forthcoming) for discussions of cognitive penetrability.

<sup>5</sup> Macpherson (2006), Nickel (2007), and Block (2007) and (2010) present arguments against representationalism based on examples like these, and Lycan (1996) and Tye (2010) present rebuttals.

<sup>6</sup> See Craig (1976) for an early statement of this argument.

one interpretation and another. It is impossible to experience more than one orientation simultaneously (including no orientation). A change of attention is a change of interpretation, and thus a change in the way the object is experienced. This may or may not be illusory.<sup>7</sup> Block (2010) argues that two experiences of different orientations of the Necker-Cube must both be veridical, but it seems to me that the representationalist need not accept this, and even if so, why this should be a problem. After all, it is a representation of depth, and for an experience of this to be veridical is to take it as such a representation. It merely has "two aspects in one" like a hologram only both can be seen from the same angle.

These diagrams are designed to "trick" the mind by playing on the way in which the sub-personal systems interpret information and deliver this interpretation to experience.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps, the lines themselves, i.e. their intrinsic properties, are seen veridically as they are on the page, and yet ascribed to them, and thus experienced, is a relational property that they do not have.<sup>9</sup>

One way to interpret the opponent is that there is a fixed "information stream", to put it in this way, which results in a fixed representational content, and yet the psychology can change. Hence, there is a difference in psychology which is not representational. However, the representationalist rejects this picture of an element of the experience which is logically independent from the conceptual interpretation. On this theory, there is no possibility of not interpreting in experience for there is no uninterpreted element, even if there is some level of information which feeds into the visual system which itself remains fixed. Compare this to a switch in attention between one side of the room and another with eyes fixed. The position that the representationalist rejects is that there is a scene which can be uninterpreted before the subject, and that the subject in switching attention comes to interpret this scene. On the representationalist theory, the change in attention is a change in psychology because the content of experience has changed: in focusing attention on the other side of the room, the level of representation changes and thus the psychology changes. Focusing attention in this case is increasing the level of representation.<sup>10</sup>

I unfortunately lack the space for more detail here as the literature enumerating each and every case is extensive, but I assume, hopefully, that each of the examples raised by the anti-representationalist can be convincingly met. I will instead go into more detail about a prominent

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<sup>7</sup> Brewer (2004) and (2008) argues that the Necker Cube and Müller-Lyer are not illusions and the actual diagrams are always directly presented as they are, and the effect is described as an intellectual interpretative mistake. Most find this rather unconvincing, and take it as a good argument for representationalism. I think that this is correct, assuming Brewer does not take it that the illusion is a disjunctive hallucination. This would be awkward, I think, as features in the world would be reliably causing hallucinations.

<sup>8</sup> And perhaps they "trick" our learned or acquired expectations. Apparently, the Müller-Lyer is far less convincing to people who have lived in places where the buildings are not constructed with right-angled corners.

<sup>9</sup> Examples like these are more troublesome for the judgement-theory, and I discuss this further below.

<sup>10</sup> See Tye (2010). Also Chalmers (2004) makes this argument. Campbell (2002) argues that the switch in attention makes directly manifest properties of the object that it in fact has. These two claims are, on my theory, compatible.

and related specific argument, that from blurry vision. It is related for my answer to this problem can, *pace* Block (2010), be plausibly carried over into a number of attention-shift examples, as it is an argument that the change in psychology is a change in the level of specificity of representation.

One way to think of blurry vision would be that the content is the same in the sharp and blurry vision of the same scene, but that there are monadic qualia exemplified in the latter. A rejoinder to this would be that the object is represented as blurry. As has been pointed out, however, this is not so. It is not that the experience represents anything *as* blurry; rather, it is more correctly put that things are "blurrily represented". Tye's (2003) response to blurry vision is that the experience 'comments inaccurately' on the object.<sup>11</sup> In objecting to this, Crane objects more widely to transparency, with blurry vision but one example.

if we are ever aware directly of features of our experience which are not features of the objects of experience – or features which these objects are *represented* as having – then Tye's negative claim is false: we can be 'directly aware of qualities of experience'.<sup>12</sup>

The "quality" I claim which can be discerned of experience is that experience is a relation. Further, I claim that the relation is the very same in each case: the difference is that the terms are different. Crane continues as follows.

When I say 'everything seems blurry' I don't mean that it seems as if the things around me *are* blurry ... What I mean is that I am experiencing things in a blurry way. Isn't this a straightforward case of where one can be 'directly' aware of an aspect of one's experience? It is natural to say that I am aware of blurriness; but I am not aware of blurriness by being aware of any other properties; and blurriness does not seem to be a property of objects of experience.<sup>13</sup>

The upshot of this observation, Crane argues, is that we are in the case of blurry vision directly aware of a property of experience, and not a property of something that experience represents. Tye's formulation, that we become aware of phenomenal character *by* attending to the objects of experience is false. We are, in this case, directly aware of a quality of the experience.

Let's accept that Tye is right that the experience underspecifies the perceived environment. The phenomenal upshot of this, everyone agrees, is that things are seen blurrily. So blurriness does seem to be a property of some kind, which does seem to be instantiated somewhere. Unlike when things

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<sup>11</sup> See also Tye (2000). Dretske (2003) employs the different tactic, holding that the object is represented as being blurry, but see the text for why I reject this.

<sup>12</sup> Crane (2006) p. 130. Smith (2008) makes a similar point.

<sup>13</sup> Crane (2006) p. 130

are seen *as* blurry, it doesn't seem to be instantiated by the objects of experience. So what is wrong with saying that it is instantiated (in some way) in the experience itself? Moreover, since I do not have to make myself aware of blurriness by first making myself aware of other things - the awareness of blurriness comes along all together with the awareness of everything else - introspection of seeing blurrily does seem to reveal a case of being 'directly aware of qualities of experience' in an uncontroversial sense of that phrase.<sup>14</sup>

Ask a Moorean introspective question: Is my *consciousness* (speaking colloquially) when I blurrily see an object any different from that when I sharply see the object? What I mean by this question is a little difficult to state clearly. The best way to put it is that the substance (to use the Aristotelian without assenting to it) of consciousness is, as Moore argued, not different. The "substance" of conscious is, as I am arguing, intentional or representational: differences in the "substance" of consciousness are really differences in the content.<sup>15</sup>

Consider a hazy and a clear memory. In both these cases what it is for the fact to be before my mind is the same, but in one case I remember in greater detail. It seems incorrect to say that my *consciousness* of the fact, my remembering the fact, is in any way *qualified* differently. The same, I think, for perception. Moore's eventual answer to this question, that of the classical sense-data theory, is that the sense-datum is fuzzy in one case and sharp in the other, whereas the external perceived object is always sharp. The representational theory can also provide an explanatory difference in relata, and not in relation or properties of the relation, or properties in addition to the relation. The difference is that the representational content is different in the two cases. This is the tactic employed by Tye (2000) and (2003).

There is in the literature an argument, one which features for example in Smith (2008), to the effect that the possibility of seeing as he puts it sharply a 'fuzzy' object, say, a cloud, or, better, of a recreation of the "painterly eye" view of a myopic visual experience which is indistinguishable from a myopic experience, combined with the possibility of hallucination and illusion poses some specific problem for a representationalist theory. While there is perhaps intuitive pull for the idea that some particular combination of elements here would create a particular problem, if a representational analysis of "s ... experiences ..." can be adduced for each basic case,<sup>16</sup> and none of the other analysanda feature in the anylsans then no combination can provide a novel difficulty that cannot be handled by the combinations of the atomic analyses.

There are two anti-representational conclusions that once could draw from blurry vision: either the analysans of "s undergoes a blurry experience of an *F*" is (1) or (2).

<sup>14</sup> Crane (2006) p. 131

<sup>15</sup> Or at least I am arguing this with specific reference to experience as compared to thought, and not here for the mental in general, even though I think that this is defensible and likely true.

<sup>16</sup> At least blurry and sharp vision, sharp and fuzzy objects, veridical and non-veridical experiences.

- (1)  $s$  bears a "blurry conscious relation" to  $p$ , i.e. an instance of  $R$  which is "blurribly qualified" to  $p$ .
- (2)  $s$  bears an unqualified instance of  $R$  to  $p$ , and  $s$  exemplifies some other quale.

The representational theory requires a difference in content which explains psychological difference between " $s$  undergoes a blurry experience of  $F$ " and " $s$  undergoes a sharp experience of  $F$ ", where we take  $F$  to be a shape property or any other property affected by myopic vision. The "loss of information" response employed by Tye seems to me to be a sufficient answer to the problem. Consider peripheral vision.<sup>17</sup> My experience "comments" very sharply on the location and properties of the edges of the keys in the centre of the keyboard at the moment. This is less true of my perception of the number pad, and things deteriorate further from there. There is a very good physical explanation of this concerning the ability of the eye and visual system to take in and process differing levels of detail and complexity in information from different angles.<sup>18</sup>

The difference in the content is, I suggest, the difference in the specificity of detail in the representational content. Considering this from the standpoint of physical explanation, this difference in specificity is presumably a function of the difference in degree and complexity of information processed, or a difference in degree and specificity of information that is brought into experience. These may diverge, as attention-shifts perhaps show.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Smith argues that peripheral and blurry vision do not have the same psychology, and both must be treated equivalently on the "loss of information" response. Peripheral vision does seem to me to have a different psychology, but in that the way in which the object is under-specified is different. I am not quite sure exactly how to put this, but there is a difference. If pressed, I would say that the shapes of objects in the peripheral field are underspecified in a manner which does not underspecify the relative locations of the boundaries of the object to each other. I admit, though, that this is not a very satisfactorily clear statement.

<sup>18</sup> This is why, I would say, subjects cannot identify in detail all of the objects experienced at a moment, and yet they are aware of the other objects. They are aware of these objects to a lesser degree. The level of predication is less specific as regards the properties of the objects and even specific numbers of objects. See, for example, the Sperling experiment, where the subject cannot name all of the letters in a grid, even though they can see them all. This is plausibly because the shape ascribed to the letter is not specific enough to allow it to be discerned as a *specific* letter. Or why, for example, when keep my eye on the keyboard, I cannot discern with very much detail what kind of bird is sitting on the windowsill even if I focus (mentally) on it. This extends, as with the Sperling experiment, to counting the number of object experienced. I see "bunches" of objects. See Tye (2009c) for a discussion similar to this.

<sup>19</sup> It cannot be denied that the brain and sensory system take in more information than is presented in experience, but this does not imply that there is a difference between the information that is merely brought into A-consciousness and that over which the light of P-consciousness is also thrown, so to speak. Consider, for example, a subject affected by subliminal messages in a film. This information was taken in through the eye, and it affected the subject, but it was not *seen*. Note that this is a different case as compared to, for example, my looking for my keys and not finding them but, in retrospect, realising that I did in fact see them. Here, I saw my keys, but I did not see them *as* my keys. Later, I remember those things that I saw as, say, just another in the collection of jumble in the drawer, were in fact my keys. I may or may not come to realise that I have seen an  $F$  as a  $G$ . For example, there must have been countless times where I saw an insect as a part of a leaf, and I will never come to realise my mistake – indeed, maybe I could never come to realise my mistake without my being told of it. That I saw my keys in the drawer as, say, a bunch of old keys that I do not need any more obviously does not imply that I cannot later in retrospect come to notice that those were my keys. Can I see my keys *as those keys*, and on the basis of this *only*, i.e. without background inference, come later to realise that those were my keys? This is an interesting question, to which I think that the answer is no, as any representationalist will, I think, have to say.

The content which brings the object before the mind can be more or less determinate, or specific. Consider as an example a three-dimensional Cartesian space, and two objects located somewhere in the space. Now consider definite descriptions of the objects that identify them with reference to their locations in the space. These descriptions can be more or less specific. For example, the object can be identified as the object whose boundaries lie inside a section of the Cartesian space which is specified by reference to a range points. Widening or narrowing the range of points will not result in a change in the object determined by the description which features these ranges of points.

This way of characterising the difference in the blurry or sharp experience of a particular object can thus supply the "difference maker" for the relevant analyses on the representational theory. As a formal answer, this answer suffices. Is it convincing? The demand is not only for a sufficient representational difference, which the suggestion looks to supply, but the further condition of compatibility with transparency is met. Smith argues as follows.

[An account of the type suggested by Tye] treats the problem of blur as if it were simply a challenge to the representationalist project of showing that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on, or is determined by, that experience's representational content, and as if defending such supervenience would in and of itself constitute a vindication of the Transparency Thesis. This, however, is not the case. For suppose that representational content does fix the phenomenal character of experience. It remains a possibility that there are, as against the Transparency Thesis, aspects of phenomenal character that are not captured by specifying the *apparent features* of the ostensible objects of experience. This possibility can be excluded only by showing that representational content determines phenomenal character *just by determining such features*.<sup>20</sup>

But the response is that blurry vision is a lack of specificity, a lack of accurate information about the experienced object. A lack of information is not equivalent to erroneous information or no information. If I tell you that the envelope is in one of the desk drawers, as opposed to the right-hand drawer, when it is in fact in the centre drawer, I have identified its location with a lack of specificity although not erroneously. Smith says that blurry vision is not an illusion because 'it is not the case that the world seems to be a certain way in virtue of blur. It is, rather, that within certain limits there isn't a way the world seems to be at all'.<sup>21</sup> But the (myopically seen) edge of the cup appears to be within a certain range. It is *sharply* within this range, only the range itself is not sharp in the sense of determinate. It is not indeterminate which range the edge falls between, but as the range is extended, the range itself is in this way "indeterminate". Likewise, it is indeterminate

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<sup>20</sup> Smith (2008) p. 208

<sup>21</sup> Smith (2008) p. 209



for the myopic subject where the edge of the object lies. But it is determinate that it is within a certain range. Within this range, the world is such that the edge of the cup is at one of the points. That it is not determinate for each point whether or not the edge of the cup is there, does not imply that there is 'no way the world seems to be at all'. As Smith says, 'it is not true that blurred vision even involves the representation of an object as being indeterminate'.<sup>22</sup> It does not: it involves a determinate object determinately being at one location within a determinate range, only indeterminate with respect to which location. This, in turn, undercuts Smith's following further objection.

there are no correctness conditions for a blurred vision of something (in so far as it is blurred). How on earth would an object have to *be* for a blurred experience to be correct? ... It is not that blurred vision lays down a condition for the world to meet that the world cannot possibly meet: it just does not lay down such a condition at all. Blurred vision is not a sort of *illusion*. And this is because it is not the case that the world seems to be a certain way in virtue of blur. It is, rather, that within certain limits there isn't a way in which the world seems to be at all.<sup>23</sup>

The correctness conditions of a sharp experience make reference to a specific location, i.e. not to a range of specific locations, of the edge of an object as with blurry vision. In this way, it can be said that the representation is indeterminate. Its content is indeterminate in the way that there are a number of ways that the object can be, but this is not because the object is represented as itself being indeterminate between these ways, but that it is represented as determinately falling within this range.

I conclude that the argument from blurry-vision, and also the arguments from aspect and attention switches can be resisted.<sup>24</sup>

### *3 Representationalism, Perceptual Modality, and Attitudes*

Let me note now a commitment that one might think that anyone who defends reductive representationalism has. In chapter 2, I argued that the difference between experience and introspection is the difference in content between (1) and (2), where these are the respective contents, a proposition (which, of course, may or may not be true) and the content that this content is the content of the experience.

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<sup>22</sup> Smith (2008) p. 210

<sup>23</sup> Smith (2008) p. 209

<sup>24</sup> Although I would have like to discuss aspect and attention switching in more detail.

- (1)  $p$ .
- (2) I experience that  $p$ .

Take visual experience. In the experience, I see that  $p$ , and in introspection I introspect that *I am seeing that  $p$* . But is this not to hold that there is something that *can* be introspected which outstrips  $p$ , namely the *seeing that  $p$* ? Siewert, for example, presses this point.

When something looks blue or square to me ... and I attend to how it looks to me, I do not attend just to blueness or squareness, without attending to its *looking* blue or square to me ... The figure, its properties, and its appearing to me, all come together as a package, as far as this act of attention is concerned. I may only *look at* the blue square - I certainly don't look at my visual experience of it. However, I can, while looking at the blue square, attend to its looking to me as it does ... what I have just said seems to commit me to holding that I can attend not just to 'external qualities and objects' but to *my experience of them* as well.<sup>25</sup>

This enforces on the reductive representationalist an intermodal representationalism, as opposed to a merely intramodal representationalism. Intermodal representationalism holds that the psychological difference between perceptual modalities is a difference between content. One could put this that modalities are individuated by content.<sup>26</sup> Mere intramodal representationalism holds that psychological differences between different perceptual modalities supervene partly on some intrinsic phenomenal quality of that modality.<sup>27</sup>

Treating modalities as attitudes, we can say that the question is whether attitudes have their own intrinsic qualitative phenomenal character. In terms of attitudes, this is what anti-representationalists hold of the difference between experiences and thoughts. Another question arises from this, namely are *all* mental acts of any and every kind intentional?

Are modalities individuated partially functionally? This is a deep question, into which I lack the space to enquire here. However, a purely functional difference would not refute unrestricted representationalism in an important sense: there are no *qualia* involved in a difference between desiring that  $p$  and believing that  $p$ , and this is because this is a purely functional difference. If the psychological difference between mental acts  $M$  and  $N$  is purely functional, then there is no difference in *qualia*. Otherwise, there would be a difference between desiring that  $p$  and believing

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<sup>25</sup> Siewert (2004) p. 20

<sup>26</sup> And likely also functional features.

<sup>27</sup> Intermodal representationalists include Dretske (1995), and Tye (1995) and (2000) and presumably anyone who holds intramodal representationalism combined with a functional analysis of the difference in modalities. Crane (2003) defends intramodal representationalism against intermodal representationalism.

that  $p$  which is a difference in qualia.<sup>28</sup>

Some hold that for representationalism to be convincing, it has to be unrestricted representationalism in that it holds of all of the mental.<sup>29</sup> If this is so, then if examples are adduced which refute unrestricted representationalism, then one may wonder as to why restricted representationalism is worth defending. This is an argument rather like Russell's (1997) argument for universals: if you allow the *similarity* universal (which you must), you might as well allow them all. After all, it is being a universal that is contentious, not how many there are. Likewise with qualia: if you allow the orgasm-qualia, and the depression-qualia, then why not experiential qualia? I lack the space to enquire into this in detail here. My focus is on the difference between experiences and thought.<sup>30</sup> However, experiential qualia are different from non-experiential qualia, and so it is not immediately clear that if there were orgasm-qualia and depression-qualia, that there would be any implication from this to, say, pain qualia, and then to experiential qualia.

If there are properties intrinsic to different perceptual modalities such that these are psychologically manifest and do not supervene solely on the content, then intermodal representationalism will be refuted. Recall the quoted passage from Siewert above: we seem to be able to introspect the qualitative "visualness" of seeing, the tactility of touching, and so on. However, this will only resist a representational analysis if there is not a difference in content in terms of which this can be analysed. But there is a difference in content, namely that different perceptual modalities make different properties available. I cannot hear red, or touch yellow, and I cannot see sounds.

Let it be that all experiences are conceptually articulated, that  $s$  sees the corner of a square while touching it, and that the contents of these two experiences both features the concept SQUARE.<sup>31</sup> The tactile experience has a content which pertains to the tactile qualities of the corner, and the visual experience to the visual qualities. Even if some of the same concepts are applied, and thus the contents of the experiences share some elements, the overall contents will not be

<sup>28</sup> Recall that qualia are defined as non-functional.

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, Byrne (2001) and Kind (2007) for discussion. I am interested here in defending only a judgement-theory of perception and so, aside from the remarks made here, I set aside this further question.

<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, I do not think that qualia, unlike functional differences, will be required. Common examples which are purportedly intractable are orgasms and moods. These are Block's favourite examples. Pains are now commonly treated as representational, although this is controversial. See, e.g., Tye (1997), Harman (1997), and Bain (2003). This is not strictly central to my task here as my task is to argue for a reduction of perceptual experience not of the body but of things distinct from the body (although in experiences of, say, after-images, there may be room to make trouble here with unclear cases if an after-image, for example, is a property of the brain or eye) to thought. Pains, moods, and emotions are not experiences in this sense, although they may be experience-like, or experiences of the body. An early version of this view with respect to pains is Pitcher (1970). I do think that it can be plausibly argued that an experience of a pain is an experience of a property (purportedly) of a part of the body. Once pain has been analysed in this way, it seems to me that an analysis of the *physical qualities* of moods and emotions can be equivalently given. The remaining functional and dispositional aspects of moods and emotions which are, I think, plausibly logically independent from the felt qualities of the body, will not involve qualia, and thus moods and emotions are apt for a representational analysis. This is, for example, Armstrong's (1968) view. However, to enquire into this in any detail would be to stray far from the matter at hand.

<sup>31</sup> This could be non-conceptual with respect to the present argument, nothing turns on this.

equivalent. Hence, there will always be a difference in content in terms of which to analyse the visualness of seeing, and the tactility of touching, even if the contents share some elements. When I introspect my seeing that  $p$  and my touching that  $q$ ,  $p$  and  $q$  will always be different. This point secures, I think, that intermodal representationalism can be convincingly argued for.

This is, unfortunately, an unsatisfactorily short treatment of this matter due to lack of space, but it is necessary to note the commitments that one may have to take on. For example, I have not broached the relation between, for example, my awareness of my fingertip and my awareness via my fingertip of the qualities of my keyboard. However, a full-dress defence of intermodal representationalism, let alone complete representationalism for all of the mental were that necessary, would far exceed the scope of this thesis. I shall just have to express my confidence that this can be defended, and that the psychological difference between the modalities is a difference analysable in terms of content (plus, perhaps, functional role).

#### *4 The Inverted Spectrum, Mental Paint, and Representationalism*

Another argument adduced against the representationalist theory is the inverted spectrum, and associated arguments. This argument is a central argument against representationalism, and so it is necessary to show that it can be rebutted. Furthermore, it will help to make more clear the central phenomenal notions being invoked. Before tackling the inverted spectrum and related arguments, consider Byrne's (2001) argument for representationalism, for this will serve to make clear the strength of the representationalist's position.

Byrne argues that the core of the representational theory need take no stand on anything over and above the supervenience of psychology on content. Byrne's argument for this minimal representationalism concerns the example of a subject presented with coloured chips. The first two are blue, and the third is red. The phenomenal character of the first two experiences are called B-character, and the third R-character.

[The] subject is shown a blue chip, and he classifies his experience as having a B- character. But this time [the first subject answered "correctly"] the chip is not replaced. The subject reports that there is no change in the chip, or in anything else: the world continues to appear exactly the same to him. "However", he sincerely continues, "something weird has happened – the phenomenal character of my experience has suddenly changed. It now has the R-character". Surely he has not understood our patient instruction in philosophical terminology. No five dollars for him!<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Byrne (2001) p. 207. Byrne's subject is idealised, possessed of perfect memory for example. However, these idealisations are innocent.

Our subject gains knowledge of the phenomenal character of her experience by reusing her ability to make judgements about the world – and in her circumstances she cannot gain knowledge by any other method. She goes through exactly the same procedure that she would go through if she were trying to make a judgement about *the quality of the object that she perceives*.<sup>33</sup>

The crucial claim that Byrne makes is that the experiences need not be experiences of 'external' objects. Indeed, they need not be experiences that present their objects as external at all. Byrne argues, correctly in my view, that the above example can be recast with after-images instead of chips: the after-image functions in exactly the same manner as does the chip.<sup>34</sup>

Is Byrne's argument successful? I think that it is. As he says of two experiences with the same content, the introspecting subject 'will not notice a change in 'phenomenal character', because she has 'no basis for noticing one'. As the subject exercises the very same abilities that are used in undergoing the experience in subsequently determining the phenomenal character, if there is no change in experience there will be no basis for an introspective difference. As Byrne extends this to *any* properties, not merely 'external' properties, how could there be? How could it seem within the experience that *p*, where *p* here covers everything that is in principle psychologically manifest, and yet it still seem that *p* after a change in phenomenal character? And how could it seem that *p* within the experience and it seem that *q* where there is no change in phenomenal character? How could any psychological element of experience vary with respect to the way in which things seem?

Byrne's argument here, as I interpret it, is as an argument about how we are entitled to use "seems". Lycan refers to Block's (1996) distinction between the two ways that things can "look" as a distinction that can be carried over into the analysis of "seems".<sup>35</sup> Does Byrne equivocate on "seem" here? I think not. This charge could be turned around, and it can be claimed that the appeal to Block's distinction uses a notion of "seem" to which the proponent is not entitled. The argument can be interpreted as an argument about the semantics of "seems", as an argument that "seems" and cognate notions in terms of which the psychology of experience are analysed are all rendered on the representational theory as seeming-that, or can be paraphrased into seemings-that<sup>36</sup>:

Byrne's argument for representationalism is somewhat reminiscent of the sense-data proposal for the phenomenal principle. This principle concerned how things are sensed. Byrne's

<sup>33</sup> Byrne (2001) pp. 210-211. Recall from chapter 2 my puzzlement at the idea that one can come by knowledge of the phenomenal character of experiences by looking at the objects of the experience. However, set this aside.

<sup>34</sup> This is because the after-image is the object of the experience. The experience is an experience of the after-image, in the way that the object of the experience of the chip is the chip. This extends, I think, to phosphenes and other visual phenomena, and also phenomena such as pins and needles or ringing in the ears. These objects, be they presented as a property of a part of the body as with pins and needles or not, are the objects of these experiences.

<sup>35</sup> See Lycan (2006) Part 3 Section 4.

<sup>36</sup> This is not meant to imply that the 'seeming-that' takes a conceptually articulated proposition.

argument concerns how things seem.<sup>37</sup> The arguments are somewhat similar, in that Byrne argues that there seems to be no escape from the fact that a change in qualitative psychology will go hand in hand with a change in the way that things seem, and vice-versa. Even if there were "qualified consciousness", sense-data, monadic phenomenist qualia, mental paint, etc., these are all *objects* of seemings—that in the same way that for a proponent of sense-data, they would all be properties of the sense-datum.<sup>38</sup>

Now, let me turn to the inverted spectrum and related arguments. This is an argument for what Block calls 'mental paint'. He distinguishes between what he calls 'mental paint' and 'mental oil'. Block (2003) begins with the following standard characterisation of the debate:

The recent focus of disagreement is on whether the phenomenal character of an experience is *exhausted* by such representational contents [of experience]. I say no. Don't get me wrong. I think that sensations – almost always – perhaps even always – *have* representational contents in addition to their phenomenal character. What's more, I think that it is often the phenomenal character itself that has the representational content.<sup>39</sup>

Block then goes on to distinguish three introspectible features of perception:

The intentional content of an experience. I am currently looking at a tomato and my experience represents the tomato as red.

Mental properties of the experience that represents the redness of the tomato. This is mental paint. According to me, the phenomenal character of the experience is such a mental property: it represents the tomato as red. According to me, one can attend to this phenomenal character and be aware of it even when one is not attending to it. Representationists [representationalists] would deny both.

Mental properties of the experience that don't represent anything. This is mental oil. I don't know

<sup>37</sup> Compare this to the way in which I argued against the sense-data theory, and its motivating phenomenal use of "looks" as opposed to the epistemic use. Things seem that *p*: a propositional seeming, like the propositional notion of an epistemic look. The epistemic "look" is stronger, as Jackson presents it, as this is a belief-related notion.

<sup>38</sup> Byrne's argument may look like it just rules monadic elements of experience out of court by insisting that all psychological elements be analysable in terms of 'seems', which is tantamount to asserting that they are analysable as looks-reports. However, Byrne's argument seems a good one to me, for how else would one account for a strange experience which the proponent of qualia would analyse in terms of monadic qualia other than that "it seems to me that ...". The looks-report version of this is "it looks to me that ...". Common examples against the acceptability of this, e.g. after-images and phosphenes, are in my opinion very weak as "it looks to me that there is an after-image", or "it looks to me that there are phosphenes" seem perfectly acceptable. Even if, say, the whole visual field could be, say, turned yellow, it would "look to me that there is a yellow patch across my visual field". The representational theory is not so far from the sense-data theory in this respect as, at least I am arguing for this interpretation, the sense-data theory's claim that the experiential relation is sensing which itself is related (or the object thereof) by an objective relation to the perceived object, is replaced by an analysis in terms of a single relation to a proposition which determines an object under that content.

<sup>39</sup> Block (2003) p. 165

whether there are any such properties in the case of a normal experience of a tomato, but I do claim that such properties are involved in orgasm-experience, pain and other bodily sensations.<sup>40</sup>

Block here distinguishes three elements. One, the content. Two, the 'mental paint'. Three, the 'mental oil'. The difference between mental paint and mental oil is that the mental paint itself 'represents the redness of the tomato'. The mental oil, in contrast, does not represent anything. Block's examples here are the experienced redness of a tomato, and the experienced quality of a bodily sensation, for example the numbness in my leg or the pain in my foot. Block (2010) makes the following standard introduction to the matter.

Are the phenomenological characters of perception – e.g. what it is like to experience redness or roundness – philosophically reducible to the redness or roundness of the objects one sees or to representations of redness or roundness? If there is no such reduction, then there can be said to be mental paint.<sup>41</sup>

However, in a footnote to this, Block adds the following.

I am not assuming that if there is mental paint, it is non-relational ("intrinsic") or has no representational aspect. Since I favour physicalism, I allow that mental paint may be a relational neural property. To avoid misunderstanding, I do not claim that there is anything red or round in the head when one veridically sees a red or round thing in the world as when red pigment in a painting represents a red barn.<sup>42</sup>

Mental paint may be, as it is put, a vehicle of representation. The mental paint, which is psychologically manifest to me, itself *represents*, say, the red of a tomato. Mental oil is different, mental oil does not represent anything to me, like, as Block would argue, the blur in blurry vision.

It is important to approach the representational theory on its own terms, namely that the objects presented in experience are the representata of the representation that the experience is. These properties are fixed by the representational content, and the theory asserts that these cannot vary without the content varying. And, unlike with the sense-data theory, the representata need not actually *exemplify* the properties they are (re)presented as having.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Block (2003) pp. 173-174

<sup>41</sup> Block (2010) p. 25

<sup>42</sup> Block (2010) note 2

<sup>43</sup> For example, in recanting the sense-data theory, Jackson puts this as follows. 'It is true that I can represent how I am representing something to be by using the actual way something is. For example, I might represent to you the colour I remember the murderer's coat to be by holding up an actual sample of the colour ... [but] I could be using the sample to represent the one colour I do *not* think the murderer's coat to be. Or I could be following the convention of holding up a sample with the colour *complementary* to that I remember the murderer's coat to be. In the same

Consider again the sense-data theory, and take, for example, the sense-data theories proposed by Price (1932) and Broad (1925). Taking a label from Smith (2002), call these theories "dual-component" theories. On a dual-component theory, perception is a complex act containing two elements. The first element is purely phenomenal or qualitative. On the theories of Price and Broad this is the sensing of a sense-datum. The other component is a more intellectual act, related in some way to the act of judgement, although it is not itself a judgement on these two theories. In his discussion of this relation, Maund quotes Thomas Reid who held a similar theory.

Sensation, by itself, implies neither the conception nor belief of any external object. It supposes a sentient being, and a certain manner in which that being is affected; but it supposes no more. Perception implies a conviction and belief of something external – something different from both the mind that perceives and the act of perception. Things so different in nature ought to be distinguished.<sup>44</sup>

That the act of sensation is not related in any constitutive way to 'conviction' or 'belief' can be rephrased as: that the act of sensation is not intentionally directed towards, or represents, any object. On the sense-data theory, it may be put that the sense-datum itself is not intentionally directed, whereas the relation of sensing is intentionally directed in that the subject when standing in the relation is aware of the sense-datum. This, however, is not quite what is meant by the experience being intentionally directed, for the experience is not, on the sense-data theory, *about* the sense-datum.

According to Reid, the sensation causes the perception, a mental act individuated by its epistemological qualities. Reid's theory is in contrast to the theories proposed by, for example, Price and Broad. On the Price/Broad theory, the two elements form a simultaneous complex. It is clear on Reid's model how the sensation and the intentional act are connected: the former causes the latter. It is not clear on the Price-Broad model how the two component of the complex are linked. But to accept transparency is to accept that experience concerns *those* objects, namely the sense-data as Price and Broad would have called them, and nothing more, for nothing else is psychologically manifest. Those are the *representata* or the *intentional objects*, and the properties which are psychologically manifest are the properties which I represent them as having, or the properties that would be mentioned in the intensional, with an "s", context of the looks-report (those

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way, standing in a certain direct-awareness relationship to a mental item with such and such properties says nothing, represents nothing *per se*, about how the world is ... The extraordinary (as I now think) failing of the sense datum theory is that it does not start to address the representational nature of perceptual experience. It somehow manages to leave out the most important part of the story. The obvious repair is to replace the sense datum theory's positing of a direct awareness relation to something red by a representing that there is something red; this transforms the sense datum theory into representationalism.' Jackson (2004a) p. 108. See also Jackson (2004b).

<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Maund (2003) p. 59.



which I can conceptualise).

The representational claim is that the psychology of the experience is what is represented to the subject. What is represented to the subject is *in this sense*, that *p*. The psychological content of the experience is exhausted by the articulation of *p*, regardless of any properties of the object seen by *p* but not represented in the articulation of *p*.

Block describes mental paint in contrast with the properties of the intentional objects of experience.

Are the phenomenological characters of perception – e.g. what it is like to experience redness or roundness – philosophically reducible to the redness or roundness of the objects one sees or to representations of redness or roundness? If there is no such reduction, then there can be said to be mental paint.<sup>45</sup>

However, this cannot be quite correct for 'what it is like' to experience something red is not identical to this property experienced, but to a representation of this property (on the sense-data theory, a sensing of a phenomenal correlate of the visual property). From the subject's point of view, i.e. the subjective element of the experience, this is the featuring of the property *red* in some way in the representational content. In a footnote, Block continues.<sup>46</sup>

I am not assuming that if there is mental paint, it is non-relational (“intrinsic”) or has no representational aspect. Since I favour physicalism, I allow that mental paint may be a relational neural property. To avoid misunderstanding, I do not claim that there is anything red or round in the head when one veridically sees a red or round thing in the world as when red pigment in a painting represents a red barn.<sup>47</sup>

Sense-data could become mental paint if their properties when experienced by *s* represent to *s* other properties. Mental paint could also be monadic properties: structured adverbial modifications as mental paint.<sup>48</sup> Judgement is transparent in that in judgement the *vehicle* of representation and its properties are transparent, i.e. not psychologically manifest. In perceptual experience, according to a proponent of the position like Block's, this is not so.

Assuming for exposition Peacocke's primed-property sense-data language, on the one hand *s*

<sup>45</sup> Block (2010) p. 23

<sup>46</sup> The phenomenal character is a property of the experience, or is an element of the experience, and so cannot literally be identical to the properties of *relata*, otherwise the experience itself would have the properties of the *relata*. Rather, the phenomenal character, the psychology, is the relation between the subject and the object experienced.

<sup>47</sup> Block (2010) note 2

<sup>48</sup> Elsewhere, Block says that 'P-conscious contents can be representational. Consider a perceptual state of seeing a square. This state has a P-conscious content that represents something, a square, and thus it is a state of P-consciousness *of* a square'. Block (1997) p. 384

is sensationally presented with, say, a red` square`, and it is represented to *s* that there is a red square via this presentation. The red` square` sense-datum *itself* represents to *s* that there is a red square. It may be that the red` and the square` properties represent the external properties *red* and *square*, or it may be that they represent other properties. The red` and the squareness` function rather like the printed words in sentences, as they are sensuous, or qualitative, vehicles of representation which are themselves experienced. The red` square` sense-datum would function like a sensuous sentence in that the red` represented, intended, or pointed to, some property.<sup>49</sup> Likewise for equivalent monadic theories. If the red` square` does not itself represent some further properties, then the red` square` is mental oil.<sup>50</sup>

But consider introspection and transparency. When I look at a red patch, does the red patch of which I am directly aware itself represent that there is some property other than this instance of *red*? It seems, at least to me, that this is not so. Does the red patch I am experiencing represent this of itself? Again, it seems to me that this is not so: the red square does not represent, or intend, itself. Is it that the red (red`) is a property of the vehicle of representation, in that it qualitatively is present *as* my representing red, and not as the property experienced? Again, no. It seems to me that the experience represents the red square. The red square itself, the red` square`, seems to me to be the *representatum* of the experience, or the intentional object.

Consider the paint on my garden shed, and a painting of my garden shed. The paint on the garden shed is like mental oil in an experience: my pain experience (on Block's view), for example, is partly *comprised* of an instance of a qualitative property in the way that the shed is partly comprised of non-representational paint. The painting of my shed, on the other hand, is a representation of my shed.

Compare this to Block's options. My experience of the red patch is like a relation to the paint in the painting, and by being related to the red patch something further is represented to me. Or, my experience of the red patch is not a relation to the red patch in virtue of which something else is represented to me, but merely accompanied by it, but this would not be mental paint but mental oil. Alternatively, my experience has the monadic property which I mistake for being the property of a relatum, and in virtue of having this property my experiences represents some further property, or my experience merely has this property as an accompaniment.

Block argues that there is no relation of superveneince, in either direction, between these

<sup>49</sup> Robinson (1994) Chapter I Section 7 interprets the 'percepts' of the percept theory, e.g. Firth (1949), as being like a classical sense-data in that it is logically private non-physical object of awareness, but one which at least has intentional directedness and may actually possess the properties it appears to have. Block's theory looks rather like the percept theory in that percepts which themselves represent or intend further objects or properties or are representations of themselves in some way. Firth's (1949) theory is a forerunner of the non-reductive representational theory, I think, although this is not the place to enquire into this.

<sup>50</sup> Compare this to Firth's (1949) discussion of the sense-data and percept theories. Firth criticises the sense-data and adverbial theories for holding that there are two psychological relations in experience.

mental properties and the properties that they may come to represent. The mental properties are rather like the paint still in the pot (or on the tip of their brush waiting to be applied): the painter can choose what to represent by using the paint, but it may also not represent anything if it stays in the pot.

In order that this be resisted, it must be argued that the two cannot diverge, and one way to argue this is to argue that the "qualia inversion" scenarios which are invoked in order to drive them apart lead systematically to *misrepresentation* and result in no variation between content and psychology.<sup>51</sup> The two common scenarios invoked here are simple spectrum-inversion, and Block's inverted-earth example.

The following passage from Wittgenstein is often quoted as an introduction to the inverted spectrum.

Consider this case: someone says "it's queer/I can't understand it/, I see everything red blue today and vice versa." We answer "it must look queer!" He says it does and, e.g., goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumst[ances] be incl[ined] to say that he saw red what we saw [blue]. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words 'blue' and 'red' what we do as he has always used them as we do.<sup>52</sup>

Note two elements of this scenario. The first is that 'he saw red what we saw blue', i.e. those objects seen red one day are seen blue (strictly speaking, this should be green but nothing turns on this) the next, and the second is that the meanings of 'red' and 'blue' do not change.

That the meanings of the words are fixed means that that the concepts expressed by the words are fixed.<sup>53</sup> When the sky "looks red", the inverted subject is applying the same concept as applied previously in the experience of the coal "looking red" when he tells us this. The second key element is that what "looked blue" yesterday now "looks red". So *y* "looked red" yesterday to *s*, and now *y* "looks blue". That 'those very things' are seen red one day and blue the next is that the very same objects are represented as blue one day and represented as red the next. If this means that the representational content picks out the same object and the same properties on both occasions, but the look in a phenomenal sense, is different, then this look does not supervene on the content and

<sup>51</sup> See Speaks (forthcoming) for a comprehensive discussion of this. Shoemaker (1994) and elsewhere has a different way out: experiences are the representations of two kinds of properties, appearance properties, in terms of which the phenomenal character is analysed, and external properties, in terms of which the object that appears the way the appearance properties account for, is characterised. This is, to my mind, at least very close to an acceptance of qualia. See Kind (2001).

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in Block (2010) p. 25. I will not discuss the question of moving from this intrapersonal scenario to interpersonal scenarios. See, e.g., Shoemaker (1996). A shifted spectrum will also suffice. See, e.g., Nida-Rumelin (1996) for discussion of what are perhaps actual cases of this.

<sup>53</sup> The concepts that would be formed on the basis of the experience.

hence representationalism is false. Hence, one of them must be misperceiving, i.e. the latter experience must have a false content, if representationalism is not refuted.

On Block's (1990) inverted earth scenario, things look the same, in the phenomenal sense, as they did on earth, but actually they are inverted. Imagine that I am whisked to inverted earth where every colour has its complement, but I (secretly) have inverting lenses installed, and so the inversion is corrected. I look at the sky, and it "looks blue". But the sky is yellow. After a while the experiences come to represent yellow, but are still 'blue feeling' (the contents are externally individuated, on this argument and so change after embedding in a different environment).<sup>54</sup> Hence, the phenomenal character has remained fixed and the representational content has changed.

Focus on the transparency claim and the representationalist theory. If both are accepted, the object of the experience is determined by the representational content and the experience is transparent to the objects. To make a familiar point, imagine a room with only a tight path between electrically charged metal cubes. I am tricked into putting on some hi-tech glasses which create a perfect image of a room with exactly the same layout, only the metal cubes have their places taken by tables stacked precariously with priceless porcelain vases, and this takes me in. My task is to get to the other side, without "breaking a vase". What did my experience represent? It represented the images on the glasses, and not either of the two rooms or their contents. The images represented this, but not my experience. More accurately, my experience represented the representations, but not *their* representata. My experience represented, erroneously, the table-representations as tables. It did not represent their content, and nor did it represent them as images or representations.

Consider now Wittgenstein's scenario. The coal is red, it exemplifies the universal *red*. I look at the coal and I see it, veridically, as red. The *represented* red inheres in the coal. I suffer inversion. Now, my experience is as of something blue in the sense that I would say that things "looked blue". But does my experience represent blue or red? It "feels" blue, for if we adopted a sense-data theory the sense-datum would be blue. The sky on inverted earth is yellow, it exemplifies the universal *yellow*. The sky on earth is blue, it exemplifies the universal *blue*. On earth, I look at the sky, and my experience represents blue and has a blue "feel", for if we were to adopt a sense-data theory, then the sense-datum would be blue. On inverted earth, I look at the sky and my experience is as-of blue. It has a blue "feel", in that if we adopted a sense-data theory the sense-datum would be blue.

My experience has a "blue feel" in the sense that things look blue in the phenomenal sense. But what does this mean? On the sense-data theory, it means that the sense-datum is blue. On the representational theory, it must mean that the representational content features the property *blue*. What is it for an experience to feature the property *blue* in the content? This is for the experience to

<sup>54</sup> 'Blue feeling' means an experience with the qualitative element captured by the sensing of a blue sense-datum on the sense-data theory. This terminology comes from Byrne and Hilbert (1997).

represent a blue representatum (which may or may not be actually blue).

I am sent to inverted earth and have my inverting lenses installed. I look at the sky and it "looks blue". The representational analysis of this is that the representatum is represented as blue. My brain has the ability to represent the property *blue* for (presumably) some reason to do with the fact that there are blue things on earth, and we assume that it still has this function and that this is triggered on inverted earth. Maybe I was swapped with my inverted earth doppelgänger, and he is now resident on earth. He has the ability to represent the property *blue* because there are blue things on inverted earth. He looks at a lemon, and it "looks yellow" in inverted language (i.e. blue). The representational analysis of this is that the representatum is represented as blue.

Are the representata the sky and the lemon? More specifically, is the blue patch of which I am aware identical in terms of the colour it has as the actual sky on inverted earth? And is the blue ("yellow" in inverted-language) patch of which my doppelgänger aware of a property of the lemon? The answer here is very plausibly that they are not, any more than I was aware of the electric cubes in the example above in that the representata of my experience as of tables and vases represented *to me* the cubes, or that my experience represented *to me* the electric squares and not the tables and vases.

The inverted sky is yellow, and the inverted lemon is blue. If the object of my awareness on twin earth is represented to me *as blue*, in that the patch which I am by hypothesis aware of if it were a sense-datum would be blue, then this representatum cannot be the colour of the sky on inverted-earth, for that is yellow. Likewise for the lemon. The lemon is yellow, it exemplifies the universal *yellow*; indeed it exemplifies the very same universal as does the sky on twin earth. What happens when I go back to earth, and I have my lenses removed? The sky "looks blue". This is a veridical experience: the sky is blue, and it looks blue. This time the representatum is identical to an external object, whereas this was not so on inverted earth.<sup>55</sup>

For an experience to be veridical is for that experience to represent properties which are actually exemplified by external objects: i.e. the representatum must be represented as having the same property as an object exemplifies; on a direct theory, these must be the very same instance. If my experience represents a property that an object does not have, then that object cannot be the object of the experience.

For an object to appear the way it is, is obviously different from the object of the appearance appearing the way it appears in the appearance. On the sense-data theory, for example, there is no

<sup>55</sup> On the representational theory, the qualitative properties are represented as being properties of the representatum. They may or may not be exemplified by the representatum. If a child believes that there is a monster under the bed, assuming for the moment that this cannot be analysed out, the representatum "has" the property *monster*. There is no monster: nothing exemplifies the property *monster*. But for something to be represented as a monster, for the property *monster* to be represented as a property of a representatum is not for that property to be exemplified. It is (relevantly) exemplified if the representatum actually is a monster. Likewise for the current scenarios. See, e.g., Harman (1997) and Lycan (1996), and Dretske (2003) for this argument.

appearance/is distinction within the sensing. Likewise on the representational theory there is no appearance/is distinction within the representation, for the representation is the appearance (in this sense) of the object. The appearance/is distinction is between the way things are, i.e. which properties are exemplified, and the way things appear to be, i.e. the way in which the content determines them to be, and which properties the representatum is therefore represented as having.

Compare this now to Wittgenstein's scenario. The coals now look blue to *s*. What does this mean? It means that it looks to *s* that *p* in *M*, where *p* is the way in which some *y* is brought before *s*'s mind. The colour of *y* which is represented in *M* and thus brought before *s*'s mind is the colour blue: it has to be, for were we to adopt a sense-data theory, the sense-datum would be blue. But this is not a sense-data theory. By hypothesis, the coal does not have colour blue: it exemplifies the property *red*. *p* is false: there is nothing blue in the fire. *p* might be partially true: there are some things of the shapes represented in *p*, and at those locations in the fire. Hence, as *p* is partially true, and partially false, *M* is partially veridical and partially non-veridical; i.e. it is an illusion.

Assuming that nothing can be blue and red all over, or at any rate that nothing like this coal can be blue and red all over, one conclusion that can be drawn from this possible experience *M* is that *s* cannot see the colour of the coal in *M*.

If I am looking at a white wall, and suddenly my experience starts to cycle randomly for some internal reason through a rainbow of colours, there is a very good question to be asked about whether or not I am still seeing the wall. Perhaps I am still seeing the shape and position of the wall, but am I not seeing the colour of the wall?<sup>56</sup> The experience of these colours which the wall does not have "screens off" my experience of the actual colour of the wall. In contrast, for example, the water does not screen off the colour of the submerged stick. I see the colour of the stick through the water. *Mouches volantes* do not screen off the colour of the sky when I "look through" them. But it looks plausible at least that in this scenario that the colour kaleidoscope would screen off the colour of the wall, in which case I would not be seeing the colour of the wall, but rather merely experiencing the "colour show".<sup>57</sup>

The answer to Maund's question about the simultaneous-complex theory of Price and Broad is the answer that the representationalist gives, namely that the interpretation, *p*, is an interpretation of the object manifest in experience: what Price and Broad would have called the sense-datum. This is independent of the veridicality of experience, for the psychology of an experience is a matter

<sup>56</sup> Here, Jackson's (1977) answer is best. The wall is white, and so I am only seeing the colour of the wall when I "phenomenally" see the whiteness of the wall. Of course, if I put on blue glasses, things are surely different, for what I am seeing is the wall behind the glasses. There is perhaps a tricky problem here of why "faulty brain wiring" behaves differently from the glasses. Indeed, why should inverting lenses behave differently from glasses? However, I lack the space to go into this here. But I do note it as a looming difficulty.

<sup>57</sup> This is different from a case where a kaleidoscope of lights are shone on the wall. In this case, the experience would be veridical, for the wall does change colour in this case. At least I would argue this if I had the space to enquire into the metaphysics of colours.

of the subjective element of experience, how things are *for the subject*.<sup>58</sup>

The content of experience is the subjective content, what the subject could glean from the experience. Consider a non-conceptual theory of content. On this theory, the content of experience is what the subject can conceptualise directly from the experience. On a conceptualist account of perception, the contents of perception are identical to the conceptual articulation of the propositional content. In the example of the room above, the content of my experience would not have involved the concept CUBE. Likewise, on inverted earth, the property *yellow*, the property exemplified by the sky was not represented to me as the concept YELLOW was not involved in the experience. And it seems equally mysterious to me how an application of YELLOW *in experience* could give rise to a representation of (an instance of) the property *blue* as it could be that a blue sense-datum could be sensed as yellow.<sup>59</sup>

Consider the following (slightly silly but hopefully illustrative) scenario to make this old point about the relation between our concepts and the experiences on which their acquisition rests. There is a tube into which balls are dropped. At the bottom, the balls are collected in a basket, and these are inspected by some people whose task it is to note down the properties of the balls, the "qualia". At the top of the tube are the "external balls". If one is dropped into the tube and then collected in the basket, this is a "veridical experience". What if the tube is adjusted such that for every red ball dropped from the top there is a chamber through which it passes and in this chamber the red ball is swapped for a blue ball. Is this veridical? It is not, for the "quale" exemplified by the ball in the basket is not the quale exemplified by the ball that was dropped into the top. The ball that reaches the basket is not the ball that was dropped. Even if it is systematic that for every red ball dropped a blue ball reaches the basket, it is not veridical in the sense that the ball in the basket is identical with the dropped ball.

Now adopt a bundle-theory of objects and let the balls be dropped into another tube which decomposes the objects into their constituent properties and then reassembles new bundles, i.e. new objects, from properties of the original objects and, perhaps, new properties that appear *ex nihilo* in the chamber, and then deposits these into the basket.<sup>60</sup> Some of these bundles are the original bundles and, perhaps, some not. There are some rules. Each bundle can only have one shape, perhaps. Perhaps there are other rules, but these are mysterious. None of those at the bottom can see the balls as they drop into the top, and no one can directly inspect the workings of the machine.

Someone comes along and notes down the qualia, i.e. all of the properties of the balls in the

<sup>58</sup> See Siegel's (2007) discussion of the 'method of phenomenal contrast' for ascertaining the contents of experience for a comprehensive discussion of this.

<sup>59</sup> Experienced colours and colour concepts are one-to-one in this sense (excepting the determinate-determinable dimension). I do not think that this is a controversial position. Certainly, I can represent the colour yellow with "the colour of lemons", but this is not like the content of an experience.

<sup>60</sup> And do not worry too much about any metaphysical problems inherent in this illustrative example!

basket. Are these "qualia" properties of objects that were dropped into the tube or not? This person does not know. But they do know if the ball is red or blue, for it "being red or blue" in this analogy is for it to be *appearing* red or blue.

When I introspect my experience, as the qualia of the balls are inspected, it is not possible that the object that appears in my experience could *appear* to be any way other than it is in the experience, for my experience *is* its appearing. To hold otherwise would be equivalent to holding that a red sense-datum can be sensed as yellow. This would be to reintroduce another level of sense-data as the sense-data are introduced to account for the appearance/is distinction, and a regress would follow.

The spectrum inversion and inverted-earth examples get their purchase from the claim that the inverted-experience, say, of the coal still represents the red of the coal, only via a "blue feeling" experience, and that the inverted-earth experience of the sky represents at first the yellow of the sky with a 'blue feeling' experience, and then perhaps that this content switches and the experience comes to represent yellow. These conclusions are incompatible with representationalism (that is not Shoemaker's). However, as I have argued, these scenarios do not in themselves show that the representational theory is false, for the inversion scenarios only in themselves show that there will be misrepresentation when inversion occurs. The representational thesis can be preserved. As per transparency and Byrne's argument, the properties manifest in experience are the representata of the experience and if the representata change it is because the way in which the representation presents representata has changed, i.e. the content has changed.

The qualia externalist, holds that the represented qualitative properties in experience are properties of external objects when experiences are veridical. On regular earth, an inverted subject is misrepresenting. On inverted earth, if I direct my gaze towards the sky and I come to have an experience which is internally indistinguishable from experiences on earth, then I will also be misrepresenting. If the contents of the experience comes to change, then the sky will appear yellow: the representatum will be yellow, and I will have an experience with "yellow phenomenology".<sup>61</sup> This does not render the past experience a representation *of the blue of the sky* with a yellow phenomenology: where there was previously a relation to a blue representatum, there is now a relation to a yellow representatum. The property *yellow* was not represented in the experience previously, because it was not represented *to me* in the sense described above. My experience, if it is analysed in purely physical notions, represents, in Grice's sense of natural meaning, a host of things none of which are semantically represented to me in the experience.

Inversion scenarios get their anti-representational purchase from a combination with content externalism, representationalism and the assumption of qualia internalism, i.e. that the qualia

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<sup>61</sup> Rather it will appear that the sky is yellow; it will only appear *of the sky* that it is yellow if the experience is an illusory experience of the sky with respect to its colour.



supervene on the internal state of the subject. These three these are mutually inconsistent, and one of them has to be rejected. To reject qualia internalism is to reject that the qualia in experience, or the phenomenal character of experience, supervene on the internal state of the subject. As content externalism for thoughts is widely accepted,<sup>62</sup> it seems natural to accept the same thesis for experiences. This is so even more on a representationalist theory. Qualia internalism gets its purchase from intuition and difficulties arising thereof with respect to the inverted spectrum/inverted earth.

These difficulties arise with the question over whether the contents of experiences change on inverted earth, whether the contents of thoughts change, whether the qualia change, and how to integrate these three dimensions of possible change. As I am defending a judgement theory, whereby experience is conceptually articulated and the very same concepts are applied in experience as are applied in thought, there is no real possibility that a concept as applied in experience and judgement could alter in its content in one attitude but not the other. Thus, there is a neat reduction here from three possible dimensions of change to two. Now, one might hold that as there are strong intuitions here regarding the possibility of deviation here that this is a point against this position. However, this intuition does not seem to me compelling. The other intuition is qualia internalism, which can be very neatly explicated as a position that bears a very close resemblance to a theory on which a brain state, call it *B*, is identical to, or sufficient for, a sensing of a sense-datum with fixed properties. On this position, fixing *B* in *s* will result in *s* sensing, say, a blue sense-datum. This part of the argument is very close to the causal argument from hallucination for sense-data. Indeed, as sensing a sense-datum is one type of quale, a relational quale, then the causal argument from hallucination for sense-data is but one variation of a general argument of this type. However, should one reject sense-data and adverbial modifications (which one can for good independent reasons), then it is unclear to me why one should accept this for qualia of any kind.

Note that this position would not be accepted by a proponent of the theory of appearing, for a quale on this theory is identified with the appearing relation (on this theory, a quale is a property of this relation). This generalises to any externalist theory. Exactly how a general externalist semantical theory is to be cashed out is an enormous question that I obviously cannot engage with here. Further, I have not engaged with the question of how the inverted earth scenario cashes out with respect to a change in memory which accompanies a change in representational content. However, space-constraints mean that I must leave this discussion here.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Although not exclusively accepted. The externalism to which I am referring is the classic externalism advanced in Putnam (1975) and Burge (1986).

<sup>63</sup> Tye (1995) and (2000), for example, argues for a causal co-variation account with reference to optimal conditions. Dretske (1995) argues for a teleological indicator semantics. Both of these are subject to general difficulties. One of these, which I do not discuss here is the problem of "swampman", a physical duplicate of, say, me, who according to (at least many) externalist theories of content would have no intentional states. I have to say that I do not find swampman a terribly troublesome intuitive problem. Indeed, I have no *intuitions* at all about swampmen,

The threat that these scenarios pose to the representational theory is that they purport to cleave apart the dimensions of content and psychology in experience. In order to do this, it is required that the psychology diverge from the content. But I have argued that these examples do not show this, for the proponent of the representational theory for the representationalist can rebut these arguments.

## 5 Conclusion

I have argued against the above arguments that a phenomenal element, that which is captured on the sense-data theory by the sensing of a sense-datum, can deviate from the representational content. I now move on, in chapter 4, to discuss the phenomenal aspect of experience in light of this. I argue that, given that the anti-representational arguments can be resisted, and that there is no element of the psychology of experience which deviates from the content leaves the representationalist in the position of being able to analyse out the phenomenal notion. This is achieved by the fact that there is no logical difference between experience and thought in respect of introspection. From there, if a content can be given which explains the difference between experience and thought, then this content is the psychological component of experience. Hence, "what it is like" can be identified with the representational content.

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disembodied brains and the like, and those that I do have are rather externalist. See, for example, Tye (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of this. That these theories face problems is of course clear, however, as Byrne and Tye (2006) point out, because it is not clear which exact general externalist semantical theory we should adopt, it does not follow that we should adopt internalism instead. In respect of inverted-earth, in Block's original inverted-earth example, the subject's thought contents come to change as a result of the dominant linguistic community. However, the phenomenal character stays fixed: hence there is a change which is impossible according to representationalism. According to Block, if the qualia also changed, the subject would come to notice. However, the representationalist can respond that the memory is also inverted. See, e.g., Tye (1998) for a discussion of this. In her discussion of these matters, Macpherson (2005) reaches the conclusion that to avoid the traveller being mistaken about the contents of their experiences, the externalist should only adopt content externalism for thoughts *based on* externalism about experiential content. Restricted to contents in experience and based on experience, thoughts have externalist content, because the experiential content is externalist. This is to set aside the classic Burge-Putnam externalism based (partly) on language community. However, I am sympathetic to this. See my discussion of Mary's Room below, and also the thrust of chapters 5 and 6 is very strongly inclined to such empiricism. Macpherson's conclusion is pertinent as regards the theory that I am defending, as she concludes that the externalist about experiences should be an externalist about thought contents, which of course *are* experiential contents for me, only if the contents of experiences are external. If Macpherson's conclusion is correct, that would tie in very neatly with my judgement-theory.

## Chapter 4 "What it is Like"

### 1 Introduction

I have argued against sense-data, the adverbial theory, the appearing theory, against the arguments that the phenomenal element of experience can deviate from the representational content, from the way in which things seem to us, or how things look, transparently in experience. I have accepted transparency, and defended the representational theory.

Let me move on now to reductive representationalism, the thesis that the phenomenal character is identical to the representational content. Recall, the matter at hand is whether experiences have any *phenomenal psychological* elements which *constitutively* individuate them as a different mode of the mental from judgements.

This brings me to a very tricky exegetical as well as philosophical matter, namely *exactly* what is meant by terms such as 'qualia' and 'phenomenal character', when the non-reductive representational theory is adhered to. If it is accepted that the above arguments for the position that the psychology of experience can diverge from the representational content can be rejected, then what is left of the notion of phenomenal character? Why think that there is a different supervening but not identical property involved? There are reasons, of course, but in this section I would like to question whether they are compelling ones. The resulting position is that experiences have a content *p* (it does matter as to the conceptual nature of *p*, but not yet), and the psychology of experience does not *deviate* from *p* but the psychology is phenomenal in a way that thinking that *p* is not: the psychology does not diverge from *p*, but it is not exhausted by it either.

To rehearse the point I quoted Langsam making above, consider an experience with content *p*, and consider a thought that *p*. On this line of thought, one could see (*mutatis mutandis* other modalities) that *p* and also judge that *p* (we will see that this is only true on one account of experiences, but the intuitive point is what matters). In the seeing but not thought, there is "phenomenal character". Levine, for example, argues the following about the 'qualitative character'.

Qualitative character concerns the "what it is like" for me: reddish or greenish, painful or pleasurable, and the like. From within the subjective point of view I am presented with these qualitative features of experience, or "qualia", as they are called in the literature. Reddishness, for instance, is a feature of my experience when I look at my red diskette case.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Levine (2001) p. 7

So, according to Levine, I can discern the 'reddishness' of my experience of something red. I am focusing here on the difference between experience and thought, the 'phenomenal' difference, and I would like to argue that there is no such things as 'reddishness', that there is no such qualitative element to experience which differs from thought.<sup>2</sup> However, this way of looking at experiences faces opposition from the very way in which matters are initially conceived.<sup>3</sup> Something *has* to have been left out. Here, for example, is Chalmers again.

Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content.<sup>4</sup>

Consider representationalism as defended so far. An experience of a red square is a relation between *s*, a content *p*, and a represented red square. The visual properties, i.e. red and squareness, are properties of the representatum (which may or may not be exemplified). The psychological element is *p*: (loosely) that there is a red square there, or that that red square is there.<sup>5</sup> If the proponent of phenomenal character is claiming that phenomenal character is solely the property that experiences have and that thoughts lack of making, for example, colours manifest in experience in a way that they are not in thought, then once the anti-representational arguments have been rebutted, all that remains is this different property of experiences, but this is not to invoke qualia, reddishness, etc., in the sense in which this notion is invoked by its proponents as properties of the experience which are psychologically manifest in experience. However, Kriegel, for example, begins a recent paper with the following passage.

When you look at the sky, you have what we may call for now a 'blue experience' ... On the one hand, the experience is of blueness, in that it represents something blue. On the other hand, the experience feels bluey, if you will, in that there is a distinctive way it is like – from the inside, as it were – to undergo experiences of its type; this bluey way-it-is-like is how the experience presents itself to introspection. We can call the former aspect of experience its representational content, and the latter its phenomenal character.<sup>6</sup>

Kriegel then says of (reductive) representational theories the following.

<sup>2</sup> One way, which I obviously reject, of perhaps arguing for this would be to hold that phenomenal character is just one kind of a general such conscious character, a determinate of a determinable for example. However, even the proponents of this position usually hold that there is an equivalent difference between experience and thought, only this is a difference in the type of phenomenal character. See below.

<sup>3</sup> Recall many of the passages quoted above.

<sup>4</sup> Chalmers (2003) p. 220

<sup>5</sup> Of course, most hold this to be non-conceptual below.

<sup>6</sup> Kriegel (2002a) p. 175

representational accounts persistently give rise – everything said and done – to a feeling that something essential has been left out in the process of their theorization of conscious experience; indeed, that it is the very experientiality of experience, if you will, that is missing.<sup>7</sup>

This is an *in principle* claim that the 'bluely feel', the experientiality' of experience, must be absent in principle on such theories. This 'bluely feel' is the same as Levine's reddishness' and the same as Chalmers' 'phenomenal what it is like', and Loar's \*-properties. Elsewhere, in response to Tye, Kriegel makes it clear that this is indeed so, at least insofar as he is concerned.

there are a priori reasons to suspect that no representational theory could account for the difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states. A representational theory must claim that the difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states is a difference in *what those states represent*. Therefore, a representational theory would have to identify certain environmental features that all and only phenomenal states represent. But *prima facie* it seems that every environmental feature can be represented either consciously or non- consciously. To suppose otherwise is to affirm the existence of environmental features which only lend themselves to conscious representation. It is implausible that the world should happen to contain such features.<sup>8</sup>

However, the first claim here is ambiguous between contents picking out different properties in experience and thought, and the content picking out the same properties under a different range of contents.<sup>9</sup> This difference in range of contents can then be identified as the difference between experience and thought, and so the latter claim does not follow. Nevertheless, something *a priori*, or an "immediately plain fact", or something "obvious", to some degree underwrites opposition to this position.<sup>10</sup> The difference between *seeing* the blue of the sky and thinking about the sky is, it seems, an introspectible difference in kind between at least one type of property which thoughts lack and which experience have: a specific phenomenal property. But once the actual examples of alleged scenarios in which the content and the phenomenal character *diverge* have been rebutted,<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Kriegel (2002a) p. 176

<sup>8</sup> Kriegel (2002b) p. 56. This mirrors the point made with respect to physicalism and functionalism that there is an essential quality to the mental, especially experience, which these accounts must leave out, only the concern is with the representationalism.. Reductive representationalism, and functionalism which is closely related, are usually offered as a first step in a physical account of the mind (e.g., Dretske, Lycan, Harman, Tye) and the attack on reductive representationalism is often an attack on the first step in this argument. This is not necessarily so, however, as Block, for example, espouses physicalism.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, the debate surrounding Jackson's Mary's Room argument. I discuss this below.

<sup>10</sup> Of course, this is not to say that proponents of the opposing position just point and say "Look! There they are, and that's it. End of discussion". Nevertheless, I think that this is often a case of ingeniously defending an intuition that many would not give up no matter what. See Dennett (1997) for a similar thought. Qualia, experiential properties, something over A-consciousness, etc., seems to be necessary, so this line goes, to avoid the "hollowing out of the mental", or some such less than clear notion, I suspect.

<sup>11</sup> Of course, it is rather unlikely proponents of this position will accept these rebuttals. However, following on from the previous note, I wonder if this is because, in part at least, they find these rebuttals implausible because they are convinced at the outset of this. See, e.g., Dretske's (1996) discussion of qualia internalism.

why think this? Let me now ask this question in detail.

In §2, I explore the intuition behind the thought that there is "something that it is like" which experiences have and thoughts lack, some phenomenal element. I argue that this can be rejected, and in §3 and §4 I describe how this can be carried out.

## 2 *The Intuition*

An experience of a red square has the following elements: an object, a relation of some sort between the subject and the object, and the subjective psychological element of the experience. On the representational theory of experiences as applied to an experience of a red square, the red square is the former, the representation relation the second, and the content the latter. What has been left out if the subjective element of this relation is taken to be psychologically exhausted by the content? Consider the following passage from Lycan regarding two distinct meanings of the locutions 'what it is like' and 'qualitative character'.

both expressions, "qualitative character" and "what it is like" (as well as "phenomenal character/property"), are now ambiguous and in just the same way. Each has been used to mean the sort of qualitative property that characteristically figures in a sensory experience, such as yellow-orangeness, pitch, or the smell – call these "Q properties". Each has also been used to mean the higher-order property of "what it is like" for the subject to experience the relevant Q-property. To see that these are quite distinct, notice: (i) The higher-order "what it's like" property is higher-order; it is a property *of* the relevant Q-property. (ii) A Q- property is normally described in one's public natural language, while what it is like to experience that Q-property seems to be ineffable. Suppose you are having a yellowy-orange after-image and Jack asks you, "How, exactly, does the after-image look to you as regards color?" You reply, "It looks yellowy-orange". "But", persists Jack, "can you tell me, descriptively rather than comparatively or demonstratively, what it's like to experience that 'yellow-orange' look?" At this point, if you are like me, words fail you; all you can say is, "It's like ... *this*; I can't put it into words". Thus, the Q-property, the subjective color itself, can be specified in ordinary English, but what it is like to experience that Q-property cannot be.<sup>12</sup>

This passage neatly illustrates an ambiguity. On the one hand there are what Lycan calls the Q-properties. These are the properties of the representata. On the other hand there is 'what it is like' *to represent* a Q-property. The former is the 'look' in the sense of a visual property, and the latter an element of the psychological, subjective look. The latter look appears to be a property of the

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<sup>12</sup> Lycan (2004) pp. 98-99

representation, some sort of property of the experience which supervenes on its terms (setting aside phenomenist qualia), one of Loar's supervening \*-properties.

So, according to Lycan, the Q-properties, first-order qualia, are properties experienced, i.e. properties of the representata. To ask what a Q-property, i.e. a represented property, is, or what a Q-property is like, is to ask what, say, red or yellow things are like. That is to ask after what is experienced. To ask what is it *like to experience* that property is a question that cannot be answered, for it is ineffable, and is not identical to the Q-property or representing the Q-property. Lycan puts this that is is a property *of* the Q-property. But as experiences are representations of properties such as yellow and red, the higher-order property must surely be a higher-order property of this relation, and not a higher-order property of the Q-property in itself (otherwise this property is a disposition to be experienced and that for that experience to be the object of a higher-order thought). A Q-property is a property like *red*, and the only higher-order property of *red* that could play this role is that of *red* (or rather something red) being a Q-property, i.e. its being experienced; or, to return to the terminology I quoted Lycan as using in chapter 1, it is for it to be a quale. But, then, this is just to say that in experience red is a quale and in thought it is not. And what could this mean over and above that in experience I represent red differently than I do in thought? However, set this aside temporarily, for there is a matter of exegesis that requires untangling, namely whether or not everyone really means the same thing, and, if not, what then do they mean.

Lycan defends a higher-order theory of consciousness in general, but experiences are different from thoughts in that when they are conscious, i.e. when they are the object of a higher-order thought, they have a *phenomenal* character as opposed to other first-order representations, such as my representation of Aristotle.<sup>13</sup> Another proponent of this position is Carruthers (2000), where an equivalent distinction is drawn between 'worldly subjectivity' and 'experiential subjectivity'. Worldly subjectivity and first-order qualia are the same: representations of properties and objects. Experiential subjectivity and first-order qualia are 'what the world is like', i.e. how things are represented as being. For example, reddish-orange. Lycan and Carruthers hold that an experience can have the very same content, and there be something that it is like (namely that *p*) without there being anything that it is like *for the subject*. This requires a higher-order thought, and the higher-order thought being directed at the first-order experience is what it is for an experience to have a conscious phenomenal character. The content of the first-order thought is still "doing the work", so to speak, but it is not sufficient.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> There is an internecine debate between proponents of higher-order theories of consciousness regarding whether or not it ought to be an inner quasi-perception, for example Armstrong (1968) and Lycan (1996), or thought, for example Rosenthal (1985) and (2005). I will elide this distinction and talk only of higher-order thoughts.

<sup>14</sup> Higher-order theories of consciousness in general are not the subject here, but this discussion is central to the way that matters are conceived in some of the central literature. As I leave consciousness in general unanalysed, I need not take a stand on a general theory of consciousness. However, it must be noted that it could not be that unconscious experiences, if there are such things, are unconscious judgements as there are no such things as

Matters now become extremely tricky, for it is not always clear as to which theory pertains to which feature, or which alleged feature, of experiences. The first distinction is between representationalists and phenomenists about experiences. Set aside phenomenism about experiences, and focus on the representationalist's two-way supervenience claim, i.e. psychology on content and vice-versa. The supervenience of psychology on content is the standard claim: there could be no 'phenomenal' difference without a difference in content. The opposite direction is also required for the judgement-theory: there could be no difference in content without a phenomenal difference. However, my argument here is that once the former supervenience claim is accepted, it is not clear that there really is any notion of phenomenal character left that could serve as a supervenience base for the representational content.

According to the representationalist, the red in an experience of a red square is the red of the representatum, the red of the red square. As with Lycan, a quale is an experientially represented property. That an experience has phenomenal character is that it is particular type of representation of a property. So, expressing the content as  $p$ , how it seem is:  $p$ . The properties determined of an object by  $p$  are the qualia: e.g., in Lycan's first-order terms, red and square. Thus, these qualia are not really properties of the experience, but properties of the representata. To ask how the experience 'feels' is really to ask what the content is. The experience "feels like" that  $p$ . Thus, it seems to me that there is not really a robust notion of there being some feel, or something that it is like. Contrast this with, say, Block's theory. On Block's theory, spectrum inversion is accepted and something that looks structurally to me to be very much like the sense-data theory is inferred. The properties manifest in experience are not properties of the representata, but mental paint or mental oil, something which has at least some qualitative element.

There is a "feel" to experience, a phenomenal character, in the sense that there are properties exemplified, or objects sensed (although Block does not say this) which have qualitative properties, and this is defined in direct opposition to thought.<sup>15</sup>

The notion of the experiential 'phenomenal' is defined in direct contrast to thought. However, just as it does not immediately follow from the difference between experience and non-experiential thought that there is a sensing relation to sense-data, it likewise does not immediately follow that there are other qualia either. Consider this argument. The sense-data theory assumes

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unconscious judgements. Recourse to a higher-order theory of consciousness would only be necessary if there was a persuasive argument to the effect that there is some problem which a first-order theory of consciousness in general cannot handle. I do not think that there is, but to argue for this would exceed the scope of the thesis as it pertains to perception. The distinction, used by Levine above of there being a difference between what the *object* of experience is like and what it is like *for the subject*, if taken to enforce a distinction in elements of experience which supports a higher-order theory in general, is not one that seem to me to be persuasive. The argument here is that  $p$  characterises how things are, but not how things are *for me*: this is a separate subjective element. However, if  $s$  judges or sees that  $p$ , then how things are for  $s$  is that  $p$ , and this covers both elements as  $p$  is the content of  $s$ 's judgement or experience. See, for example, Byrne's (2004) Section 4 Part 1 discussion of Rosenthal's (2002) use of this distinction.

<sup>15</sup> This is in fact the way in which Lewis (1929) introduces the word 'quale', as a property of 'the given'. This is very close to a sense-data theory on which qualia are properties of sense-data and experiences are sensings of sense-data.



(on the basis of, to my mind at least, a rather unsound set of observations) the phenomenal principle, the sensing relation and sense-data. The reason that I rejected this apparatus is that I found that there are good arguments against it, and these good arguments turn on the rejection of the phenomenal principle in favour of an understanding of "looks" which is, or is closely related to, Jackson's epistemic use. This use of looks is actually an analysis of the relation that the proponent of sense-data (mistakenly) analyses as the sensing relation. If the use is genuinely epistemic, then there are no more sense-data, or relational qualia, in experience as there are in thought, the canonical example of an epistemic attitude. Once one finds oneself unpersuaded by the arguments that there are psychological elements which can deviate from the content, although one may find difficulty with further features of, for example, Dretske and Tye's theories, should one of the difficulties be that they have failed to account in some way for some psychological element of phenomenal character or qualia?

Lycan is in agreement with Tye and Dretske that the problems posed by, for example, Block's inversion scenarios do not validate the anti-representationalist claim that there is some psychological element that does not supervene on the content. He is in agreement with Tye and Dretske that experience, as opposed to thought, need not be partially analysed in terms of (for the sake of argument) monadic experiential qualia. Tye and Dretske still think that experience is not just thought, and Lycan agrees. Here, however, there is a parting of opinion. Tye and Dretske hold that experiences are phenomenal mental acts because of their content, specifically the type of content, and the functional role of experience, and Lycan because they are also the objects of higher-order thought. According to Lycan, the higher-order quale is the first-order experience being the representatum of a higher-order mental act.

According to Lycan and also Carruthers,<sup>16</sup> an experience could have the same content whether or not the subject was phenomenally conscious *of* the experience.<sup>17</sup> Consider Armstrong's (1981) sleepy lorry-driver who suddenly "comes-to" after a long period of driving unawares. Presumably, he managed to navigate the road for an extended period of time through something other than mere chance when he "switched off". Speaking with the lack of care inherent in everyday talk, the driver "saw the road but wasn't conscious of it". We can perhaps draw from this that it is possible to see *y* and not be aware of *y* or conscious of *y*, or to see *y* but not be aware or

<sup>16</sup> And also Rosenthal, who puts forward this position even with regard to a Blockian phenomenist quale!

<sup>17</sup> This is not a very helpful use of the word "experience" as some experiences are non-conscious. "Experience" could be replaced by "representational state with a certain content". This makes Lycan's and Carruthers' first-order states look rather like sub-personal states. Maund (2002) makes this point specifically with respect to Tye and Dretske's non-conceptual content (non-epistemic seeing), and mentions, at p. 38, that Heil also raises the same question as Dretske. Of course, Heil (1983) defends a theory similar to the theory that I am defending here, and anyone sympathetic to a conceptualism about experiences will wonder whether or not non-conceptual content is really sub-personal content. There is a problem of interpretation with regard to Evans (1982) concerning this, where the notion is introduced.

conscious of seeing it, and that one can experience that *p* unconsciously.<sup>18</sup> Lycan and Carruthers explicitly draw from examples like this that there is level of first-order qualia or worldly subjectivity which is not in itself intrinsically phenomenally *conscious*, although it is phenomenal, *and* a level of higher-order qualia or experiential subjectivity, whereby the former becomes phenomenally *conscious*. Thus, the very same distinction between non-phenomenal thought and phenomenal experience is maintained, only it is made with respect to an independent difference: the first-order experiential content requires supplementation by a higher-order thought in order for there to be a phenomenally conscious experience, but this *phenomenal* consciousness is still a feature of experiences but not thought.<sup>19</sup>

The central contention that I am rebutting here is that typified in many of the quoted passages, namely that there is a quality to experience which will always be lacking on a judgement-theory. I am in agreement with Lycan that the locution “what it is like” is not useful, despite its ubiquity. However, it seems to me not to be useful not because it is ambiguous, but because it is not clear that it is at all required. There seems to me be nothing that a judgement-theory will leave out, if, that is, representationalism is accepted.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Neither of these are linguistically very pleasing. Note that this is different from a case where, for example, I see a white rabbit in a snowy field, but I see it as a patch of snow. In this case, I definitely did see the rabbit, and I was conscious and aware of this, only I saw the rabbit as a patch of snow.

<sup>19</sup> So, Block's view, as I understand it, is that experiences are representational, but the *phenomenal* character is identified with the exemplification of P-consciousness properties, mental paint (and maybe mental oil). Strip away this mental paint and, (unless some version of inverse-representationalism is adopted) the content *could* remain the same but the “phenomenological light” would go out: there would be nothing that it is “like” in the phenomenal sense. There would still be some conscious occurrent mental activity, for there would be A-consciousness (this is the solution for blindsight). This is a different picture from the Lycan-Carruthers view. Stripping off the mental paint “puts the light out” for Block, but in order to “put the light out” for Lycan and Carruthers it is a different property that is removed, namely the higher-order relation. This job is done for Block by mental paint and mental oil on the first-order level, so to speak. The “inner light” for Block appear to be (the relation that subjects are in to, or the exemplification of) the properties that Russell would have taken to be properties of sense-data, that Peacocke takes to be primed properties of the visual field, and that the adverbialist takes to be monadic properties of the mind. This is also Chalmers' position, but, unlike Peacocke and Block, Chalmers does not believe in phenomenist qualia. On an inverse-representational theory, the content supervenes on the exemplification of these properties and so to remove these properties is to remove experiential consciousness *in toto*. Unlike Block, for whom stripping away the mental paint leaves the subject solely A-conscious, *unless* the P-consciousness is the vehicle of A-consciousness and not merely attendant mental paint (in which case Block would be an inverse-representationalist; sometimes Block is a little unclear as to which of these options he favours). According to Lycan and Carruthers, the subject can be *visually conscious* of the red square, but not *phenomenally* conscious of the (experience of the) red square. However, being merely visually conscious, but not phenomenally conscious, is not what being solely A-conscious is for Block because being A-conscious for Block is still for the subject to be in an occurrent, conscious, mental state (or at least I take this to be the difference between Block's A-consciousness in experience, and Lycan and Carruthers' non-conscious experiences). For Lycan and Carruthers, first-order states are not really conscious states at all in the sense that there be an element of “for-me-ness” which is required for conscious experience, until they are the objects of higher-order states. As far as I can see, Rosenthal invokes *all* of these properties and relations, only the higher-order level is representational, and the first-order level phenomenist! Lycan and Carruthers have a *dual-level* representationalism, with the higher-order representational level again being the locus of consciousness. Tye and Dretske defend a first-order representational theory of consciousness, as does Block except his is a phenomenist theory. The present point, namely whether there really is anything like a phenomenal distinction between experience and thought in a robust sense, does not turn on a higher-order or first-order theory, *except* for the fact that, as I am defending a judgement-theory, experiences must be conscious first-order as there can be no unconscious judgements (I take this to be a matter of definition: it might even turn out to be better for me if there could be unconscious judgements; but there cannot).

<sup>20</sup> Hence, the question of inverse-representationalism falls away. Standard representationalism is the position that the

### 3 Leaving Something Out?

This position is not often put forward. Dennett, especially (1997),<sup>21</sup> is an exception, and also Pitcher (1971).<sup>22</sup> Dennett defines the standard notion of qualia in the first paragraph as follows.

Look at a glass of milk at sunset; *the way it looks to you*. The particular personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the *quale* of your visual experience at the moment. The *way the milk tastes to you then* is another, gustatory *quale*, and *how it sounds to you* as you swallow is an auditory *quale* ... let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes's evil demon, and yet what the figment is *made of* (for you) will be the *qualia* of your hallucinatory experiences.<sup>23</sup>

The last sentence makes qualia look like qualia in Lycan's first-order sense, the first sentences as qualia in the other sense, i.e. a property of the experience (which is not the property of having a range of content). We are asked to focus not on the way that it is, but on the way it looks. But this is: "white", "liquid", "in that glass", "on the table", and so on.<sup>24</sup> Familiarly, its looking that way has none of these properties. Its looking that way is my being visually conscious of it (otherwise it would always *look* that way, as opposed to sometimes its visual properties, which are the properties it always has, sometimes being seen!). The representational analysis of this is that it is represented under a content, and if there are no psychological elements to the experience other than this content, then this exhausts the way that it looks.

This is the position of Dretske, Harman, and Tye (as well as Lycan and Carruthers, with the

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phenomenal character supervenes on the content. This is non-reductive. But I am arguing that the non-reductive position leaves nothing out, and so we can move straight to reductive or eliminative representationalism. The question of inverse-representationalism now falls away, for there is no distinction to be made as there is no phenomenal notion to invoke.

<sup>21</sup> However, I do not want to rely on Dennett's verificationist arguments. Dennett also seems to be targeting the very notion of *consciousness* itself as construed by many participants in the debate, and not merely phenomenal consciousness as distinct from the consciousness involved in thought, even though his examples are experiential.

<sup>22</sup> 'There can be no doubt that one's first reaction to the thesis that seeing something consists of nothing but acquiring certain true beliefs about it by use of one's eyes is to dismiss it as obviously false ... If, for example, our man with the insect on his paper comes, as the result of using his eyes in a certain way - I mean, by looking at the insect and the paper - to believe, truly, and in fact to know, such things as that there is a piece of paper lying before him ... and so on - then is this not enough to constitute his actually seeing the insect and the piece of paper. What more could be required? It will doubtless be objected that what is left out of this account is the very essence of seeing - namely the sensuous visual presentation or manifold. But the answer to his might well be that to be aware of, or to have, that visual presentation or manifold just *is* to know, by means of using one's eyes that there is a piece of paper ...' Pitcher (1971) p. 66. This is a "no-experiences" theory, as Pitcher takes perceptions to be purely sub-personal non-conscious causal events which merely dispose us to believe, although he does speak, at pp. 56-58, of the acquisition as possibly a conscious event. I discuss Pitcher's theory, and his objection to mine, in more detail below, where I argue for a judgement-theory (which according to Pitcher is 'absurd!'). Armstrong (1968) and Roxbee-Cox (1971) also defend similar theories.

<sup>23</sup> Dennett (1997) p. 619

<sup>24</sup> How it tastes is difficult to put into words, but this is likely because we do not require *words* of such detail in order to practically communicate. After all, the level and range of detail in vision, for which our language is more finely honed, is far greater than in auditory perception or in taste. Nevertheless, we do have the demonstrative "that", which suffices if the property determined is commonly available.

proviso regarding a second-order theory of consciousness in general). The red in experience is a property of the red square, and this is the 'quale'. If it is conceded that the experience does not possess any of these properties for the experience is a representation of these properties and only the relata possess these properties, and the relata are not sense-data but the same objects that are the objects of thoughts, the difference between experience and thought comes down to a difference in the content and the properties of the object that feature in the content, or a difference in attitude/functional role.

Recall intermodal and intramodal representationalism from chapter 3. The intramodal representationalist holds that there is a psychological component inherent in each modality; in contrast, the intermodal representationalist holds that there is a different range of contents for each modality.<sup>25</sup> Experiences, on the reductive-representational view, can differ from judgement in two ways. One, the experience has a different functional role.<sup>26</sup> Two, the experience has a different content. Both Tye and Dretske accept these two theses, but this makes the difference between thought and experience look rather like the difference between, say, touch and sight: and I have already argued that the analysis of this difference need not invoke qualia.<sup>27</sup> Tye and Dretske, and Lycan and Carruthers, however, analyse the difference in content as a difference in *type* of content, i.e. non-conceptual, and not the range of content. Thus in a weak sense, they still advocate a form of qualia where qualia are psychologically manifest elements of experiences which are absent from judgements: qualia are *non-conceptual* contents. Exactly how a content being non-conceptual itself should explain why experiences have phenomenal character is a little unclear to me.<sup>28</sup>

To say that qualia are properties of representata is to dramatically weaken the position if the representational content is non-conceptual and the difference between thought consists in this (and perhaps a difference in functional role). On Dretske's view, the question about what it is like to see red is just a question as to what red is. However, although this is in essence correct, in my opinion, it has to be rephrased slightly. For what red is like is red, but what it is like to see red is that *p*, where *p* is something like "there is something red over there", only as we will see below, if the content is non-conceptual there are difficulties.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> The consequence of this is that the modalities are at least partially defined in terms of the content.

<sup>26</sup> Kriegel (2002b) argues that this renders the representational theory really a brand of functionalism in disguise: the difference in psychology is analysed as a difference in functional role. However, I am really denying that there is a difference in psychology in kind or type, and so this argument, even if it effective against, say Tye or Dretske, is less effective against the theory being proposed here.

<sup>27</sup> Or, rather, I sketched a common position in the literature. It is generally accepted that there is at least a very good probability that the intermodal representational position can be elucidated and defended successfully.

<sup>28</sup> See my discussion of this in chapter 5.

<sup>29</sup> For example, Dretske says that 'knowing what bats, fish, and neighbours experience is, in principle, no different from knowing how things "seem" to a measuring instrument. In both cases it is a question of determining how a system is representing the world'. Dretske (1995) pp. 81-82. How the system is representing the world is different from that which is represented. But the representation is transparent to the representata. So, strictly speaking, how things seem to me when I see red is not red, for that would make the seeming red, but "that there is a red thing there" or somesuch. Only representing "that there is a red thing there" *is* to experience the red directly, at least on the

I think that the difference between seeing red and thinking of red is, then, that in one case red is before the mind in a particular way and in the other not. The difference between what seeing red is like and what thinking about red is like is, I would say, that in seeing red what red is is revealed in the way that we call visual.<sup>30</sup> I contend that none of this, however, is enough to introduce qualia in any form. Consider again Tye's description of transparency.

you are directly aware of a range of qualities which you experience as being qualities of surfaces at various distances away and orientations *and thereby* via introspection, you are aware of the phenomenal character of experience. By being aware of external qualities, you are aware of what it is like for you.<sup>31</sup>

This makes it look rather like Tye is arguing that phenomenal character is something that one is aware of by being aware of external qualities. But this is nothing that one is not aware of in experience. Perhaps one can compare an experience of red with a thought of red, and thereby come to know that there is a difference. But the difference now perhaps is only that in experience external qualities such as red are "revealed" (my way of putting it) in a way that they are not in thought. In a reply to Maund who enquires about this, Tye says the following.

if you try to introspect a visual experience, say, you will certainly become aware *that* you are directly aware of various surfaces and qualities, which you experience as being qualities of the surfaces, but you will not find yourself being aware, as you introspect, of an inner token experience or of any qualities of an inner experience. By being aware of the qualities and surfaces outside (or apparently outside), you are aware that you have an experience with a certain phenomenal character. That is all.<sup>32</sup>

Maund wonders why say that there is a phenomenal character to the experience at all.

Tye's theory is that the phenomenal qualities that we discriminate are qualities specifiable in the content of the experience, and are not intrinsic qualities of the experience. But if this is so, Tye's theory is that the phenomenal qualities that we discriminate are qualities specifiable in the content of

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theory that I am defending. As a mere measuring system arguably (at the very least) cannot take up the content of this representation into its cognitive or further rational system as the measuring machine is not a subject, it is (very) unlikely that the machine is really having an experience. Demarcating the mental is a problem for a theory like Dretske's, but I do not engage with this matter here. It seems to me that Dretske has a problem with this element of his theory, but it seems to me that he is quite correct about qualia as standardly conceived.

<sup>30</sup> Likely, I would say, because as a matter of fact, colours can only be known through vision. Hence, these two notions, vision, and visual properties, are inter-defined. This is not circular, however, as visual properties is a name for a class of properties and not an analysis of what they are.

<sup>31</sup> Tye (2002b) p. 48. I have rephrased this as Tye states in his reply to Maund.

<sup>32</sup> Tye (2002) p. 48

the experience, and are not intrinsic qualities of the experience. But if this is so, I find it difficult to understand how there is a difference between what results when I introspect my perceptual experience of a brown shoe on the floor as opposed to what results when I introspect my belief that there is a brown shoe.<sup>33</sup>

Maund's point applies not only to Tye, but to any proponent of transparency and representationalism.<sup>34</sup> Maund takes the above to be an implausibility. In his reply, Tye takes Maund to have mis-stated his thesis. He says that the introspected content is non-conceptual, abstract (i.e. general and not particular) and that is poised in a certain way as regards thought and action.<sup>35</sup> But why should such things result in experiences having a *phenomenal* character? Why not just say there is not really such a thing as phenomenal character, and do away with the notion?

I see the brown shoe. How does it look? Let us say that it looks to be brown. But the shoe is brown (at least insofar as it is represented as brown), the *way* that it looks is "brown",<sup>36</sup> not brown. The "is" here is attributive and not exemplificative. I can focus on the brown of the shoe, or on the way that it looks, i.e. "brown". Now, consider my thought that the brown shoe is there. I can focus on the object of the thought, the shoe, and its represented properties, one of which is its being brown, or on the *way* that I think of it, as "brown". Maund interprets Tye's theory as purely representational-relational in the sense that it is solely a relation to a propositional content and not (also) to an object, and so he thinks of introspection of experience as introspecting a mental act which is solely a relation to a content. And, as the content and the experience do not have the features of its elements, to introspect the content is to introspect something that is not brown.<sup>37</sup> Tye, however, thinks that as the proposition itself contains the property *brown*, unlike a conceptual proposition which contains only, say, the concept BROWN, then the property *brown* can be introspected. However, as the way that things look is not brown, even if the content contains the property of being brown, or something that is brown, then Maund is correct: all that there is to introspect is that it looks brown, or that it is thought of as brown; i.e. that it is represented as brown. The point is that apart from the fact that in the experience I know of brown in a way that I do not in

<sup>33</sup> Maund (2002) p. 38

<sup>34</sup> Disjunctive proponents of transparency will have to analyse experiences in terms of a sensing relation, or something similar. This is why, for example, Alston and Langsam present the disjunctive theory as a modern version of the theory of appearing with a primitive appearing relation. It is really not clear, to me at any rate, how to gloss, for example, Travis' (2004) notion of "openness" to the world in any way other than this openness being a relation between myself and the world. After all, it is no good the till being open if no one puts their hand in it.

<sup>35</sup> Although Tye (2007b) and (2009b) has changed his mind on this somewhat.

<sup>36</sup> This is conceptualised, and perhaps the proponent of non-conceptual content will hold that there should be some notation to show that the way it looks is actually ineffable. See, e.g., Byrne (2002), who defends the ineffability of experiential content, and also Raffman (1995). Raffman's defence, however, is premised on an account of memory which the conceptualist is required to reject. I discuss this rejection below. I briefly discuss Byrne's argument below, as he neatly sets matters up in a manner conducive to highlighting the move that I am advocating.

<sup>37</sup> Note that I am interpreting some short remarks from Maund, and I may be misinterpreting him. Raffman (2008) Section 1 seems to have the same interpretation of Tye as Maund, and the same view of its implausibility as regards the existence of qualia.

thought, there is no difference in this respect between the thought and the experience in introspection.

I focus on the property *brown* (or an instance thereof) and I come to know, according to Tye, of the experience's phenomenal character. But this is to focus on a property of the *object* of the mental act. Alternatively, I can focus on the content, the *way* that it looks. But this is just to focus on how it looks, i.e. that it "looks brown", and its looking brown is its being represented as brown. This is a feature that thoughts have in common, and so Maund, I think, is in fact correct.<sup>38</sup>

The "introspection" of, better, focusing on, the way that the object *is as thought*, i.e. the representatum, when it is thought of (i.e. as brown, as opposed to my thinking of it as "brown") does not reveal the property to me in the way that an experience does because it is not there to be experienced, only thought of, and so the property as revealed *in the experience* is not itself there in the same way. But this is only to say that it is not experienced. But the property *as a property of the object of the thought* is there to be introspected in logically the same way. The difference, then, as concerns thoughts and experiences is not a logical difference, for in each case there is the way that the object is *as represented*, i.e. the way that it is before the mind under the content, and then there is its being before the mind under that content which can be introspected. The difference is only that we seem to have more information about what brown is solely in virtue of the experience as opposed to the thought. Can this be defended?

#### 4 Experiences and Thoughts

One may disagree with the claim made at the end of the last section, but no consideration so far adduced against this is one that I find compelling. I do not take this to be an absurdity, but a consequence of accepting transparency. Consider the following two thoughts about circles.

- (1) Circles are the most common shapes of outdoor cafe table-tops.<sup>39</sup>
- (2) Circles are geometric shapes on a plane with each point equidistant from a single point.

Here are two thoughts about circles, only one of which allows me to know of the property expressed by "circle" in a way in which the "nature" of circles is made manifest to me.<sup>40</sup> This is parallel to the

<sup>38</sup> I stress again that I *think* that this is what Maund means and rejects, as Maund rejects transparency and representationalism and defends a qualia-theory. See Maund (2008).

<sup>39</sup> I guess this is true, it certainly seems true from experience.

<sup>40</sup> Obviously, this is barely even to scratch the surface with respect to the issues involved here. It may be replied to this, for example, that the application of CIRCLE here only reveals the nature of circles as a matter of definition or

difference between the experience of the brown shoe, and the thought about the brown shoe. If it can be established that the independent arguments against the judgement-theory can be rebutted, a task I undertake in chapters 5 and 6, then the difference between the experience of the brown shoe and a thought of the brown shoe is comparable in the relevant respect to the difference between (1) and (2). And just as nothing "phenomenal" in respect of circles follows about properties of the *act* or the *psychology* of judging (1) as opposed to (2), so nothing phenomenal follows about an experience, analysed as a thought, of the brown shoe as opposed to a non-experiential thought about the brown shoe.

We may say that the property *brown* is a phenomenal property, and the concept BROWN, or whatever concept is relevantly applied in an experience of brown in the way that the concept CIRCLE is applied in (2), is a *phenomenal* concept, but this makes this concept a type of concept that applies to properties to which the experience is a relation and (via a mediating but not interposing *range* content articulated with this concept), and not to the experience itself.

The notion of a phenomenal concept is standardly invoked in discussion of experience as opposed to thought. This notion can have various meanings, but the core meaning is that it is a concept which can only be acquired and/or applied on the basis of undergoing an experience.<sup>41</sup> On what I take to be the standard use, a phenomenal concept applies to the very quality of 'what it is like' to which I am objecting. So, what is introspected in the experience of the brown shoe, and what is lacking in the thought of the brown shoe, is conceptualised under a phenomenal concept which picks out this property of experiences - the property to which many quoted passages have been making reference. However, the phenomenal concept need not apply to a property of the experience, other than that the experience has the property of having a certain range or type of content.<sup>42</sup> That experience brings before the mind objects and properties in a way that thought does not, does not imply that experience has any properties other than this.<sup>43</sup>

Harman, for example, originally argued in that the phenomenal concept involved (or one of

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explanation, and not merely in and of the application of the concept itself. For example, CIRCLE is a structured concept, and RED, or at least RED<sub>21</sub> is not. However, there are presumably unstructured non-experiential concepts. But even if this were not so, this would only imply that the concepts applied in experience behave differently from concepts applied in thought. As experiences are, on the proposed theory, a sub-class of judgements, this should not be surprising as this class of judgements behave differently from other judgements, and likewise the concepts that feature therein. I discuss these issues in greater detail below. There is the further problem that one may hold that there is a certainty to visual introspection and the knowledge of properties: I absolutely certainly know what red is when I see it, but, as indeed may be shown by the incorrectness of (1), I may be misinformed in thought as to what the property is. But if one acquires CIRCLE through (1), and most cafe table-tops are square, then one does not have the same concept as someone who acquires it through (2) (I think that this is a metalinguistic concept).

<sup>41</sup> For example, in a recent paper, Ball (2010) p. 937, defines a phenomenal concept as a concept C meeting the following three conditions: there is some phenomenal experience type *e*, and some property *p*, such that experience tokens fall under *e* in virtue of their relation to *p*; C refers to *p*; under normal circumstances, a human being can possess C only if she has had an experience of type *e*.

<sup>42</sup> Tye, for example, holds this with respect to type, i.e. non-conceptual, and I am arguing for a range of conceptual content.

<sup>43</sup> Of course, this still individuates experiences from thoughts in the sense that experiences have this property and other thoughts do not, but this is extremely weak, and something that any theory will accept.



them) in seeing the brown shoe is the concept BROWN as it is applied to the brown of the shoe, and not a concept that applies to the experience. According to Harman, the concept is defined via its functional role, that of being acquired in virtue of the visual experience of something brown.<sup>44</sup> Subjects who have not experienced brown will lack the concept BROWN, or at least lack it in the full sense. They may possess a metalinguistic concept, something like THE PROPERTY DENOTED BY THE CONCEPT "BROWN". This still leaves experiences as non-conceptual representations with a content that features the property *brown* in some way. Thus, as with Tye and Dretske, what it is for an experience to have phenomenal character is for that experience to be a non-conceptual content (plus functional role). On this argument, the 'qualia' are properties of representata, and for an experience to have qualia, i.e. for it to have phenomenal character, is for it to have a non-conceptual content (and a functional role). This, according to proponents of this position, is the difference between experience and thought, and in what phenomenal character consists.

In defending a judgement-theory, I am defending the position that the object of experience is an object of judgement, and that the content of experience is the content of a judgement. Holding to the distinction between the act, the content and the object, I identify the psychology of the experience or the subjective element of the experience with the content. This is "what it is like". So, in seeing the brown shoe, "what it is like" is the content *p*. So, and this needs to be stressed, I am not denying that there is something that it is like to see that *p*, I am only denying that the analysis of "*s* sees that *p*" as opposed to "*s* judges that *p*" will make recourse to any distinct notions, specifically any qualia. I am not, therefore, denying that one can introspect one's experience as opposed to the object of the experience, for *s* can introspect the appearance of the object, only this appearance is "it looks to me that *p*", and not any qualitative properties of the experience. One cannot really introspect the object of the experience, for being aware of the object is experiencing. I am also not really denying logical privacy for, although I hold that the concepts used are concepts available to all as they are used to denote properties available to all, experiences are logically private in the sense that they are relations which feature a subject and could feature no other. Hence, *this* experience is not available to anyone else.

What about the claim that experiences are "ineffable". According to google's dictionary, "ineffable" means "Too great or extreme to be expressed or described in words". Even though one cannot report all of one's experience at a time verbally, and although our language lacks perhaps words which can be used outside of experiential contexts (e.g. remembering the exact shape of some object) to refer to very specific properties, and it perhaps follows from this that something like the position that experiences have contents that are not expressible in *certain words in certain*

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<sup>44</sup> Harman (1997) pp. 669-671. Harman is defending a thoroughgoing functionalism.

*contexts*, this does not really say very much at all about experiences and their contents or features other than that they have this relation to *words* in verbal language. I defend this below.

The position I am defending therefore only encroaches on the debate surrounding dualism in the sense that I am denying that there is a particular type of experiential subjectivity, analysed in terms the exemplification of experiential qualia, which can be used to motivate these arguments.<sup>45</sup> I think that there is subjectivity, in a sense "what it is like" to experience, only I am arguing that this is the same phenomenon that is found in judgement. One may think, for example, that reflection on thought in general as a perspectival locus of subjectivity gives rise to an explanatory gap, or to an *a priori* problem about the reduction of the mental to the physical.<sup>46</sup> To hold that what it is like to see the brown shoe, i.e. what it is like to have an experience with the content involved in seeing the brown shoe is somehow "different" from what it is like to judge that the brown shoe is on the floor, however, is to hold that there is a difference in the subjective quality of applying these different concepts, and *not* in the exemplification of different qualitative properties of the mental. A phenomenal concept, therefore, if defined as a concept that applies to properties of experiences, is a concept that applies to the property that experiences have of having concepts of a certain range, and thereby bringing certain objects and properties before the mind in a way that we may otherwise be unable to bring before the mind if we lacked these concepts.<sup>47</sup>

One anti-physicalist argument, that of the debate about Mary's Room is, though, closely related, as it turns on the differences between experience and thought. I am claiming here that there is a difference, only this difference is between the range of concepts applied.<sup>48</sup> In subsequent chapters, I defend conceptualism about experiences and define the concepts in experience that serve to individuate experiences from thoughts. One kind of concept applied in experience is a demonstrative concept, and there is a point about demonstrative concepts that bears on the current matter. One may put it that a demonstrative concept is applied, say, only in the presence of the sample. This is in contrast to non-demonstrative concepts. On a representational theory, that defended by Tye or Dretske, the presence of the sample will be analysed as a non-conceptual representation, and the phenomenal concept will be applied either to this non-conceptual

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<sup>45</sup> See Chalmers (1996) for contemporary *locus classicus* of this dualist argument.

<sup>46</sup> There is something 'that it is like', in this sense, for me to see the brown shoe, namely "that there is a brown shoe over there". Remove myself from the world, and although the brown shoe is still there, *that* the brown shoe is there *for me*, i.e. my experience and its content are not there any more. I am not denying this.

<sup>47</sup> Compare, for example, Stoljar's (2005) typical characterisation of what he calls 'Experience Thesis' with respect to phenomenal concepts, which gives a necessary condition for a concept to be a phenomenal concept, to Ball's above: *s* possesses the phenomenal concept C of experience *e* only if *s* has actually had experience *e*. Here the concept applies to the experience, and is not acquired in virtue of the experience.

<sup>48</sup> See Jackson (1982). The argument is that Mary knows all of the physical facts about colour but is confined in a black and white room. When she exits the room and sees something red, she comes to know 'what experiencing red is like'. Hence, as she knows all the physical facts, she must come to know some non-physical fact about her experiences.

experience, or somehow extracted from it.<sup>49</sup> Dretske, in defending representationalism, compares qualia to 'observational properties'.

If qualia are understood (as I understand them) to be qualities that, in having an experience, one is consciously aware of - those qualities (therefore) that, from a first person point of view, distinguish one type of experience from another - then qualia are a subset of objective, physical properties - what used to be called observational properties.<sup>50</sup>

The conceptual correlate of an observational property is an observational concept, a concept which can only be acquired, or even applied, on the basis of observing an observational property.<sup>51</sup> Transparency plus representationalism plus the thesis that 'qualia' are really observational properties will result in the position that experiences are the applications of observational concepts. This imports only a distinction between observational properties and non-observational properties and thus observational concepts and non-observational concepts. No notion of phenomenal character over and above a distinction between these concepts is implied. Experiences have a richer content, or a content of some other yet to be defined kind, and in virtue of this richer content make available a greater range of properties of their object. Dennett, for example, makes this point.

*There is no upper bound on the richness of content of a proposition.* So it would be a confusion - a simple but ubiquitous confusion - to suppose that since a perceptual state has such-and-such richness, it cannot be a propositional state, but must be a perceptual state (whatever that might be ) *instead*.<sup>52</sup>

For Dretske and Tye, this is captured by the experience having a non-conceptual content (plus further features). However, Dennett is, it seems to me, correct about this. To assert that there is a difference in kind is just that, to assert it. Independent arguments are required. Many of these independent arguments are against experiential conceptualism, and I rebut these below. The *in principle* argument which is being discussed here is not one that I accept, and as it is an in principle argument, I am under no obligation to accept it.

The focus here is on what a judgement-theory leaves out, not how to defend the judgement

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<sup>49</sup> This is to defend reductive representationalism, but with a content which is ineffable, as non-conceptual contents can only be expressed via conceptualisation. Thus, the phenomenal character of experience on this theory has this property in common with classical qualia. Balog (2009) p. 311 notes that non-conceptual content plays the role of Sellars' 'given', something which is not always made clear by proponents of non-conceptual reductive representationalism.

<sup>50</sup> Dretske (2003) p. 67

<sup>51</sup> Compare this to Ball's definition of a phenomenal concept.

<sup>52</sup> Dennett (1996) p. 162. Pitcher (1971) p. 72 also makes this point.

theory against independent arguments.<sup>53</sup> Recall Maund's brown shoe. It does not leave out the brown of the shoe, for by hypothesis to judge of the shoe that *p*, where *p* features the concepts the application of which bring the property before the mind, and it does not leave out the relation between the subject and the shoe, for the subject applies a concept to the shoe and in doing so is related to the shoe. And, most importantly, it does not leave out the look of the shoe: it *could not* leave out the look of the shoe, for the look of the shoe, i.e. the looking of the shoe to be some way, *is* this relation.

Recall now Langsam's argument from chapter 1 about seeing that *p* and judging that *p*. This is only effective if one *can* see that *p* and think that *p* where *p* is the same in both cases. If *p* circumscribes a range of contents which if they are the contents of judgements are contents of experiences, and thus these judgements are defined as experiences, then one cannot see and merely think that *p*, for one would be seeing the same thing twice simultaneously. And this is not possible, just as it is not possible to literally simultaneously judge twice that *p*.<sup>54</sup>

Take again Maund's brown shoe. I am looking at the shoe and I introspect my experience. In experience, there are the properties of the shoe. In introspection, I can discern that the properties of the shoe are before my mind as a term in a relation, and thus that the experience is a relation. I introspect this relation, this look of the shoe, and I find no more than I found in experience, namely the brown of the shoe, and that I am related to the shoe. I now think about the shoe, and I introspect this. In thinking (non-visually)<sup>55</sup> about the shoe, I think about its properties: I think about the shoe's properties in the way in which I conceive of it, that is it a shoe, brown and so on. I introspect its properties as it is thought of: this is different from introspecting the way that it is thought of just as much as in experience, only this way of thinking of it is not a "look". As I argued above, there is no difference in principle here.

Johnston identifies a thesis regarding our knowledge of colours he calls 'revelation', the thesis that experience of colours makes available the 'intrinsic nature' of those colours. His example is canary yellow.

Revelation: The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual

<sup>53</sup> However, there is a relevant point to be made here, namely why the application of, say, RED in thought does not give rise to an instance of the property *red* being made manifest, but it does in experience. There are two possible answers to this. One, that the concept in experience is related to RED, but is not actually that very concept. Two, that it is applied as part of an experiential content. This may be defined either in terms of a range of content or in terms of functional role. It may also be defined in terms of its epistemic features, e.g. incapable of being justified. See chapter 6.

<sup>54</sup> One can no more do this than simultaneously jump twice.

<sup>55</sup> There is a complication here with imagination. I can imagine, or remember, things that are brown in a "phenomenally" similar way to experience. Likewise for dreaming. However, my argument concerns the relation between perception and judgement, and not the relation between visual imagination and dreaming, and judgement or perception. I am not quite sure what to say about visual imagination and dreaming, but I do not have to take stand on this here.

experience as of a canary yellow thing.<sup>56</sup>

Combine this, or something like it that perhaps does not imply anything about the (realist) metaphysics of colours, with Dretske's identification of qualia as a class of observational properties, and the resulting thesis is that the intrinsic nature of observational properties are revealed by experiences. Combine this further with the thesis that in order that an observational property be experienced, the subject must apply an observational concept. The resulting position is that experiences involve the application of observational concepts. If applying a concept in the content of experience is what it is to experience the property (or object) picked out by the experience, then the resulting thesis is that experiences are the applications of observational concepts in the content, and that this is what it is for the observational property to be revealed in experience.<sup>57</sup>

In experience, let us say, the observational property that the shoe has, i.e its being brown or rather its brownness, is before the mind such that the nature of this property is revealed. The experience is an application of the observational concept, call this BROWN for the moment, and in applying the concept in the content of the experience, the observational property, the brown, is brought before the mind in the particularly detailed and rich way which Dennett described above. The experience is not brown, the experience is of the brown shoe, and the way that it is of the shoe is that it has a content which determines the brown shoe. This is the psychology of the experience, the way in which the brown shoe is experienced, and the relevant element which corresponds to the brown of the shoe is the application of the concept BROWN. Matters are exactly analogous to this for the thought of the brown shoe, only the concept applied is less fine, and the proposition less rich and precise.

Thus, pending an outline and defence of perception conceptualism, Peacocke's Adequacy Thesis can be defended: the psychology of an experience can be identified with the conceptual content of the experience. This content will be different from the contents of thoughts, but this difference is a difference in the range of contents.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Johnston (1992) p. 223. Compare this to Russell's famous claim that we know colours absolutely and fundamentally when we are *acquainted* with them, and that no knowledge of truths can ever lead us to any further knowledge of colours. Acquaintance and knowledge of truths, i.e. nominal and propositional knowledge respectively are different modes of the mental, different types of mental act. This explicitly Russellian distinction between nominal and propositional knowledge has recently been advanced by Tye (2009b). Dretske (1969) also famously makes a similar distinction between nominal and propositional seeing, although this is a more heavily epistemological notion. Of course, Tye is sympathetic to this.

<sup>57</sup> 'Observational concept' here is ambiguous between a concept that can only be acquired as a result of an experience, and a concept that can only be applied in an experience. But this ambiguity does not threaten the theory that I am defending. See the note four above.

<sup>58</sup> There are two final problems with representationalism which I must briefly deal with, namely blindsight, and the "zombie" problem. According to the zombie problem as it pertains to a representational elimination of qualia, *s* can stay representationally the same but have their phenomenal character gradually fade away to nothing. See Chalmers (1996) for the origination of this argument. However Byrne (2001) seems to answer this argument satisfactorily: when the qualia fade, or are switched, off, the world seems to fade or disappears from view. A more difficult problem than that of zombies is blindsight. According to a higher-order theory, Armstrong's (1981) sleepy-lorry

The target in this section, one that features in many quoted passages, is that there is something *phenomenal* that it is like to see, say, red, over and above what the red itself is like as it is revealed, or, rather, the revealing of the red as analysed as a representation of the red. Red itself is not like anything, save in the comparable sense. It makes no sense to ask someone what, for example, the table is like, unless this is elliptical for an enquiry as to the features of the table, i.e. the properties that it has.<sup>59</sup> Asking what the experience of red is like, is, then, asking what red is like. And the answer to this is: red. Asking what an experience of red is, is not to ask for an

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driver's experience represents the road perfectly, indeed it has first-order qualia, however the driver is not *conscious* of this, there are no second-order qualia and no experiential subjectivity, as the proponents of a higher-order theory would put it, as there is nothing it is like *for* the lorry-driver. Blindsight is a similar phenomenon where subjects report no conscious awareness and have no beliefs and hence no inclinations to (relevant) action, but they respond correctly to a degree higher than chance when asked (as they see it) to guess as to the properties of objects in their "visual field". It is worth noting, I think, that "higher than chance" is really not very good at all for identifying objects in good light before the eye, and, as I understand it, there have been no actual cases of Block's 'superblindsighter'. Armstrong's long-distance lorry-driver does not have blindsight. However, he shares some similarities. If asked as to what he had just seen, as opposed to what he was seeing now, he would reply that while he had seen things (surely), he could not be certain. Like the blindsighter, he would have to guess. Only, he would take himself to be guessing about something *that he had seen*. The lorry-driver, unlike the blindsighter, can "come-to". Consider another scenario. I want to rival my sister's knowledge of Roman history, but rather than reading a book I play a list of facts on a tape while I sleep. After a while, I come to realise that I know a number of these facts. Did I consciously represent, i.e. hear, the tape while asleep, or did it seep into my mind without appearing even in a dream? Or consider the following case. I am playing football and I fall in the box. Before I can get up, and before I have noticed or become aware of doing it, I instinctively poke my foot out and direct the ball, which I had not seen appear at my foot, into the goal. Did I consciously represent the ball, did I *see* it? Examples like these abound: did I hear the fridge humming before I realised it? I (my brain) presumably must have represented the facts about Roman history and represented facts about the ball. The brain can process more information than we can become even dimly, or with a great lack of detail, aware or conscious of, and this can be received through the eye and put to use by the brain in moving the body before the subject becomes conscious of it. The question is whether this refutes representationalism by providing an example of experiential content without any conscious character. This would only be a problem for the representationalist if these cases show that there is visual A-consciousness, importantly, and this must be stressed, *occurrent* A-consciousness without P-consciousness. According to Tye (1995), for example, phenomenal character is poised, abstract, non-conceptual, intentional, content. The reason why there is no consciousness in blindsight is that the relevant content is not sufficiently poised for action and belief. This is a rather good way of putting it. The subject (or their brain) processes information, but the resulting content is not readily poised for belief, and hence this has no conscious impact on the subject. Dretske (1997) has suggested that blindsighters have only propositional content but no objectual knowledge (This could be put as a variation on the subjects having knowledge by description, but not knowledge by acquaintance, especially if one thought that acquaintance is responsible for phenomenal character. Although it must be stressed that Dretske does not put it in this way, even if this is close to Dretske's theory). Another possibility is that the subjects have such an extremely low level of detail in their representation, and hence why it seems to them as though they are guessing. Compare this to what you see, and believe, in very low levels of light. Although you "see" a vague shape, this does not readily allow you to confidently act, and nor would you confidently say even that you could see anything. There is occurrency here, but the content is so low, that it is not really clear to me if I really am seeing anything at all. Imagine pitch black with a shape very possible hovering into view. I *think* I see something and yet I am not sure. If asked to guess, I might do better than chance, and yet I would not really take myself to be seeing the shape. Higher-order explanations of phenomenal character and why there are such "non-conscious" experiences are not available on the judgement-theory as one cannot have unconscious judgements, whereas on the higher-order theory one can have unconscious perceptual experiences. I would say that Armstrong's long-distance lorry driver either literally did not see the road, and his visual consciousness went "off-line" but his brain nevertheless directed his body where these directions were not actions, or, and this is far more likely, that he saw the road perfectly well only he could not *remember* seeing it. Instead of a deficiency in experience, there is a deficiency in memory. On the former explanation, the representation, and resulting bodily action, was sub-personal in the manner of my instinctive reaction to the football. This would go to show that some bodily actions and representations in the brain are not personal, not subject to the will and not consciously undergone as they are not actions performed by the subject. As for blindsight, it seems reasonable to me that to hold that the subjects are not conscious of the scene before them because they do not make any judgements, i.e. they do not see it. They may *guess*, as they put it. But what is a

analysis of experience. The difference, I am claiming between seeing red and thinking about red is that experiences satisfy Johnston's revelation thesis (or something like it): in seeing red, the 'intrinsic nature', as he puts it, of red is revealed. As mere thoughts do not satisfy revelation, there must be a difference between experiences and mere thoughts. I identify this difference as a conceptual difference, and the difference in the concepts applied accounts for the difference in the psychological access to the object that the experience bestows on the subjects. As far as I can see, there is nothing that has been left out.<sup>60</sup>

To tie the above together, let me refer to Byrne's (2002) reconstruction of Mary's Room. He sets up the matter in terms of way of denying C.<sup>61</sup> In a change from the usual red, Mary gets to see a blue bead.

- P1 Before seeing the bead, Mary believes that the bead is blue.
- P2 Mary's visual experience represents that the bead is blue.
- P3 If someone believes that an object is blue, and then has a visual experience that represents that the object is blue, then , she will not acquire a belief about its color.
- C When she sees the bead, Mary will not acquire a belief about its colour.<sup>62</sup>

Byrne asks which premise to deny in blocking C. The method of blocking C in this particular argument, therefore, is to deny P1, or rather deny it in the sense that Mary possesses the concept BLUE. Rather, in the room, she possesses either a metalinguistic concept, or a concept of the

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guess in this situation? It must be a tutored guess, as they perform better than chance, and so perhaps they make judgements in perception of such a low level, and lacking in such detail, that they can only, as they would put it, guess. Or perhaps they make no judgements whatsoever, and instead draw the information from sub-personal representation into a different attitude. This also seems to be a reasonable explanation, and fits neatly with their insistence that they are guessing, a different attitude from judgement.

<sup>59</sup> Rosenthal (2002) argues that there is nothing it is like *for the table* to be a table, but there is something it is like to be a table. As I discussed above, Rosenthal draws from this that there is a subjective for-me-ness to the experience but not the table, and from this the higher-order theory. I disagree with this and also with the framing of the statement that there is something it is *like* to be a table: there is something that it *is* to be a table, and something may be (comparatively) like a table if it has some of these features. Experiences, in this sense, are like tables. What is it like *for me* to see the milk is that the propositional content is judged *by me*, and as my judgement could not be the judgement of anyone else, and is conscious as concept application is by definition a conscious act, it seems to me that Rosenthal is introducing a distinction where there is not really one to introduce.

<sup>60</sup> A rare case of agreement is Hacker. 'One may say, clumsily, that there is a way that it feels to have a pain. That is just a convoluted way of saying that there is an answer to the (rather silly) question 'How does it feel to have a pain?', e.g. that it is very unpleasant, or, in some cases, dreadful. So, one may say that there is a way it feels to have an acute migraine, namely dreadful. That is innocuous, but lends no weight to the general claim that for every differentiable experience, there is a specific way it feels to have it. Pains are an exception, since they, by definition, have a negative hedonic tone. Pains are sensations which are intrinsically disagreeable. Perceiving, however, is not a matter of having sensations, and perceiving in its various modalities and with its numerous possible objects can, but typically does not, have any affective or attitudinal quality at all, let alone a different one for each object in each perceptual modality. And for a vast range of things that can be called 'experiences', there isn't 'a way it feels' to have them, i.e. there is no answer to the question 'How does it feel to ...'? Hacker (2002) p. 163. See also the passage from Pitcher in the note above

<sup>61</sup> Jackson's original (1982) argument targeted physicalism, but it is closely connected to representationalism. Indeed Jackson (2004a) and (2004b) has recently adopted representationalism in rejecting the argument.

<sup>62</sup> Byrne (2002) p. 126

colour which is identical with, say a spectral reflectance, or whatever (realist) metaphysics of colour happens to be true and Mary happens to learn in the room.<sup>63</sup> On this view, the phenomenal concepts are not concepts that apply to experiences, in that they pick out a *phenomenal property of experiences*, but they pick out properties which experiences are of, and concepts of which cannot be acquired in another way.<sup>64</sup>

I thus conclude outlining this unpopular position (pending a defence of conceptualism, if one holds that non-conceptual content in experience counts as a kind of qualia): there are no experiential qualia. There is nothing that it is 'like' to have an experience, which outstrips the content. To, say, see my keys is to see that *p*,<sup>65</sup> and this is only like "that *p*". And this is also true also of thoughts.<sup>66</sup>

## 5 Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that denying the notion that there are qualia which are present in experience but not in thought. I have argued that the difference, pending a defence of

<sup>63</sup> See the final note of chapter 3, and compare this to the point I made there. As I am arguing that experiences are conceptually structured, there has to be some concept that Mary does not have the ability to grasp in the room. Below, I argue that experience is articulated by demonstrative concepts. Mary's inability to apply demonstrative concepts to colours is, on this view, an inability to acquire colour concepts. As well as Harman, Byrne lists Wittgenstein (1977), Nagel (1997), Peacocke (1984), and McDowell (1985) as agreeing with the position that Mary lacks colour concepts. It also seems quite fair to me to hold, although this is equally often denied as it is advanced, that the blind lack colour concepts and instead only have metalinguistic concepts. Byrne's (2002) own argument is that the contents of experience are ineffable.

<sup>64</sup> Here one could agree with Dennett (2004) and (2007) that the argument is flawed as Mary could *in principle* learn the nature of colours (for 'what it is like' to experience, say, blue, is to know what blue is like, which is to know what blue is), or the nature of colours which we glean through experience, in the room as she knows *everything* and could work it out. This is not a terribly popular position, and not one that I have the space to investigate in detail. I am sympathetic to this, though, and whichever stand I were to take on this would not conflict with my arguments here.

<sup>65</sup> I defend propositional-seeing in more detail below.

<sup>66</sup> This is, I take it, the standard position, and was often, although not always, assumed without argument. However, recently some more philosophers, for example, Strawson (1994), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Pitt (2004), Siewert (1998), and Chalmers (1996), have argued that there is something that it is like to judge, for example, that Aristotle was a Greek philosopher, and that this is different, *constitutively different*, from judging, say, that Plato was a Greek philosopher. However, the standard position, that there is nothing that it is like in the *phenomenal* sense, and even that there is unlike experience not even a *temptation* to say this, is the position that I hold to. I hold to it for the reason that most people have held to it, namely that it seems so obviously true, much more obviously so than in the case of experience. See, e.g., Lormand (1996), Soteriou (2007) and (2009), and Nichols and Stich (2003), for arguments against constitutive cognitive phenomenal character. I have to confess that I am on the side of those, Stich and Nichols for example, who just think that this notion is, unlike with experience where it takes a lot of argument to get to the denial of experiential qualia, especially in the very strong sense in which I am denying it, rather clearly misapplied to thought: is there *really something that it is like* to think that two plus two is four which is different from thinking that two plus three equals five? I struggle even make sense of this claim, I have to admit. In rejecting this constitutive claim, I am also rejecting the *inverse-representational* theory as suggested by, for example, Horgan and Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson and Graham (2004), and Kriegel (2002a), (2003) and (2007). According to this position, the content supervenes on the phenomenal character of experience, and in turn (on this particular version), even the content of *thought* supervenes on the content of experience. This view is, I suppose, the ultimate opponent view to my own. However, I reject the very notion of phenomenal character invoked. This particular brand of inverse-representationalism is internalist, but one could hold an externalist version also. Note, finally, that Pitt (2004) thinks that, although there is something it is like to think that *p*, this is constitutively different from what it is like in experience.



conceptualism, can be accounted for by the difference in the content, and how it brings the object before the mind. In experience, we know more of the objects than we do in thought: more is revealed; the contents provide us with greater detail regarding the object, and its properties are brought before the mind in a richer, and more precise way. But this does not require us to say that there is a constitutive *psychological* difference or a difference in kind between experiences and thoughts. If a theory can be given on which the contents are different between experiences and other thoughts, and conceptualism defended, then experiences can be analysed as judgements with these contents.

## Chapter 5 Concepts and Experience

### 1 Introduction

In this chapter, I turn now to defend the conceptual nature of experiences. Below, I define a class of contents which I take experiences to have, demonstrative contents. This serves to provide a content which individuates experiences from other thoughts. I then defend the demonstrative nature of concepts from objections against conceptualism in general and demonstrative conceptualism in particular. These demonstrative concepts, in their range and precision account for the psychological difference between experience and other thought.

In §2, I introduce the distinction between the state and content views, and argue against the state view, thus the content view is the position that I think the conceptualist is set against. In §3 and §4, I outline a range of contents that I take experience to have and which individuates them from thoughts, and then set this in context in §5. In §6 through §9 I defend the demonstrative concepts response of the conceptualist against arguments in the literature, the arguments from richness and fineness of grain and arguments against acquisition. In §10 and §11, I defend conceptualism in general from some further objections.

### 2 The State and Content Views

A conceptual proposition is a proposition of the type towards which the attitude of judgement is taken.<sup>1</sup> Thus, a non-conceptual proposition may look like a different *type* of proposition, and a non-conceptual mental state or act an attitude towards this different type of proposition. However, there is a distinction between the state and content views of non-conceptual content. The background to this debate is Fregean, in that the central figures in establishing the contemporary debate mostly subscribe to a Fregean theory of thought contents.<sup>2</sup> On a Fregean theory, the contents of thoughts

<sup>1</sup> I take this to be definitional.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Evans (1982), Peacocke (1983), (1992), and (2001), McDowell (1994), and Brewer (1999) for central arguments with regard to the specific debate in question. The framework of the debate is set by Evans (1982) and followed by Peacocke (1992) and McDowell (1994). Crane (1998a), (1988b), and (1992) also discusses the matter in terms of Frege's cognitive-significance criterion. See, e.g., Frege (1997). Byrne (2005) notes this background and its importance to the debate. I am adopting this standard position and arguing for an extension of this view to experiential contents. As I am defending a very common position in the literature, especially with respect to thought, I do not motivate this position with respect to thought with a full-dress defence, but rather assume it to extend to perceptual experience. Frege's theory of sense neatly solves the problems of *salva veritate* substitution failure into mental contexts defines concepts in terms of differing cognitive value. Further, by holding that concepts are abstract objects, we can explain how two people can have the same thought. This provides us with a neat explanation of the inference to the fact that both believe the same thing: they do so, because they both bear the

are propositions which are complexes of senses or concepts. Fregean contents are fine-grained in the familiar way argued for in terms of the cognitive significance of different linguistic terms.<sup>3</sup> A central principle involved in characterising conceptual content is what Evans called the 'generality constraint'

We cannot avoid thinking of a thought about an individual object  $x$ , to the effect that it is  $F$ , as the exercise of two separable capacities; one being the capacity to think of  $x$ , which could be equally exercised in thoughts about  $x$  to the effect that it is  $G$  or  $H$ ; and the other being a conception of what it is to be  $F$ , which could be equally exercised in thoughts about other individuals, to the effect that they are  $F$ .<sup>4</sup>

This capacity to think of one object as  $F$  and another object as  $F$  involves the separate application of the same concepts in distinct thoughts, and thus the subject must possess the concept in a way which is independent from the thinking of a particular thought.<sup>5</sup>

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judging relation to the same proposition. If propositions are somehow internal to the judgement, then as judgements are non-repeatable particulars, two people could not judge the same proposition to be true. As propositions are composed of concepts, the same follows for concepts. We introduce such concepts to solve the problem with *salva veritate* substitution into intensional mental contexts. This is a perspective problem: we can in thought and perception take a different perspective on the same object. Hence this relation must be more than a two-place relation as there is more to the psychology of standing in this relation than the two-place theory can account for. Therefore, we introduce the level of sense (Russellians make a different move). The Fregean theory is commonly adopted, as all theories are, in the face of some outstanding problems. One main objection to such concepts is that they themselves should introduce a mode of presentation problem: concepts are modes of presentation of their referent. See, e.g., Fodor (1998). Let me make a gesture as to the answer to this. In grasping the sense of a name, for example, we bring the referent before the mind: we *use* the sense to think of the referent. If I kick the ball twice, say with slice and flatly, both times I kick the ball, but differently. The way in which I kick the ball is the application of a skill, of an ability. This skill or ability is what allows me to stand in the relation, kicking, to the ball. The manifestation of the skill is what relates me to the ball. The skill explains how I come to be related to the ball. Similarly for concepts. Without firmly adopting the thesis, from Evans (1982), that the possession of concepts is the possession of abilities, let me use this as an analogy. The application of a concept, like the kicking of the ball, is what explains my relation to the referent. Just as there is no problem in explaining the relation to the kicking *in respect of the reason that this is introduced in explaining my relation to the ball*, there is no equivalent problem in explaining my relation to the application of the concept *in respect of the reason that this is introduced in explaining my relation to the referent*. Another alternative, the mental representation theory, is that concepts are mental representations. These two theories may be related: representations individuated by Frege's criterion. Laurence and Margolis (2002) suggest this. The theory is open to Frege's psychologist objection: my concept  $C$  is not the same as your concept  $C$ . Laurence and Margolis (2002) argue that Frege is assuming that mental representations are 'conscious mental images', and that this is unwarranted. However, if a mental representation is some token of a general type, then the type must be identified with the concept. Types, however, are abstract entities; and, if the type is individuated by the mode of presentation argument, then we have switched from an abstract grasped Fregean sense to an abstract tokened mental type. Perhaps there is not a great difference.

3 See, e.g., Frege (1956). Familiarly,  $s$  can believe that Superman flies, but that Clark Kent does not fly. The cognitive significance associated with the use of "Superman" and "Clark Kent" by  $s$  cannot be the referent. As a condition, if  $s$  can judge that  $p$  and that  $q$ , *without irrationality* then  $p$  and  $q$  have a different cognitive significance and thus are composed of different concepts. That this leads to senses as components is denied by philosophers who hold a Russellian theory of propositions whereby a proposition is a complex of universals (and perhaps a particular). Thus  $s$  believes the same proposition in both cases, and the difference is explained away in some other way. However, I take this to be an antecedent debate.

4 Evans (1982) p. 75. See also Evans (1982) Section 4 Part 3.

5 'I certainly do not wish to be committed to the idea that having thoughts involves the subject's using, manipulating, or apprehending *symbols* – which would be entities with non-semantic as well as semantic properties, so the idea I am trying to explain would amount to the idea that different episodes of thinking can involve the same symbols,

A subject has to possess concept *C* in order to think a thought with this concept as a content. Denying this for experiences leads to a distinction between the 'state view' and the 'content view' of non-conceptualism, as introduced by Heck.

In particular, one might think that there is no reason we must distinguish the kinds of contents belief and perception have: whatever one might take the contents of belief to be - Fregean Thoughts, say - there is no reason that perceptions cannot have the same sorts of things as their contents; it is just that the contents of a thinker's perceptual states can, while the contents of her beliefs cannot, involve concepts she does not possess. But if this were one's view, it would be misleading to summarize it by saying that perceptual *content* is non-conceptual. There is, on this view, which we might call "the state view", nothing unusual, as it were, about perceptual content. Perception is just a state of a different sort from belief: a non-conceptual, or concept-independent, state, as opposed to a conceptual, or concept dependent state. Since Evans does speak, quite explicitly, of perceptual states as having non-conceptual *content*, I think we cannot interpret him as having intended to defend the state view. His view is what we might call "the content view", that the content of perceptual states is different in kind from that of cognitive states like belief: The former is non-conceptual; the latter, conceptual.<sup>6</sup>

The state view is that experiences are attitudes to a conceptually articulated content but that the subject need not possess the concepts that articulate it. The content view is the thesis that the type of content in experience is not composed of concepts. The content view is, I think, the predominant view.<sup>7</sup> Heck remarks, without explanation, that he suspects that the state view is 'indefensible'.<sup>8</sup>

This is an important distinction as the adoption of the content view really makes clear the underlying motivation for the introduction of non-conceptual content. Indeed, the two views are each motivated by one of the central arguments. The state view is motivated by the argument that some subjects such as children and animals lack the concepts which would characterise the content of their experiences, and yet we want to credit them with experiences which outrun their repertoire of concepts. Evans was relatedly motivated also by the thought that experiences are a more

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identified by their semantic and non-semantic properties. I should prefer to explain the sense in which thoughts are structured, not in terms of their being composed of several distinct *elements*, but in terms of their being a complex of exercises of several distinct *abilities*'. Evans (1982) pp100-101

6 Heck (2000) p. 485

7 See, e.g., Tye (1995) and (2000), and Peacocke (1992), who present the content view. Crane (1992) sets things up in terms of the state view but Crane (2009) later retracts this.

8 Heck (2000) note 6. Since Heck's paper there have been a number of closely related distinctions made in the literature. Speaks (2005) distinguishes between 'absolute' and 'relative' non-conceptual content; Wu (2008) between 'possession' and 'involvement' conceptualism: the difference between the subject's needing to possess the concepts that merely 'characterise' the content, and those concepts 'involved'; Crowther (2006) between 'composition' and 'possession' conceptualism: a content is compositionally (non) conceptual if the content is (not) composed of concepts; possessionally (non) conceptual if the subject need (not) possess the concepts that characterise the content.

fundamental type of representation.

The position that I am defending is that experiences are a class of judgement, and the theory of judgement that I am subscribing to is what I take to be a standard Fregean theory. Frege distinguishes between the following.

- (1) the apprehension of a thought – thinking.
- (2) the recognition of the truth of a thought – judgement.
- (3) the manifestation of this judgement.<sup>9</sup>

There is a relation of logical priority between (1), (2) and (3). (1) is the act whereby any mental act gets its content. A (contentful) mental act of any type acquires its content through the subject's apprehending a conceptual proposition. To grasp the concept is to bring the referent of the sense before the mind under this mode of presentation.<sup>10</sup> (2) rests on (1) because in order to assent to the truth of a proposition, one must first have apprehended it. Apprehension of *p* is common to all attitudes with a content *p*, and the apprehension of *p* is a complex of the grasping of the constituent concepts. To grasp a concept *C*, one must *possess* the concept *C*. I am defending this as applied to experiences.<sup>11</sup>

Consider the four options available. In Crowther's (2006) terminology, an experience can be: compositionally conceptual and possessionally conceptual, compositionally conceptual and possessionally non-conceptual, compositionally non-conceptual and possessionally conceptual, and compositionally non-conceptual and possessionally non-conceptual. That is, using *p* now to refer to a conceptual proposition, the options are as follows.

Experiences as relations to propositions which are complexes of concepts:

- (4) *s* is required to possess the concepts that articulate *p*.
- (5) *s* is not required to possess the concepts that articulate *p*.

Experiences as relations to propositions which are not complexes of concepts:

- (6) *s* is required to possess the concepts that "characterise" the metaphysically

<sup>9</sup> See Frege (1956) p. 294.

<sup>10</sup> I do not want to subscribe to Frege's theses that predicates express the sense of functions, or that sentences express the senses of the True and the False, or that the functions map objects to the True and the False.

<sup>11</sup> I must stress one point here regarding the characterisation of judgement as the 'recognition of the truth' of a thought. This makes judging that *p* look rather like the result of first the apprehension and then as a matter of a *distinct* mental act, assent to the proposition. One need not hold this. Rather, judging that *p* is the taking of the attitude of judgement to *p* which has as a *logical* part the apprehension of *p*. I wonder if the picture of judgement I am rejecting here is one to which Pitcher subscribes when he says that he 'shall not be defending the wholly absurd thesis that sense perception consists, either wholly or in part, of entertaining [apprehending?] propositions and assenting to them, of making (conscious) judgements, or anything of that sort'. Pitcher (1971) pp. 70-71. Whether (3) depends on (2) is not relevant.

non-conceptual content of the experience.

- (7)  $s$  is not required to possess the concepts that “characterise” the metaphysically non-conceptual content of the experience.<sup>12</sup>

I am defending (4). (6) seems to me to be odd: why should  $s$  need to possess any concepts in order for  $s$  to undergo an experience with non-conceptual content?<sup>13</sup> And, importantly, the proponent of this view is taking experiences to be very much like thoughts, *unless* thoughts have a Fregean content.

(5) is the canonical understanding of the state view. Experiences are constitutively a relation between the subject and a *conceptually articulated* proposition, but the subject does not need to possess the concepts that articulate it. (7) is the canonical characterisation of the content view. Experiences are constitutively a relation between the subject and a *non-conceptually articulated proposition*. Further, the subject does not need to possess the concepts that would characterise it. There is, I think, a strong argument against the state view with content conceptualism.<sup>14</sup>

This argument does not knock down the state view, but it makes it rather difficult for me to see how it could be defended.<sup>15</sup> Compare (1), (2) and (3). (1), that  $s$  apprehends the proposition,  $p$ , is a necessary condition for  $s$  to be in mental state  $M$  with content  $p$ . Apprehension is a complex of graspings, where these are occurrent: i.e. *applications* of the concept (not necessarily applications *to* something in thought). A subject can only grasp a concept  $C$  if the subject possesses the concept. This means that (1) is a complex of *applications*. Possession is not application (I possess many concepts I am not applying), but it is necessary to apply  $C$  that I possess  $C$ .

12 'Characterising' the content is a rather loose notion. I take it to mean what  $s$  could conceptualise from the experience. A standard argument that I discuss below is that experiences have a more finely grained content than thoughts: particular shades of colour can be non-conceptually represented in experience. That one shade as opposed to another is non-conceptually represented is determined by the fact that the subject of this experience would conceptualise the content in terms of one concept as opposed to another.

13 One could hold that only genuine subjects can be in non-conceptual representational states, and the subject must be capable of being in some conceptual states. This is a strengthening of the denial of Peacocke's 'autonomy thesis', which is the thesis that non-conceptual states are possible for non-conceptually able subjects. Peacocke (1992) Chapter 3 denies this. Bermudez (1994) criticises Peacocke's reasons for denying it. What explains why a non-conceptual content cannot be the content of an experience in terms of the subject lacking a concept which is related to the content in some way other than the fact that the content is partly composed of the concept? I think, also, that this is quite a good argument against a theory of (uncontroversially) cognitive states on which the subject has to possess certain concepts and yet the propositional contents themselves are not composed of concepts: the standard Russellian view of thought contents. The propositions are complexes of universals and but the subject, in order to have a thought with such a content, has to possess concepts. Why? If I cannot swing a golf club it is because I lack the skill to swing it: I am unable to swing it in any way. What explains my lack of being able to stand in the relation of swinging to the golf club is that I lack the skill that would allow this. With respect to concepts, the clearest reason why lacking a concept  $C$  disbars me from thinking a thought is that the *application of the concept* in the thought is a necessary condition on having that thought. And if this is what disbars me from having the thought, then it looks like the reason for this is that the concept is waiting to be applied in the thought as it is a constituent somehow of the content. However, I certainly do not want to engage in an argument for this which extends further than this sketch here. Stalnaker (1998) argues that all contents are sets of possible worlds. This is another version of state non-conceptualism but content conceptualism.

14 And I think, although I have no evidence for this, that this is why Heck says that the state view is 'indefensible'.

15 Bermudez (2007) Section IV argues against the state view similarly, but with less detail.

Nothing in this precludes the state view. But we are surely owed an explanation of how  $p$  can be the *constitutive propositional content of an attitude* (in the sense of Pautz's (2009) identity view) where  $s$  does not possess, and so cannot apply, the articulating concepts. It does not seem promising that there could be a convincing answer to this. There would have to be a convincing explanation of why a proposition  $p$ , which is composed of concepts, could *constitutively* be an element of an experience in which the subject does not possess, and so cannot apply, the constituent concepts. But the Fregean picture of the relation between grasping and apprehending I outlined above looks to be very close to definitional. Hence, the position in question would fall foul of the way in which matter are defined. The condition that in order to *apply* a particular concept the subject has to possess it would have to be dropped.

Speaks (2005) points out that many of the non-conceptualist arguments would only establish the state view, but I take it that in establishing the state view, the purpose is to draw from the different conditions on a content being the content of an act that the contents are different, i.e. the content view.<sup>16</sup>

### 3 Individuating Contents of Experience

I argued previously that there are no experiential qualia: seeing a red square is *psychologically* exhausted by the propositional content of the experience, and the red, say, present in experience and not in thought is not a psychological property of experiences. Certain concepts, which I called "observational concepts", when applied reveal what the property to which they are being applied is. So, when something green is seen, the concept application in experience to the green of the object seen is what it is to experience the property, and thus for what that property is to be revealed in the experience. When the property is merely thought about, what the property is is not revealed.

My explanation of this was that the subject has less information about the property as a result of this mental act. Experiences have contents of greater richness and detail. When I see the red square, I see that it is that exact shade, and that it is that exact size, at that exact place, and so on. When I merely *think* about this, the level of detail in the content is less. The concepts applied in experience are demonstrative concepts. These are not *linguistic* demonstratives, but *experiential*, or *perceptual*, demonstrative concepts.

Linguistic demonstratives are linguistic communicative devices. Perceptual demonstratives are elements of the content of experience. And, although metaphorically one may put it that experiences are like communications to oneself, this is not strictly accurate as a communication

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<sup>16</sup> Bermudez (2007) seems to share this view.

takes place between two subjects.

That the conceptual contents of experience are demonstrative is the move that the conceptualist about experiences makes in defence of their position against the standard non-conceptualist arguments. I discuss these arguments below, and defend the demonstrative concepts theory. Beforehand, however, I would like to argue that perceptual demonstratives are an individuating feature of experiences: experiences are judgements with these contents. This ties together two related elements of my discussion so far. Firstly, it serves to individuate experiences as thoughts with a content of a certain type, namely a content containing perceptual demonstratives. Secondly, the fineness and multitude of the demonstratives explains the richness and detail of experiences that is lacking in thought.

The most fundamental knowledge that I can have of a particular object is that gained through perception. This can be cashed out in terms of an acquaintance relation, such as Russell's original notion or Tye's (2009b) revival of it, or in terms of the use of a demonstrative (which is acquired "on the basis of" perception), and so on. These are glosses on the following point.

Ways of coming to think of an object, or ways in which an object is conceived *within a certain* mental act (call this the "conception" of an object) which are not acquired through experience are, in a way, epistemically lesser. "Conception" here is a shorthand for the content of the singular term used partly to express the content of a mental act. Experience, I will now argue, provides the most fundamental conception of an object available to us.<sup>17</sup> This content, i.e. the conception of the object of the experience, is what individuates experiences from other mental acts.

The standard demonstrative concepts defence of experiential conceptualism is that the contents of experiences feature the demonstrative concepts expressed linguistically by the use of the linguistic demonstratives "this" and "that".<sup>18</sup> These apply both to the particular as it is fundamentally conceived as a particular, and to its properties experienced. I deal with these two elements in turn.

To agree with Brewer (1999), in seeing a red square the content of the experience would be expressed as "that is thus", where the concept THAT expressed applies to the red square as a particular, and THUS to the red or the squareness of red square. In contrast, a non-experiential content partially expressed by "that", is an expression of the *anaphoric* THAT, not a *demonstrative* THAT. These are two different concepts, and thoughts featuring these two concepts have different contents.

If I say to you, reporting my current experience while running and pointing, that "that tree is going to fall", "that" expresses a different concept than it does in you telling me the day after that

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<sup>17</sup> This follows a line of thought originating in Strawson (1959) Chapter 1.

<sup>18</sup> See, centrally, McDowell (1994), and Brewer (1999) and (2005). Chuard (2006) and (2007) does not endorse the theory, but defends it against counter-arguments.



"we were lucky to get out from under that tree". In the second case, "that" is used to refer anaphorically to a tree already named in a previous conversation. In that conversation, it was named as "that": it was referred to demonstratively. Although the referent is the same, the falling tree, the concepts expressed are different.

#### 4 *Demonstratives and The Role of Experience*

There are at least three ways to approach the philosophical analysis of perception, I think, which are certainly not mutually exclusive but are distinct in their starting points. One is the phenomenal approach of, e.g., Block and Chalmers. The coming together of the other two starting points can, I think, help to explain away the intuitions of those such as Block and Chalmers.

One of these is to focus on perception as the mental output of the sensory organs as, e.g. Quine does.<sup>19</sup> We cannot deny this, and one difference between experience and thought is that experiences are a result of a causal interaction with the object through our sense-organs. Hence, and this is a strong point in favour of the demonstrative concepts defence, the different level of information in experience can be explained in terms of this. Thoughts of objects are not a direct result of delivery of information via the sense-organs. But this does not imply that the structure of the reception of the information is different.<sup>20</sup>

Relatedly, one may focus on the way in which perception (or experience) as a mental act is the mental act through which we have a primary conception of external objects and their properties. This is to focus on their internal epistemological role. What I mean to highlight is the importance of perception as regards the way that we come to think of objects not in general *as* objects, but as regards the way that we come to conceive of *particular* objects.

Consider the sometimes irritating habit that children have of asking "why", but instead consider one who always asks "which" object. Most fundamentally, the answer, the one which would satisfy any such child whose conceptual scheme was functioning correctly, would be "*that* one". There could be no further answer as concerns our basic way of conceiving of things. To identify an object as "that one" is to supply the most fundamental identification possible. And, of course, to identify the object as "that one", would be to show it to them: i.e. it would be for them to *perceive* it.

This is marked in language by the demonstrative use of the *word* "that". Kaplan (1989)

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19 Consider the way Quine (1960) begins with: 'This familiar desk manifests its presence by resisting my pressures and by deflecting light to my eyes. Physical things generally, however remote, become known to us only through the effects which they help to induce at our sensory surfaces....'.

20 Evans (1982) would agree with this, but would hold that the reception of information in experience is non-conceptually structured.

distinguishes between genuine linguistic *demonstratives* and pure linguistic indexicals. The former require a demonstration, the latter not. Indexicals, such as "now" and "here" do not require a demonstration because their linguistic meaning supplies the required restriction. In the case of "now", for example something analogous to the "demonstration" is implicit in the linguistic meaning of the word: there is a rule that "now" is used to refer to the time of utterance (or production of a token sentence more generally). In the case of genuine demonstratives, "this", "that", "there", for example, these are linguistic demonstratives in that their use in communication requires an actual demonstration. A *perceptual* demonstrative, however, does not require a demonstration.<sup>21</sup> The proponent of non-conceptual content, as I discuss below, holds that the non-conceptual experience plays the role of the demonstration in supplying the referent of the demonstrative concept in thought.

My claim is that the perceptual content "that is thus", is in its full form: "the object now at egocentric location *l* is that shade, that shape, etc". I argue first that the content of the conception of *which object* it is that is being experienced is egocentric, and subsequently for the demonstrative concepts such as THAT SHADE which are the concepts of the properties that the object has.

Non-experiential thoughts do not have demonstrative contents which articulate the way in which the properties of the object are before the mind, such as THAT SHADE, and the descriptive content of the singular term is different, the "conception" as I have been calling it.

The former point presumably rests on the way in which we are able to process information received through the sense-organs (and that the brain can put itself in this state, and thus the subject come to hallucinate). Should a subject be able to recall in full detail the contents of their experience, then they would be able to recall exactly the psychology of that experience.

However, one cannot *recall* the conception of the object: the articulation of the conception of the object in recollection will be different. The conception of the object in recollection is of the object that *was* the object previously experienced. So, should I see that the object at egocentric location *l* is a lemon of such and such a colour and so on, then should I recall the lemon in equivalent detail (which, as I discuss below, does appear to be empirically not possible so far as we know) then I would recall as the lemon that *was*, and not *is*, at egocentric location *l* and so on.<sup>22</sup>

My conception of the computer in front of me, for example, is a long description of its visual properties, and also such properties as its being mine and so on. However, the conception of it *in experience* which serves to individuate it as an object of thought is that it is the object now located at a particular egocentric point.

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21 Otherwise we would be off on a regress (I rebut a similar argument below, namely that a demonstrative requires *attention*) Levine (1988) makes this point, and argues that demonstratives in experience are tokens of mentalese, non-conceptual 'percepts' as he calls them.

22 Should the content of the experience be duplicated in judgement, in the same way that the recollected content of a memory is a form of judgement, then this would be a hallucination or an illusion.

If you *tell me* of such an object, or I read of such an object and so on, then the conception within that experience, the content *of the experience* pertains to whichever *means of communication* it is that I am experiencing and through which I mediately come by a conception of an egocentrically located object. But the *experiential conception* is of this means of communication, whatever that is, be it a sentence or a person, a pointing finger and so on. Of course, if I can see the object at the same time, say you direct my attention by pointing, then this will lead me to focus on it and thus I will come to know of it in experience.

Seeing, then, has a content which picks out an object as the object at a particular egocentric location *l* where the specification of the location, or my knowledge of the location, or my commitment to its being there, is not qualified in any way. It is not qualified by it being *according to such and such* that it is there, or that it *might be*, or is *likely to be* there, or is *still there*. These will be results of inferences, and the conception of the object will be inferential. And, crucially it is that the object of the experience, that picked out by the singular term is the object that is there *now*, and not that *was* there.<sup>23</sup>

The test for this is how one would fully express in language the conception that one has of an object. If the conception is of an object that is there now and that this is not qualified in any way, then this is the content of an experience: what one is expressing is a looks-report.

Consider now extended experiences, such as looking out of the window at a tree for some time. There is an independent but related question here about counting experiences which I do not go into.<sup>24</sup> Either the extended experience consists in a very long single experience which ranges over many times in one act, or it is a complex of sub-acts at each time. Let us discuss the latter case, for the former presents its own difficulties with respect to extended experiences which are far from central to my discussion. One sees the tree continuously as the same tree, but this consists in, I would contend, repeatedly seeing the tree, identified as the object (tree) now at egocentric location *l*, as the same tree as was previously there. This is not to qualify the conception of the object within the experience, but to make an identity between two conceptions in terms of their having the same referent.

So, to state the condition for the particular demonstrative as opposed to the predicative

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23 What if I am unsure as to whether or not there is an object there? Perhaps it is dark, a shape looms into view, and I am unsure if something is there. Would I be thinking that there *might be* an object there, and therefore is it the case that I am not experiencing this object? I discussed this with respect to blindsight, and my conclusion was that this is a borderline case of seeing as opposed to sub-personal, i.e. non-conscious, information processing delivered not to the subject as an experience but delivered in some other way. Further, as one changes one's mind about whether or not there is something there, i.e. about whether or not one is seeing something, one will alternate between taking oneself to see and not.

24 The current problem concerns seeing objects as the same through time, or over different experiences. See, e.g., Campbell's (1987/1988) discussion of seeing the bee, turning away, and then looking back at the bee: are you seeing the same bee, and do you take yourself to be doing so?. Campbell does not think that experience *is* demonstrative reference, but that experiential consciousness 'targets' objects for attention and thus demonstrative reference. He is, in this sense, close to the Roskies' position I discuss below. See Campbell (2004).

demonstrative which individuates experiences along this dimension, an experiential content is one whose particular content is stated in (8).

- (8) that which would be expressed as the content of the singular term in a looks-report, is: the object now at egocentric location *l*.

This is to analyse the perceptual concept THAT, which I claim articulates experience, in terms of the concepts THERE and NOW. NOW pertains, I argue, to the position of the act in the stream of consciousness, and THERE names a point in egocentric space.

Evans (1982) advances an analysis of demonstrative thought, couched in terms of reference, of an object which is contrasted with the two other types of identification of an object: recognition-based and descriptive. Descriptive thought here is what Evans calls non-acquaintance based thought, non-perceptual thought. Evans subscribes to Russell's principle of acquaintance, his understanding of which is that in order to think about an object one must have individuating knowledge of it, for one must know which object it is that one is thinking about.<sup>25</sup> This is analysed firstly in terms of possession knowledge of the fundamental ground of difference of the type of object.<sup>26</sup> For numbers, this is their position in the number-line, for external objects, their spatio-temporal location.

In perception we are presented with external particulars, spatio-temporal objects, hence the fundamental idea of an object will be that which individuates this object uniquely by its spatio-temporal location.<sup>27</sup> What I have been calling the conception of the object is in perception a grasp of the fundamental idea of the object as a given particular.

Our grasp of the very notion of an external particular rests on our general conception that all such objects are individuated by their spatio-temporal location. In order to grasp the proposition that *a* is an external particular, we must have grasped that external particulars are individuated by their spatio-temporal location. This is the fundamental *ground* of an object (and what makes the statue-lump question a problem).<sup>28</sup> In order to have a fundamental *idea* of a given particular, we

25 Russell's original Cartesian principle is stronger. It is that the subject must be acquainted, in that they have full knowledge, of either sense-data or universals that are before the mind. Hence Russell has a perspective free ontology of objects that can be directly before the mind: sense-data, logical notions and universals.

26 See Evans (1982) Chapter 4.

27 For Evans, experience is non-conceptual and the non-conceptual content, much as for Campbell, plays the role of facilitating the conceptual demonstrative grasp of the fundamental idea of an object. The conceptual egocentric representation is a matter of the non-conceptual content being conceptualised.

28 Arguably not, however, if the statue and the lump although co-located and therefore identified egocentrically under the same conception have some different perceived properties. The case of a shadow on a wall is a similar case, for although they are co-located they have quite different properties. One object is a wall, and the other is a shadow on the wall, however this is analysed. There seems to me to be no difference in principle here between this case and a spot of paint on the wall, only that the shadow is, like water, for example, in a sense transparent in that it can be seen through to the wall.

must be able to identify its spatio-temporal location.<sup>29</sup> This we do egocentrically. Firstly, we identify the position of the object egocentrically and then in virtue of this we orientate this property with the general, fully objective, spatial map with which we picture the layout of our environment. This then provides us with our fundamental *idea* of that object. A mere grasp of the egocentric location of an object is enough, in one sense, to provide individuating knowledge of the object; only without the conceptual ability to link this to an objective knowledge of its relative non-egocentric relations we would be unable to grasp its objective nature, for the fundamental ground of external particulars as a type is that they are objectively spatio-temporally located. This seems like a very good theory to me, and I basically assent to these fundamentals of Evans' account.<sup>30</sup>

According to Evans, this map is in some way *non-conceptual*, and based upon our ability to unreflectively navigate our way around the environment.<sup>31</sup> However, I see no reason, which is not an *independent* reason against some feature of the position, why a spatial map could not be interpreted as a set of judgements about the relative objective positions of objects which individuates each object (and its parts, perhaps) as distinct objects of experience.

Egocentric space could be understood as a three-dimensional system of axes emanating from the subject.<sup>32</sup> It is perhaps rather arbitrary to define a particular bodily point from where these axes are centred. However, the best candidate is either the gravitational centre of the subject, or the point between their eyes. Perhaps, there are many such systems of axes, which are integrated via one's sensory-motor system. This seems more than plausible, especially if the egocentric space is analysed as a set of beliefs. For each object in the visual field will be identified by its egocentric position with respect to each body part.<sup>33</sup>

Egocentric space is differentiated from objective space in that the egocentric space is a space that has a privileged point of perspective. We require that there be such a perspectival point in order that we have a fixed point from which to describe an object in such a way that this description guarantees that the description uniquely picks out one object.<sup>34</sup> This fixed point, the origin of the egocentric axes is the point that we occupy.<sup>35</sup>

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29 This implies that there are no cases of perceptual thought about an object that presents the object as external but not at some point in space. Putative counter-examples to this, such as white-noise or enveloping smells, are, I think, answered in terms of their being sometimes presented as being all around the subject as is the case with swirling white noise. In these cases, it feels as if the white noise is coming from all points, and in related cases that it is moving around. The egocentric location, as with blurry vision, can, of course, also be more or less specific.

30 This discussion is conducted in terms of particulars, but, if, say, events, or properties of particulars, can be the objects of perception, so to speak, then what has been said covers this.

31 See also Heck's (2007) discussion of 'cognitive maps'.

32 See Peacocke (1992).

33 I set aside here the matter of one's awareness of one's own body, kinaesthetic and proprioceptive awareness and how this is integrated.

34 See Strawson (1959) Chapters 1 and 2.

35 In order for there to be a unique description of an object, it is only necessary that there be such a point from which the content is specified, and not that we physically occupy it. However, we do occupy it, presumably because it is empirically necessary that our sense organs be located there. I suppose that our sensory organs or sensory point could in principle be dislocated from our body. In these circumstance, we would perceive the objects in the

There is a point omitted by Evans here. Egocentric space supplies a fixed point from which a description of an object will necessarily uniquely determine it. However, egocentric location must be supplemented with an identification of the object in egocentric time. As we, so to speak, carry our egocentric axes around with us, the identification of an object at a particular egocentric location will not individuate it unless the time is also stipulated (unless duplicated scenes were not possible). And, just as our understanding of objective space is defined in terms of our understanding of egocentric space, likewise for time.

The simplest explanation of this is that egocentric time is a matter of indexing conscious mental acts into the stream of consciousness which only "flows" in one direction. All mental acts are individuated along this dimension by their position in the stream of consciousness.<sup>36</sup> The object we conceive as being there now, the object that *is* there in experience is the object conceived of in the way that I am discussing now. The object that *was* there, i.e. the object that as a matter of inference we might conceive of as *still* being there, is the object conceived of in an unqualified way in a previous experience.<sup>37</sup> Thus, as experiences involve conceptions of objects which are not qualified with respect to objects seen in previous experiences, what it is to say that the object is at egocentric location *l* now is to say is that the conception of the object is solely that it is at egocentric location *l*. If the conception lacks any further qualifications, involving memory, tense, probability, testimony, representation, inference, and so on, then this is the pure conception of an object of current experience.

To recap my claim. I am claiming that the content of the singular demonstrative linguistically expressed by "that", which is used to communicate the content of the concept experiential THAT, is: the object now at egocentric location *l*. The egocentric location is specified by the subject's egocentric "axes", and the tense is given by the fact that the conception of the object as the object at this location is not qualified in any way. It is not the object that *was* there, although one may identify it as so by inference from identification two conceptions as co-referring, and it is not the object that I was *told* is there (for this would be a mediate conception involving an

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perceptual field, but we would be unable to locate them objectively with respect to our bodies. Unless, that is, we had some way of connecting the location of the sense-organs to the body.

36 See Strawson (1959) Chapter 1 Section 1 Part 3 (of course, Evans was well aware of this). Is this a temporal ordering or a logical one? That is, could experiences *M* and *N* be such that *N* follows *M* in the temporal order, but *M* precedes *N* in the stream of consciousness? From a conceptual point of view, this does seem to be acceptable, presuming, of course, that sense can be made of the divergence of the order of the stream of consciousness from the temporal order of events in the world. See also Le Poidevin (1999).

37 Does this imply that a subject with a grasp of tense, i.e. a subject able to conclude, as a squirrel certainly does, that the nut left under the bush will still be there, requires a grasp of the notion of experience? If so, this might be a bad result for my theory. But it is not immediately clear that the attribution of tense in this way does not occur within the content, as opposed to inferentially as a matter of consideration of past experiences rather than previous contents. It may be automatic that a recalled content is, as a matter of the different attitude (perhaps cashed out functionally), that the tense is different from an experiential content. In *remembering* that the nut *was* under the bush, I remember that the nut conceived of as being under the bush there and now at that time, is likely still under the bush now at this time, i.e. that were one (i.e. a squirrel) to look under the bush there would be a nut there now which is identical (presumably) to the original nut.

experience of the vehicle of communication) and it is not the object that as a matter of inference *might* be there, and so on. The tense is a function of the position of the experience as a mental act in the stream of consciousness. Let me set this into context, before addressing the question of predicative demonstratives.

### *5 Perceptual Demonstratives and the Articulation of Perceptual Contents*

The theory of judgement that I am adopting, in order to extend to perceptual experiences (and thus perceptions), is that *s* judging that *p* is analysed as *s* bearing the judging relation to a conceptually articulated proposition *p*. Recall my discussion of the state and content views above. I am arguing that the way to analyse the difference between the psychology of experience and judgement is in terms of the content. The above description of the way in which the fundamental idea of an object is articulated in experience, stated in (8), serves to individuate experiences as a way of conceiving of objects from other thoughts. Further to this, experience reveals to us in great detail, far more than does thought, what the properties that we experience objects to have are.

The classic example of this is colours. Recall my discussion of Johnston's theory of 'revelation'. I argued that the psychological difference between experience and thought is that the contents of experiences are richer and finer in detail. There is a greater range of content, i.e. more volume, and a greater precision in the content. One could perhaps put this that the representation goes further down the determinate/determinable scale than does the content of thoughts.

One way to look at perception is that it must be defined in terms of it being an output from the sensory organs. This looks to be an empirical truth: we gather information about external objects from the sensory organs. Some of this information may itself be representations of further facts about external objects, but this rational knowledge, to put it in this way, is mediately based on immediate perception of the representation. It should, therefore, not be surprising that the level of detail in experience, the level of information we gather about the world through the sensory organs, should outstrip the level of detail that can be retained or processed via a non-sensory method.<sup>38</sup> After all, it is seeing and escaping from the tiger that is important, not recalling it in detail.

However, these empirical facts about experiences as they are caused do not imply that analysing what an experience is in a philosophical sense requires us, in fact, to mention the sensory organs within the analysis. Compare this to Snowdon's (1980/1981) point about the causal theory of perception. Perhaps it is indeed empirically impossible (although this may not be so) that a perception *M* of *y* not be caused by *y*. Snowdon points out, and I agree with him, that this does not

<sup>38</sup> Compare here the now derided theory of Hume that recollections and thoughts are ideas, faded sensory impressions. This, perhaps, does get something correct in that the level of retained detail drops.

appear to be constitutive. Neither, indeed, does the role that the sensory organs and perceptual processing system seem to be constitutive in a philosophical conception of experience "from the inside", so to speak. There is a further point in favour of not mentioning the sensory organs in the analysis and that is that the use of "sensory organ" in the analysis has the flavour of circularity about it.<sup>39</sup> In any case, if experiences can be individuated from other mental acts in virtue of their epistemic role and properties, then the addendum of a reference to their functional or causal origins will not be necessary.<sup>40</sup>

The theory that I am defending is an extension of a standard Fregean analysis of judgement to perception. A perceptual experience is, on this theory, a relation to a complex of concepts each of which the subject has to possess, as the relation involves the application of the concepts. This proposition is the *content* of the thought. If the same is true for experiences, then the content of an experience is also a proposition.<sup>41</sup>

The use of the *linguistic* demonstrative "that" in communicating the content of an experience is to direct the attention of the listener to the object which is the content (or one of) of an experience. Hence, as I am not discussing here communication, I can set aside detailed discussion of how linguistic demonstratives perform their function. However, consider Kaplan's (1989) theory of linguistic demonstratives. Kaplan distinguishes between *pure indexicals* and genuine

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39 Roxbee-Cox (1971) raises this against Armstrong (1968). I do not press this here, as it is not clear that this is a worrying circularity.

40 Should, however, I come to be persuaded that this *is* necessary, then this would not refute the theory that I am defending. Rather, it would only enforce the modification that the judgement be caused, or be more intimately related to the sensory organs as in Pitcher (1971).

41 But what kind of proposition is it? Is it *de re*, as opposed to *de dicto*, or singular as opposed to general, and how does this relate to it being demonstrative on my view? I am analysing experiences in terms of a three-place relation. In this sense, this is the type of theory held by one branch of the Austrian intentionalist tradition, stemming from Brentano. It is the theory of Meinong and Twardowski (however, they would not have invoked propositions in the Fregean sense that I am invoking them). In contemporary terms, the psychology of the judgement is the content as it features in the attitude and the object is that which the content determines. Holding to a theory of *de re* senses, such as those inspired by Evans and McDowell (1984), makes this Fregean theory similar. Another similar theory is suggested in Quine (1956). Quine distinguishes between the three-place relation, reported in a sentence such as "Someone is such that Quine believes him to be happy", or "Someone is believed by Quine to be happy" and "Quine believes someone to be happy". The latter express only a two-place relation. It is analysed in terms of 'belief-notional' as Quine puts it. The former expresses a three-place relation between Quine, a proposition (sentence), and the person that Quine believes to be happy. The three-place relation is fundamental, and cannot be analysed in terms of the two-place relation. Burge (1977) also holds to this view, namely that *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs, i.e. Quine's beliefs-relational and beliefs-notional, are fundamentally distinct. Whether or not this is something to which I would need to subscribe or reject, is not a matter I pursue here. I can set it aside for the reason that however the terminological lines are drawn, experiences, construed as judgements, will be unquestionably *de re*. What *else* is *de re*, e.g., my belief that Plato taught Aristotle as opposed to someone's belief that someone taught Aristotle, is not something that I need to take a stand on here. This matter concerns the relations between types of belief, or judgement, and not the relation between experience and judgement in question here. I take it that experiences (if it is accepted that they have such types of content) are unquestionably *de re* if anything is. Experiences are sometimes held to have singular contents, and this is taken to mean the same thing: that an experience is an experience of a given particular, and not just of a notional particular in the sense that someone's believing that someone taught Aristotle of course *schematically concerns* a particular in the sense that the belief is about something that is notionally particular but not a specific one. Compare the belief that not all dogs have tails. This does not even schematically concern something that would be a particular. These distinctions, general content and singular content, *de re* and *de dicto* all closely align, although different theories will distinguish them in different ways.



*demonstratives*. Both are linguistic terms which change their referent depending on context. Genuine demonstratives, however, require a demonstration in order to fix the referent and are not just fixed by the context of use.<sup>42</sup> Let me focus on "that". "That", as a linguistic demonstrative, only has a content, i.e. only picks out an object, in a context. It always has a linguistic meaning in that it performs the same role of function when used, i.e. to refer to a particular. It acquires its content in a context. The context is the circumstances of use of this particular expression (the speaker, the location and time of utterance, etc). The linguistic meaning of the term is a function that gives the content from the context. So, the use of "that" has a linguistic meaning, roughly that it picks out the demonstrated object. This linguistic meaning fixes the content of the term "that" when it is used in a context. So, when I say "that tree is going to fall", either I need to point to the tree or there needs to be some other salient proxy for pointing.

In contrast, I am making two different claims about *perceptual* demonstratives. The perceptual demonstrative does not have a linguistic meaning which is a function from a context to a content, and, as I am analysing experiences in terms of the application of perceptual demonstratives, it cannot be that these require a demonstration. That is why I tried to reduce "that" to "there" and "now". "There" cashes out in terms of egocentric spatial location which I argue is as given propositionally as anything else is in experience, and "now" in terms of the egocentric location of the experience in the stream of consciousness. These two dimensions of content and location in the stream of consciousness individuate each experience uniquely: no two experiences could have the same overall content in that they identify two qualitatively identical objects as being at the same egocentric point *and* these two experiences be at the same time in the stream of consciousness *even if* the same subject were to have their memory erased and then undergo a qualitatively identical stream of consciousness to the one they had previously undergone.<sup>43</sup>

The theory that I am defending is the analysis of perception (experience) in terms of a three-place relation. *s* seeing *y* is analysed as *s* bearing the judging relation to a proposition *p* and to an object *y*. The proposition *p*, as on the general Fregean theory, is the psychology of the experience, the subjective element of how things are for the subject. On this theory it is a complex of concepts. The complex of concepts that I am claiming articulate the propositional content is that the object in experience is conceived of as the object now at egocentric location *l*, where this is unqualified in any way. "Now" as it is used in this sense is only introduced in contrast with conceptions of objects

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42 "I", as a term, always refers to the speaker, for example, but "that" is not like this. "That" will require a demonstration in order to pick out the referent from other objects in the environment. This distinction is not be clean cut: if there is only one woman in sight, "she" will not require a demonstration, but if there are two, it will.

43 Thus this theory can neatly solve the problem of content with respect to identical scenes. The content is not identical, indeed no content *actually could* be identical, assuming that no *subjects* can be identical. This lines up to some degree with Martin's (2002) p. 194 discussion of unrepeatable aspects of the psychology of experience. Martin, however, thinks that the unrepeatability pertains to the *object*, but I think it pertains to the experience's place in the stream of consciousness.

acquired in past experiences. To have a conception of an object as being located at egocentric point  $l$ , where this is unqualified in any way is to have a conception of it as being now at egocentric point  $l$ .<sup>44</sup>

I turn now to defending the use of demonstrative concepts not for individuating the object in experience but for our experience its properties.

## 6 The Richness and Fineness of Grain Arguments

The richness and fineness of grain arguments are that the content of perception exceeds the range of concepts that a subject can generally apply in judgement.<sup>45</sup> There are two separate arguments. One is that as there are more individuated elements represented in experience, more by number, than can be judged, experiences cannot be judgements.

The first argument is the argument that to analyse perception conceptually would be an error because it would involve more concepts than the subject could apply. Consider one of the examples discussed by Tye (2005), where subjects can only recall/see a certain number of letters on the screen but where the subject is visually conscious of more than they can identify in this way. However, one could hold, that all that this shows is that we cannot say that subject applies high-level concepts, such as LETTER, or THE LETTER "T", to these letters. But this does not show that they do not apply lower-level concepts to those letters in perception. In other words, they do not see a "T" *as* the letter "T", but as a certain shape. And this is compatible with a range of concepts being applied in perception, but these perceptual contents being linked to the contents that are *reportable* after the fact in a way such that not every concept applied in perception is one that can be applied in reporting. Further, when the subject focuses their attention on the "T" they may then come to apply the concept THE LETTER "T" to it, indeed this may be focusing on it in the relevant sense, but this only implies that they did not apply this concept before, and not that they applied no concept. And certainly one's memory is constrained: for example, I can no longer remember in full detail even how things were before my eyes a few seconds ago. Nevertheless, this tells us about *memory*: about the relation between concepts as applied in experience, or if one is a non-conceptualist, on the basis

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44 Assuming that experiences can be called *de re*, this means that even if Quine and Burge (see the note two above) are correct that the three-place relation and the two-place relation which *de re* and *de dicto* are respectively analysed in terms of cannot be analysed equivalently in these terms, then another of Burge's (1977) theses, namely that *de re* attitudes require a non-conceptual link between the subject and the object is in some way *non-conceptual* p. 347, can be rejected on this theory. On a full "Fregean" theory, see Frege (1956), all indexical elements are analysed out in favour of non-indexical senses. See Heck (2002) and May (2006). Compare this with Tye's view on which *de re* experiential contents are analysed in terms of a non-conceptually mediated link, what Tye (2009) now calls acquaintance (which I take to be a form of "nominal-knowing").

45 The argument originates in Evans (1982), and is defended by, e.g., Peacocke, (2001), Heck (2000), Kelly (2001), and Tye (2005).

of experience, and those concepts which are retained for future use. Indeed, this feature, the loss of concepts is a feature not only of perceptual concepts. I am certain that I have possessed non-experiential concepts and come to lose them: i.e., I have forgotten that I ever had them.<sup>46</sup>

I do not see that the richness argument, on the basis of the observation that experiences have a greater volume of representation than thoughts alone, is compelling. After all, experiences have other features than other conceptual acts, one of which may be, as a result of empirical circumstance explained in some evolutionary way, that the volume of representation is greater: and, presumably, the explanation of this is that the volume of information in experience cannot be retained or duplicated in non-experiential thought because this was not evolutionarily necessary. One can fit a greater volume of representation on a DVD than a CD, but this does not make these two types of thing different types of *representations*: both are, at bottom, digital representations.

Chuard concludes that the problem for the conceptualist raised by the richness argument is one of plausibility.<sup>47</sup> He probes the motivation for the thesis that it can be drawn from this that experiences are non-conceptual. He distinguishes this from closely related claims, failure to report detail as in the Sperling experiment, change blindness, coming to notice something previously unnoticed, coming to remember something that previously one thought one had not seen, and concludes, correctly in my view, that these do not motivate the move from richness to non-conceptualism.<sup>48</sup>

As Chuard diagnoses it, to get from the richness of experience to non-conceptualism about experiences, something like the what he calls the 'bridging thesis' will be necessary: 'if *s*'s experience ... is rich in information, it is possible that *S* does not deploy a concept for at least one of the many objects ... or properties ... represented simultaneously'.<sup>49</sup> However, in order to motivate the bridging thesis, some further work needs to be done, and this is done by arguing that such a concepts cannot be *deployed*, i.e. applied, in experience simultaneously.<sup>50</sup> And, as Chuard notes, the conceptualist will reject this.

Chuard mentions Noe's (2002) discussion of the 'snapshot' view of experience, where experiences represent all of the detail (that could be represented, not microstructure for example) about every object in the visual field. The conceptualist can reject this,<sup>51</sup> and will analyse the

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46 For example, I struggle even to remember basic calculus, let alone the more advanced maths that I learned in school.

47 See Chuard (2006) p. 183.

48 It is interesting that these arguments bear great similarity to arguments I discussed above against representationalism about experiences. Conceptualism is to non-conceptualism what representationalism is to non-representationalism in a sense, and if these arguments are unsuccessful, which in my opinion they are, against representationalism, it should not be surprising that they are unsuccessful, which in my opinion they are, against conceptualism.

49 Chuard (2006) p. 156

50 See Chuard (2006) Section 3 for discussion,

51 It is interesting that a notion very similar to this, that whereby there is some element of experience that is like a photograph, and that experiences are in some way akin to viewing a photograph, is one keeps re-appearing. Neither part is entitled to assert this or its negation, but the tendency seems strongly to be in favour of holding this in various guises.

notions of 'attention' and 'noticing' that Chuard distinguishes from the richness argument in terms of the application of concepts.<sup>52</sup> I conclude that the richness argument can be rebutted.

Relatedly, the precision, or fineness, of concepts that are applied in experience may seem to outrun the fineness of concepts that are applied in experience. This leads into the fineness of grain argument, the conceptualist's defence of which turns on the rejection of a condition on the possession of demonstrative concepts as opposed to a stronger conditions on the possession of non-demonstrative concepts. However, these possession conditions perhaps serve to individuate two types of concept, and thus (contingently, perhaps) to individuate experiences from thoughts along this dimension.

The fineness of grain argument, again originating in Evans (1982), is that the range of properties represented in experience, in terms of the precision and not mere number, outstrips the range of concepts that subjects possess: the conceptual repertoire of the subject is too coarsely grained to articulate experience. The conceptualist's rejoinder is that the concepts applied in experience are *demonstrative* concepts. The central non-conceptualist argument against this, pressed most forcefully in Kelly (2001), is that the possession conditions are not met for these concepts: the subject cannot *re-identify* a property and so cannot be said to possess the concept.

Consider the concept DOG. I certainly possess this concept, and one reason that we will accept this is that I can re-apply the same concept, DOG, repeatedly. Supposing that DOG is a perceptual concept, should I see two dogs, I would both times apply the same concept, DOG, and come to see the two dogs as dogs. Should I see the same dog, I would *re-identify* the same dog both times as a dog. Subjects cannot do this for very fine-grained experiential concepts. Should I see a specific shade of red, or a very determinate shape, I would be unable to re-identify the shade or shape even moments later. I would be unable to knowingly apply the same concept twice.

So, a condition being appealed to for a content to be conceptual, is that the conceptual elements pass the re-identification test: a subject must be able to use concept *C* to re-identify properties or objects falling under it.<sup>53</sup>

The argument here is that a demonstrative concept will be lost once it ceases to be applied. Think of a very specific shape. In looking at the shape of the tear in a piece of paper, my thought of it may be articulated by THAT SHAPE. But when I look away from the shape, I can no longer

52 See, e.g., Tye (2009c) for an argument against the "snapshot model".

53 See Chuard (2007) Section 2 for discussions of the various re-identification constraints in the literature. The two dimensions are temporal, i.e. diachronic or synchronic, and epistemic, i.e. whether or not re-identification mean that the subject knowingly re-identifies. Diachronic re-identification of the same property as a property that falls under the same concept which is known (should the subject think about it) to have applied before, is the strongest criterion. This is what we think about DOG for example. When I re-identify something as a dog, I know that I am using the same concept as before. When I look twice at a shade and apply THAT SHADE, the comparable knowledge is not available solely from the experience. Should I suffer amnesia, and come tomorrow to look at my sister, I might apply a concept on the basis of testimony, say the descriptive concept (that I do not spell out for brevity) MY SISTER, but this would not be to *re-identify*, but merely to identify, my sister. The reason is that I am unaware of possessing and applying the same concept.

think of the shape using this concept. This is unlike the SHAPE component of the demonstrative. Chuard compares this to a specific other type of concept, that which, after Campbell (2002) he calls a 'sortal concept'.<sup>54</sup> A subject can only possess such a concept if they are able to apply the concept (although not necessarily to a particular that falls under the concept) absent an experience of something that falls under it, and they possess a criterion for sorting those things which (would) fall under it from those that don't. Demonstrative concepts need not be taken to be like sortal concepts, but this does not mean that they are not concepts of a different sort, namely demonstrative concepts. Perhaps some sortal concepts begin as demonstrative concepts. A good candidate for this is the class of colour concepts. In seeing something as THAT SHADE, I retain, i.e. draw into my retained sortal repertoire perhaps COLOUR and RED, or even MAROON, but not THAT SHADE. As Chuard points out, there is no prior reason to hold that either the first condition above, the application of the concept absent a sample needs to be taken to hold for demonstrative concepts.

What about the second condition, that the subject knows a criterion for sorting those which (would) fall under it from those which do not? Recall my discussion of objectual demonstrative concepts in terms of our knowledge of *which* thing a thing is. This applies also to properties. And to know which property a property is, i.e. to know which objects with those properties (would) fall under it when it is used as a sortal, and which not, is to be able to *re-apply* the concept. To be able to knowingly apply the same concept twice, and thus know that the two particulars it is used to sort fall under this same concept.

To hold this is to hold that demonstrative concepts, although they do not meet the same conditions for possession as sortal concepts, nevertheless meet Evans' Generality Constraint as a condition on their being possessed by a subject. Notice that in moving from re-identification as a condition to re-application, indeed possible re-application, as a condition, and that in moving from re-identification to re-application we have moved from a discussion conducive to a diachronic condition to a discussion conducive to a synchronic condition. Consider a subject faced with four squares, two of which are one colour and two another. According to the proponent of demonstrative concepts, the subject identifies each colour in terms of the concept THAT COLOUR. However, the subject here will be applying two of the very same demonstrative concepts twice, once to each of the two squares. Further, the subject will know that the very same concept is being applied, for the subject will possess a criterion for sorting objects with respect to these two properties; indeed this is undertaken in the experience. That the subject fails to meet a further diachronic conditions of knowing re-identification, shows only that there are certain conceptual capacities, which behave differently with respect to these parameters. The central condition on a mental act being the exercise of conceptual capacities, and thus concepts, namely the Generality Constraint, is met. I

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<sup>54</sup> Roskies (2010) compares demonstrative concepts to 'standing concepts' which subjects retain absent an experience of the sample.

thus conclude that the challenge posed by the fineness of grain argument can be met by the conceptualist.<sup>55</sup>

## 7 *Experience, Demonstrative Concepts, and Acquisition*

I have argued that the richness and fineness of grain arguments are unpersuasive. There is, however, another challenge specifically in respect of demonstrative concepts as the concepts that articulate the content of experience. This challenge is first put forward in Evans (1982). It is that a level of nonconceptual content is required to ground the acquisition of a concept based on that perception. The argument that I am now going to consider is that the acquisition of the concept requires the presence of, i.e. the experience of, the sample. Heck takes up this argument as follows.

In Evans's own writings, the notion of nonconceptual content is introduced, not to resolve problems in the theory of perception, but because it is needed *in his theory of demonstrative reference*: Without the claim that perceptual content is nonconceptual, Evans could not give the sort of account he does of what fixes the contents of demonstratives 'that object'. Very roughly, Evan's story goes like this: For a demonstrative concept to be of a particular object  $x$  is for one's attitudes towards contents containing that concept to be sensitive, in the right sort of way, to information about  $x$ , information that is, in central cases, delivered by perception. It should be obvious that this explanation would be viciously circular if the information to which one was supposed to be sensitive (the content of the relative perceptual experiences) had the conceptual content '*That object is F*': One cannot have information with such a conceptual articulation without already having the demonstrative concept *that object*. But the circle is broken if the information is (typically, and in relevant respects) nonconceptual.<sup>56</sup>

Peacocke (1992) also argues that the concept THAT SHADE cannot be a part of the content of the perception, for then there would be no non-circular explanation of how I come by the concept in the

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<sup>55</sup> Let me add two notes. Firstly, there may be some people with extraordinary powers of memory for whom *all* concepts would be sortals in the sense discussed. However this would not tell against the position I am defending, for then a demonstrative concept would be a class of sortal concepts for which some subjects lack certain re-identification abilities. This would tell us something about the capacities of subjects across time and how these can vary. Secondly, although my point about some sortals, concepts of very unspecific determinables (with are themselves determinates), such as RED, starting life as demonstratives is just a hypothetical option. I do not wish to advance this as my view. There is, however, an interesting point here, and that is that we ought not to be led into individuating concepts by the names that we give them. "THAT COLOUR", as opposed to "THAT SHADE", and "RED" might in fact be the same concept, only we name them differently. Peacocke (2001) argues that this overly determines the content of perception, but I am not convinced. After all, I can think of a shape simultaneously as a shape and as a square. Even if this were not so, but it were in experience, this could be explained by the fact that some of the concepts are re-applications in the sense of applications of antecedently possessed sortals, and some, the determinates of the sortal determinable, are not.

<sup>56</sup> Heck (2000) p. 493

first place. Rather, perception includes a 'positioned-scenario' level of content, whereby the surfaces and their positions are mapped along axes centred on the subject's body, and a level of 'proto-propositional' content which is non-conceptual but, unlike the scenario content, representational. This explains, in the manner that Heck describes with respect to Evans, how the concepts are acquired.

We require an explanation of the *acquisition* of the concept THAT SHADE which picks out, say, something that is red<sub>21</sub>. The conceptualist holds that the subject's application of THAT SHADE *is* their experiencing something which is, in this case, red<sub>21</sub>. Recall my example of the subject presented with two sets of identically coloured squares. According to the conceptualist, the experience of the squares consists in four applications of the demonstrative concept THAT SHADE. But these four applications are two sets of applications of the same concept.

The non-conceptualist worries that experience is being explained in terms of the application of a concept, but that experience is necessary to acquire a concept. But it seems to me that the conceptualist is entitled to hold that experience is both acquisition *and* application of the demonstrative concept.<sup>57</sup> The burden is on the conceptualist to explain this: how can the application of a concept be its acquisition? There is, I think, a good answer to this. The acquisition of a concept is identified, in the relevant sense, with the first time that the concept is applied (or unknowingly re-applied; in which case it is a different concept).

This stands in opposition to the way in which Evans, and Heck and Peacocke, see the non-conceptual content as playing a role in the acquisition of the concept.<sup>58</sup> The non-conceptual content is supposed to explain the acquisition of the concept, as the conceptualising move exploits the non-conceptual presentation of the sample (this is McDowell's unfortunate way of putting it, for it implies something like the non-conceptualist's view). There is no circularity on the conceptualist's account: the presence of the sample is not *explaining* the acquisition of the concept; the presence of the sample to the mind *is* the acquisition of the concept.

At some point sub-personal processing, which is of course non-conceptual, gives rise to a mental act. Which objects are the objects of my experience depend on where I am at that time and what is there (to be seen). If there is an *F* in my visual field, and my brain and sensory organs processes the information, I will come to see the *F*. Whatever theory is given, at some point I will acquire the concept. At this point, there is a transition to the state of affairs of my possessing the concept under which I think of the *F*, from a state of affairs whereby I did not possess this concept. Recall my discussion of demonstratives in general above. *Linguistic* demonstratives require a demonstration. *Experiential* demonstratives do not require a demonstration, and were there to be a demonstration in the form of a prior mental act then the demonstrative concepts theory of the

<sup>57</sup> See McDowell (1994) Afterword Part II.

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., Evans (1982) p. 122.

conceptualist would indeed fail.

Before I discuss this line of attack, in particular from Roskies (2008) and (2010), consider the role of non-conceptual content as characterised by Evans. If it is invoked to explain the transition from not possessing to possessing THAT SHADE,<sup>59</sup> then the non-conceptual content stands between a sub-personal state, which is non-conceptual, and a conceptual state, whereby I possess and apply the concept. However, does the insertion of another non-conceptual state help? Perhaps it helps by being a bit like a conceptual state. Perhaps it is structured and so on. One problem with this is that the more that non-conceptual contents (and the abilities required to be in the state, recall the state/content distinction from above) are tailored to fit the way in which conceptual states with conceptual contents integrate with each other, the less motivated the notion of non-conceptual content becomes.<sup>60</sup> Further, at some point there is still the move from a non-conceptual state to a conceptual state whereby the concept is acquired. The acquisition is either this transition, or it is the act of applying it for the first time. A level of non-conceptual content is not required, indeed does not help, to explain this. Indeed, now *two* transitions stand in need of explanation: from sub-personal to non-conceptual, and from non-conceptual to conceptual.

I discuss now a related problem to this, that of the 'conceptual nativism' of this account put forward by Roskies (2008), before returning in more detail to the current problem of the alleged ungroundedness or circularity inherent in the conceptualist's account of the acquisition of a demonstrative concept.

## 8 *Concept Acquisition and Conceptual Nativism*

In a recent paper, Roskies (2008) argues that one would 'either have to deny that there is any scientifically viable explanation of how [concept] acquisition occurs, appealing to miracles or magic, or one would have to invoke demonstrative concepts',<sup>61</sup> but that demonstrative concepts themselves would require an explanation of how they came to be acquired.

Learning intimately involves the person level: it requires effort and attention; it is a goal-driven, cognitive activity. The philosophical intuition is that in concept learning, concepts are actively constructed by thinkers, they do not just occur to them. They are not constructed *ex nihilo*, but on the basis of experience. The content of an experience plays a role in fixing the content of the

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59 And I mean here THAT SHADE as *used* in a thought, and not the ability to *use* THAT SHADE. On the account I am defending, this is the ability to perceive shades of colour.

60 This, of course, can be turned around, especially with respect to the strength of the theory of concepts. The key here, I think, is the Generality Constraint and the re-application condition discussed above.

61 Roskies (2008) p. 639



concepts a thinker acquires. We might characterize this view of learning with the slogan "learning is a cognitive achievement". This, I maintain, is the only viable way to account for concept attainment, for it is the only one fit to explain how concepts can be person-level constructs, available for deployment in thought.<sup>62</sup>

The key is understanding 'on the basis of experience', and concepts being 'personal-level constructs'. This language is, I think, a little loaded, and one ought not to be tempted to draw conclusions from this language alone, however naturally it fits exposition. 'On the basis of' implies that the based and the basing are distinct, and 'personal-level constructs' that the concept is constructed in an intentional (purposeful) act. Compare this to the constructing of a paper aeroplane. The final product is constructed in the sense that it is the result of an action. Moving this analogy back to the mental, a concept as a construct would be the outcome of a purposeful act. Roskies does indeed think this, but I think that she equivocates over two notions of purposeful.

In opposition to the above construal of 'on the basis of', one may put it that concepts are acquired in experience as experience *is* the acquisition of some concepts, and allows for others to be acquired.

A further difficulty comes with the idea that the 'content of the experience plays a role in fixing the content of the concept'. If the former use of 'content' actually is better rendered, to keep the distinction clear, as *object* instead, then the conceptualist will not deny this.

Roskies is appealing to the idea that the acquisition of the concept *C* is the result of a conscious process, like the construction of the paper aeroplane in the sense of its being finally constructed, is *constitutively* the result of the *process* of constructing it. This distinction, between the process and the result, is, I think, underwriting Roskies argument.

I would like to defend the position that the acquisition of the concept *C* can in fact be defined as the first time the concept is applied. There is a slight terminological wrinkle here, for I can acquire non-perceptual concepts by mention and not use. When I acquire a concept via explanation, I do not apply the concept *to* anything. If empiricism about some concepts is correct, then those empiricist, or observational, concepts will be those which can only be acquired through application. And these will be the concepts that can be acquired only as demonstrative concepts.

So, *s* acquires the concept *C* when *s* applies it for the first time. This is sufficient but not necessary. If *s* merely mentions the concept, or uses a metalinguistic concept, such as, THE CONCEPT *C*, then *s* will not have applied it. If *s* already possesses *C*, then then mentioning of *C* is not the application of it, but *s could* apply it, and so *s* possesses it. However, if *s* acquires *C* through explanation (or through inference of some sort), then *s* will not apply *C* to anything, but will come

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62 Roskies (2008) p. 643

to acquire it. So, perhaps the full analysis of the notion of acquisition here is that a concept *C* is acquired when it either is or could be applied to something that falls under it for the first time. The current interest is in demonstrative concepts, which cannot be acquired through inference or explanation.

The subject's acquiring the concept is a matter of their grasping the conditions on sorting objects under this concept, and therefore being able recognise objects as falling under this concept. An example of something like this would be the concept TABLE. We can, presumably, specify what it is for something to be a table. Of course, and as is well known, there has been successive failures in any attempts to outline such a specification for the concepts for which it is suggested that this is possible. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently intuitively clear that a concept like TABLE can be somehow be acquired in virtue of the subject possessing certain more fundamental notions, in the sense that they comprise the *definiens*, such as "function" and "artefact",<sup>63</sup> as well as concepts pertaining to shape and structures and so forth.

Roskies' argument is that if the demonstrative concepts theory of experience is accepted, then the account of acquisition is nativist, in the sense that it is unlearned. Again, I would argue that for a concept to be learned here is for it to be acquired as the result of learning it via some mental process.

Conceptual nativism is here a theory about the acquisition and logically subsequent possession of concepts which asserts that the concept need not be learned, and thus acquired, through a mental process such as a transition from a non-conceptual content to a conceptual content or a transition between conceptual states. The definition thus turns on the notion of learning. I think that there is an error that may be made, and that I think Roskies makes, regarding acquisition and attention. The error here is structurally similar to the present error. This error is that the acquisition of a concept is *constitutively* the result of a mental process.

If I purchase a toy aeroplane, I acquire it. However, my acquiring it may be understood in the sense of my coming to possess it, which occurs at the moment that the transaction occurs, or the process of my shopping for it and so on. Recall my point about the construction of the concept above. For Roskies, learning is closely related to construction, both of which *constitute* acquisition. However, imagine that I have never thought of a table before, and you introduce the notion to me. Let it be, for the sake of argument, that TABLE is defined in terms of three concepts, A, B, and C. When I come to consider what a table is, i.e. to acquire the concept TABLE (by mention, not use), I grasp the relation between A, B, and C, and thus will come to possess TABLE. However, and this is central, *during* the process of putting these together, I did not possess, and so at no point had acquired, the concept TABLE. This occurred when the process had finished, and the culmination of

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<sup>63</sup> Maybe not all tables are artefacts, actually, as there may be "natural" tables apt for use as a table. However, the point is clear. To grasp the *definiens* is to have concepts of these notions.

the process here is my acquiring the concept. I can only be said to have acquired when I either applied, or in this case could have applied, it: while I was queuing for the till, I had not acquired the toy aeroplane. *This* is what *acquisition* is. This is what is common to all cases of concept acquisition, and not the process.

According to Fodor (1998), those concepts which are acquired empirically, i.e. those concepts which are acquired through perception, are acquired as a matter of the subject's 'locking' on to the property which falls under the concept. This is because all concepts are lexical and all are innate in that the acquisition of the concept is atomic and not a matter of any process involving the grasping of conditions or a definition. In other words, no concept decomposes into conceptual units in a manner similar to the way in which a proposition decomposes into concepts. I think that this Fodorian nativism is correct in at least one sense.

There is, I think, an important point here, namely that the application of the concept, or the mention of it, is not equivalent to the application or mention of the concepts out of which it is constructed, they must be grouped together somehow: to grasp a sense is not in this sense comparable to the apprehension of a proposition, which is like this in that the apprehension of *Fa* is the joint application of the constituent concepts. For example, the subject will have to possess OBJECT, SHAPE, etc, in order for them to acquire TABLE, but will have to combine them in some way to result in TABLE.

The acquisition of *TABLE*, on this theory, would depend on the subject's possession of a further group of concepts and grasp of the relations between them. So, this is structured and the concept is structured in the sense that it is defined, and to possess the concept is to know a definition (perhaps one of many) of the notion (i.e. to grasp the concepts exercised in the knowledge of the *definiens*). However, the *concept itself* is not structured in this sense, and, crucially, the *acquisition* of the concept is not structured, even though the process by which it is acquired is structured. At one point I did not know what tables were or lacked the concept, and at another I had it.<sup>64</sup>

If the charge against the conceptualist is that if experiences are articulated by the application of demonstrative concepts that this renders the theory unacceptably nativistic, then I think that this can be rejected. There is no magic. Rather, the experience is the application, and therefore in some cases acquisition of a concept. For non-empirical concepts, the presence of the sample is not necessary in acquiring the concept, and the acquisition is still not identified with the process of acquiring it, but with the event of the subject coming to be able to apply it, i.e. their possessing it. A concept is something that is applied by the subject, and so in acquiring it, it must be that the subject

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<sup>64</sup> Peacocke (1992) Chapter 1 discusses the notion of partial mastery, but then, at which point did I have partial mastery of the concept? Concept acquisition does not seem to happen on a curve; the sophistication of the concepts grasped happens on a curve, but not each individual grasping.

comes to be able to use it. One way to do this, is to actually use it, and if one cannot use it, then one does not have it. In objecting to Roskies, I would apply this analogy directly to the acquisition of concepts.

## 9 *Demonstrative Concepts and Attention*

In the previous section, I argued, the acquisition of a demonstrative concept can be identified with the first time that it is applied. The second of Roskies' arguments that I will rebut is similar. Instead of there being a process of learning which stands constitutively and logically prior to acquiring the concept, there is the subject's *attending* in experience to the sample which falls under the concept acquired. Here I think that Roskies is mistaking the *conditions under which* we acquire concepts for an analysis of *what it is* to acquire a concept. In the previous argument, learning *C*, construed as constitutively prior a process or mental act of some sort, necessarily preceded the subject's ability to apply *C*, and thus be said to possess *C*. On this version, the subject attending to the sample is playing the role of learning.<sup>65</sup>

Suppose we are going to form a demonstrative concept of an object *O* not previously encountered, for which we lack a concept. In order to form a demonstrative concept, we must delineate with attentional mechanisms that part of visual space that corresponds to *O*. However, since we have never before encountered *O*, we have no pre-experiential information about *O*'s boundaries. We must therefore rely upon the deliverances of experience to provide us with content representing that object, in order to successfully delineate it with attention. Since, by hypothesis, this something in our experience cannot be conceptual, it must be nonconceptual. Thus demonstrative concept formation itself requires nonconceptual content.<sup>66</sup>

However, I argued that the boundaries of the object can be delineated conceptually: that is what it is to see the object. Roskies repeats this argument, this time making some matters explicit, in a subsequent paper

- 1      Forming a demonstrative concept requires a demonstration.
- 2      The relevant demonstration in conceptual demonstrative formation is the endogenous (voluntary, intentional) focusing of attention.

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<sup>65</sup> Notice again that another notion, that of attending, is playing the same strategic role with respect to a non-conceptualist argument against conceptualism as it did with respect to a non-representationalist argument against representationalism.

<sup>66</sup> Roskies (2008) pp. 655-656

- 3 Intentional focusing of attention involves representational content of experience.
- 4 To be a response to the learning argument, that representational content cannot always already be conceptual.
- 5 Thus, forming a novel demonstrative concept appropriate to account for novel concept learning must involve focusing attention on contentful aspects of experience that are nonconceptual.<sup>67</sup>

The first premise is only true if the demonstrative is a linguistic demonstrative, and not a *perceptual* demonstrative which is a concept in terms of which experiences are articulated. No demonstration is required for this. Or, at least, Roskies is not entitled to assume this position without argument by analogy to linguistic demonstratives. The third premise will be accepted by the conceptualist. The fourth premise concerns the learning argument which can be rejected as above.

Consider the notions of "attention" and "endogenous" in the second premise. The object of my attention is the object that I am looking at. There may be many objects I see, but only one that I am attending to. But no problem arises from this. Recall the argument from attention against representationalism. The rebuttal to this argument was that changing attention, i.e. changing mental if not physical *focus*, changes the content. Thus, if attention means only this, then the conceptual content, i.e. demonstrative content, will change. Thus, this cannot be an argument against *conceptualism* any more than it was against representationalism: all objects seen are objects of attention; "attention" here serves to highlight the object of my interest or focus, but the other objects are still *seen*. But if "attending" only means seeing, then this is of no help.

Consider the quoted passage: 'In order to form a demonstrative concept, we must delineate with attentional mechanisms that part of visual space that corresponds to *O*. However, since we have never before encountered *O*, we have no pre-experiential information about *O*'s boundaries.' The experience provides the ability to attend to it, i.e. to 'delineate it with attentional mechanisms'. But, according to the conceptualist, this is a very loose paraphrase of *what it is to see it*.

Consider this, the second premise, and the ambiguity in "attention" between attention to something in the visual field, i.e. something seen, and, what is not really attention, but putting oneself in a position to see something. In order to see in the drawer, I have to open it and direct my eye into it. This is, in a sense, to attend to the contents of the drawer. Alternatively, when I am seeing the contents of the drawer, I can attend further to something in the drawer that I already see. This latter notion was covered in the paragraph two above. What if, after I have been looking in the drawer for some time, a jumping spider leaps out and, *instinctively*, I direct my attention to it? This was not a purposeful act, like looking in the drawer, and so was not attending in any sense over and

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<sup>67</sup> Roskies (2010) p. 123

above seeing. But then what notion of attention is left? The notion of looking in the drawer to see its contents cannot be the notion in the second premise.

Consider now the first premise, for the ambiguities inherent in the second premise are related to the error in the first premise. As well as the notion of attention, the second premise contains the notion of a demonstration. Indeed, the attention is really playing the mental role of the linguistic demonstration: the non-conceptual experience functions like the pointing does in a *linguistic* use of the word "that". But this is a communicative act between subjects, and not the delivery via perception of content to the subject. To hold that there needs to be an analogue of the demonstration required with the use of a linguistic demonstrative in experience is unwarranted. One may put it that the *sub-personal* system functions in this way, but then this is not relevant to the acquisition of a concept any more than my choosing to look in the left-hand drawer as opposed to the right-hand drawer was relevant to my seeing, which according to the conceptualist is conceptually articulated, the jumping spider. As I argued above, the way that the *experiential* demonstrative concept works is that it picks out an object via its egocentric location. This pattern then is subsumed into the linguistic rules of verbal demonstratives. In respect of properties, to see the shade as "that shade", is to apply a demonstrative concept which satisfies Evans' Generality Constraint in the synchronic way I described above to the shade. I thus conclude that this argument from Roskies can also be rejected.

Let me discuss two other arguments against conceptualism in general, and not against demonstratives in particular. In chapter 6, I discuss the argument against the judgement or belief theory.

## 10 The Motion Aftereffect

This argument is pressed most famously in Crane (1988a), (1988b) with respect to the waterfall illusion. The motion aftereffect results in a visual phenomenon whereby, as a result of looking at something that is moving for a while, looking at something stationary will result in a curious phenomenon whereby it "looks as though the object is moving, and simultaneously that it is not moving". The object *appears to be moving and staying still*, within the *same* experience. This is unlike the Müller-Lyer, which I discuss in chapter 6 whereby the lines looks longer *and* one knows that they are the same length. It is a scope difference, between (*p* and *not-p*) as a content pertaining to the aftereffect, and *p* and *not-p* as two contents pertaining to the Müller-Lyer. As the constituents of contents are individuated by the following principle, the conceptual theory, which holds to a Fregean individuation of concepts, faces a challenge.

$F$  and  $G$  are different concepts if it is possible for a subject to rationally judge, of an object  $a$ , that  $a$  is  $F$  and that  $a$  is not- $G$ .<sup>68</sup>

From this, Crane derives the following.

$F$  and  $G$  are different perceptual concepts if it is possible for a subject to have (at the same time) an experience with the content that  $a$  is  $F$  and an experience with the content  $a$  is not- $G$ .<sup>69</sup>

Thus, as it is possible to experience that ( $a$  is  $F$  and *not- $F$* ), the experience cannot be conceptually articulated as this violates the individuating criterion for concepts. Crane mentions Craig's (1976) discussion of the Necker-Cube which "switches" between orientations in experience. This preserves the application of the principle of individuating concepts to experiences, as the contradictory contents are the contents of different experiences. Mellor (1988) suggest this with respect to a switch between *moving* and *having moved* which are delivered differently in experience. This suggests another explanation, not that there is a whole content pertaining to the illusion, but two different contents pertaining to two different parts of it.

It is not clear to me, in fact, that the object really *looks to be moving* in quite the sense that one takes this to mean. One might hold that the interior of the object looks to move, but the edges not. This seems somewhat accurate to me, in fact. However, what of an object for which there is no relative spatial comparison: could the interior look to move, but the edges not without their not looking to move being relative? I would say, in fact that the object looks not really *to move*, and presumably this is because the visual system is misfiring: it is itself representing (in its own sub-personal sense) something as moving, or trying to, and yet it is not representing the usual range of features that would occur when something is moving and so this cannot be integrated into the usual content delivered to the subject. Rather it looks as if it is *warping* and not that its boundaries are moving in the sense that the centre of the object is *travelling* anywhere, especially with respect to the surrounding objects. It is as if the space that the object occupies is changing in some way, and not that the object is *moving and not moving*. Hence, although this argument puts pressure on the conceptualist, perhaps pressure to reject the Fregean principle for individuating concepts, it is not clear to me that this example, nor indeed other such examples of the aftereffect that I have seen, have the actual visual effect that Crane takes them to have.<sup>70</sup>

68 Crane (1988a) p. 144

69 Crane (1988a) p. 145

70 It must be noted, however, that it may be that there are other such phenomenon which do have a more difficult to explain away. Another alternative, which I discuss in chapter 6 with respect to the Müller-Lyer, is that perhaps experiences, although they are conceptual, function in some respects differently from beliefs. However, I do not think that the example itself shows it necessary to adopt this position in this case. Another argument which I would

## 11 The Continuity Argument

The continuity argument is the argument that the mental lives of adult humans are continuous to some degree with the mental lives of animals and young children who do not (by hypothesis) possess any concepts.<sup>71</sup> The most likely continuity is in perceptual experience: a mouse or a newborn baby can see me equally as well as I can see them. More specifically, if we are all three looking at, say, a dartboard, neither the mouse nor the newborn baby have the concepts DARTBOARD. What we have in common, according to this *prima facie* plausible argument, is the non-conceptual experience. The first point to note is that if the non-conceptualism in question is state non-conceptualism, then this argument will look perhaps rather good: the psychology of the experience is explained by the conceptual content, but the mouse and the baby do not possess the required concepts. However, I question the validity of the state view, and the central position in question is the content view.

The content view here has perhaps its strongest intuitive pull. Nevertheless, this assumes two things. One, that we are entitled to say that animals and very young children really have *experiences* in the way that we would understand this. Secondly, it presumes that these subjects do not have any concepts at all, and that their conceptual capacities are fully formed.<sup>72</sup> Perhaps as their conceptual capacities emerge, so does the psychological complexity of their experiences. Perhaps they do have a limited range of concepts, in some cases a very limited range. The mouse maybe has CIRCLE, RED, and BLACK and can see the dartboard like this, or even mostly only demonstrative concepts which cannot be retained for any length of time. Even though it has some standing conceptual capacities, it does not have a stock of *retained* concepts and therefore a stock of retained conceptions. What is the lower bound for possession of very simple colour concepts? Animals seem to reason to some degree, for example. Their reasoning is often not sophisticated in the sense that the concepts involved are sophisticated, but it looks like reasoning nonetheless. How do we know what it is "like" for a mouse to see the lake but not possess the concepts WATER, FLOATING, etc., but only some limited colour and texture concepts very few of which are retained? Is the non-conceptualist entitled again to the "photograph model" of experiences?

While this argument has a *prima facie* appeal it seems to me less appealing the more that one thinks about it. For example, to possess a colour concept and a shape concept, and the concepts of DANGER and FOOD and so on, what is the lower bound of inferential relations that a subject has

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take not to work would be an experience of an impossible object. For this would be an experience of a *representation* of an impossible object that involved the content (*p* and *not-p*) somehow. Just think of a "round square". Of course I cannot visualise a round square, but when I see an impossible diagram, when I come to realise that it represents something impossible, I take it to be, a *representation*. And a representation can be of something impossible or contradictory and be seen as such.

<sup>71</sup> See, e.g., Dretske (1995) and Peacocke (2001), and many more.

<sup>72</sup> I think that something like this is McDowell's (1994) view when he talks of 'bildung'.



to be able to enter into in order to grasp these basic concepts that can allow them to see and to reason to some degree based on their perceptions? The argument would be a very strong one if conceptual capacities could be tied to highly sophisticated communicative *verbal* abilities. But it is not clear that this is necessary. Further, the notion of language is a communicative notion, and it may be, as things look ever more likely, that animals are indeed capable of more sophisticated communication than we previously gave them credit for.

Until there is a very solid theoretical reason to attribute experiences which are very much like our experiences and *not* a stock of concepts of a low level of sophistication to animals and young children, then this argument has intuitive pull, but less to it than one might think at first blush.<sup>73</sup>

## 12 Conclusion

I conclude from the above that there is a content that can be given that experience uniquely have: if *M* has a content of this type, then *M* is an experience, and that the concepts involved, namely demonstrative concepts, can be defended. Further, the discussed arguments against conceptualism in general can also be rebutted.

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<sup>73</sup> This is perhaps an all too brief discussion, but I lack the space to go into every argument in detail.

## Chapter 6 Perception and Judgement

### 1 Introduction

I have argued against the the sense-data, adverbial, and appearing theories. I subsequently argued for transparency and the representationalist's supervenience claim, then that the representationalist, if they can secure a difference in contents between experiences and other thoughts can analyse the purportedly *phenomenal* difference between experience and thought in terms of a difference in content. I then outlined this content and defended conceptualism about experiential content. In this chapter, I defend now the claim that the experiential attitude is that of judgement.

In defending this theory, I have offered something of an "incremental defence" by attempting to knock down rival theories and their supporting arguments. I argued against experience being held to be constitutively different from thought in terms of its objects, its phenomenal nature, and then I rebutted the arguments that experiences must have non-conceptual contents. This leaves me in the position of having *defended* the thesis that experiences are like thoughts in that they have conceptually articulated contents and that they have no constitutively individuating experiential phenomenal psychological element.

However, short of the negative tactic of objecting to arguments in favour of a contrary position, I have not yet provided a positive argument for the thesis that experiences are judgements. This should, in a sense, not be surprising, as many of the arguments against this are arguments that such a theory does not accurately account for the phenomenal nature of experiences, or that experiences exhibit features which renders them non-conceptual, theses weaker than this one.

A central argument for experiential conceptualism, the argument from reasons, is that the relations between experience and judgement must be conceptual as that is the only way that we can cash out the claim that experiences *justify* beliefs is that they are, or provide, reasons, and hence that they are conceptual. Given the arguments that I have advanced so far, namely that the reasons for holding that experiences have features which judgements do not can be rebutted, I do not need to rest my argument for conceptualism on a deductive version of this argument. I do think that it is intuitively very compelling, however, and I discuss it favourably.

But is there being no impediment to the theory enough of a reason to hold it, or to want to hold it in the face of a final objection? In a sense, yes, if the theory itself is inherently appealing, as I think the judgement-theory is. There seems to be no distance between our experiences and out

beliefs.

Byrne (2005) §4 makes what I take to be an excellent point. He argues that conceptualism should be the 'default position' as it is generally agreed that experiences have representational content. This, of course, is not generally agreed. However, if this is conceded, as those involved in the conceptualist debate do concede, Byrne argues that it should be 'puzzling' why one should not hold that we can bear the judging (or belief, as Byrne puts it) relation to the content of experiences as this is the 'natural position'. This seems intuitively correct to me. When I see the cup on the table, there appears to be no distance at all, certainly no temporal distance, and no mental or logical distance either, between my seeing that the cup is on the table and my judging this. It certainly does not seem as though the former causes the latter, and as I argued before it seems as though the content or the representation involved is a representation of the objects in which the properties I experience reside. I share Byrne's intuition here, and go further (Byrne is not defending the judgement-theory).

In §2, I introduce Davidson's claim that only a belief can justify another belief, and relate it to the position that I have defended so far. In §3, I discuss McDowell's argument from reasons, and in §4, Heck's response. I conclude by defending the judgement-theory against the Müller-Lyer objection in §5.

## 2 *Davidson's Claim*

The Davidsonian coherentist position with respect to justification that 'nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief',<sup>1</sup> is summarised with respect to perception in the following often quoted passage.

The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified.<sup>2</sup>

Relations between beliefs are 'logical', with justification being such a relation. The relation between a 'sensation' and a belief cannot be a logical one, and hence it is a causal one. Further, logical

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<sup>1</sup> Davidson (1986) p. 310

<sup>2</sup> Davidson (1986) p. 311

relations hold between all propositional attitudes, i.e. conceptual mental acts. Hence, any mental act which does not stand in a logical relation is not a propositional attitude, and vice-versa.<sup>3</sup> Substituting 'sensation' with the notion of experience, the conclusion is that experiences cause, but do not justify or are otherwise logically related to, beliefs.<sup>4</sup> As a mental act can only be a propositional attitude if it stands in a logical relation, experiences are not propositional attitudes

If 'sensations' are sub-personal events, say the causation in *s* of the first mental state or act which has a particular content, then if sensations cause beliefs, then experiences are beliefs. However, this is not the usage of "sensation" that Davidson intends. Rather, sensations are non-conceptual *conscious experiences*.

However, consider Davidson's claim with respect to the position that I have been defending so far. I have argued against features of experiences that would fall under Davidson's classification of them as sensations. Consider now that I am analysing experiences in terms of thoughts with the features I outlined in chapter 5. So far I have not defended the attitudinal component of this claim, so for the moment take experiences to be a propositional attitude of some kind with this content.

Now, these are playing the role of sensations. Thus, the position seen in Davidson's terms alters significantly. Byrne's point that I raised above is a good one. When I see that the cup is there, it really does sound puzzling to hold that the content of my seeing is not something that I can literally judge.

So, on the view that I have set up, the relation between experiences and judgements is not a causal one, but a justificatory one. However, the experiences themselves are propositional: they are the mental acts with the contents that I have specified in the previous chapter. Further, as these justify other beliefs, they themselves must be beliefs, and as they are conscious they must be conscious beliefs, i.e. judgements. Are they themselves justified? No, because they are caused and interjected into the stream of consciousness without a prior rational relation to other mental acts: I could not justify them in any sense. If there are two boxes, and I look in one rather than the other, I may be unjustified in looking into this box rather than that one, but my seeing into the box was neither justified nor unjustified: it was, like the box itself *a-justified*. Does this necessarily render it non-conceptual? No, for the experience itself can certainly justify my other beliefs, or interact with my desires. It can play all of the classical justificatory roles. And it can do them with ease, for it is a judgement and that is its role. Having done the spadework in previous chapters, this is the position that I am defending in this chapter.

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3 Recall my discussion of Crane's (1988a), (1988b), and (1992) arguments against experiential conceptualism in chapter 5.

4 'Sensations' stands for: 'sensation, perception, the given, experience, sense data, the passing show'. Davidson (1986) p. 310

### 3 McDowell

Can we find some argumentative support, however for the conceptualist thesis, and then the judgement-theory? McDowell's famous (1994) argument is that experiences have to have conceptual content because only propositional (conceptual) attitudes can stand in justificatory relations to other propositional attitudes and, as with Davidson, the choices are either that experiences justify beliefs, which is a logical relation, or that experiences cause beliefs. However, we cannot give up the thesis that experiences justify beliefs, and hence we must hold that experiences have propositional content.<sup>5</sup>

McDowell's argument is multi-faceted and intended to establish at least two points. One is that experiences have conceptual content in terms of their articulation, and the other is that experiences are articulated with a certain range of concepts.

He diagnoses a repeated move back and forth between two constraints. One is the constraint between propositional attitudes, the *rational internal* constraint. The other is the *empirical external* constraint. Assuming that a state's content is a function of the constraints it is under, if one or other of these constraints is taken in isolation to define the content of an experience, then something will be lost.<sup>6</sup> If we focus solely on the rational constraint, then we will lose the empirical content. However, if we focus solely on the empirical constraint, we will lose the rational nature of thought. I think putting the matter in terms of the content being a function of the constraint helps to precisify this.<sup>7</sup>

McDowell's solution is that experiences are constrained both empirically and rationally. They are constrained by the rational relations that they stand in to each other, which gives them their conceptual nature, and by the fact that their content is empirically constrained by a break between the fully rational qualities of judgements and experiences. Their content is empirical because unlike judgement where one *actively assents* to a proposition, in experience one does not assent. In Fregean terms, one could put this by saying that the proposition is merely *apprehended* in experience, but assented to in thought.<sup>8</sup> When we see that *p*, we merely *take in* a fact in a conceptually articulated way.<sup>9</sup> Thus, it is a mental act, but not a mental *action*.

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5 This argument is also taken up by Brewer (1999) and (2005). Brewer (2005) reconstructs the argument almost exactly as I have done in this paragraph.

6 I am very briefly summarising McDowell (1994) Lecture I.

7 One could perhaps think of the difference between a causal theory of semantics and a purely conceptual-role theory of semantics.

8 This caused difficulties for McDowell, and he has recently recanted his theory that experiences are the exercises of concepts in McDowell (2008).

9 Indeed, there seems to be an identity-view here between the fact and the propositional content, which I find peculiar. But I do not enquire into this.

This is unlike thought in that to judge that *p* is to make a transition from one mental act or state to another. Even if one spontaneously comes to remember that one has left one's keys in the door, the choice to keep judging this renders the continuing assent to it a mental action; it may begin as a mental act, but it persists, or disappears, as a result of a mental action. As it has already acquired its content, it is now fully constrained by its internal rational relations.

The transition to a new belief, or the holding of the old one, in and of itself is only constrained by the rational relations, and so to acquire empirical content, an empirical constraint will be required. The mere apprehension of the proposition is not constrained, like the assent to the proposition, by the rational relations governing assent.

Experiences are also enmeshed in the conceptual sphere, the 'space of reasons', and yet experiences, unlike other thoughts are not the assent to a proposition *in virtue* of their relation to other thoughts. Unlike these thoughts they bear other constitutive relations, namely content-giving relations to the external world. Empirical *beliefs* already have their content, acquired from experiences, and thus are otherwise constrained only by the rational relations.

McDowell's argument is that the non-conceptualist, like the sense-data theorist, is advocating a theory that is a version of the 'Myth of the Given', one version of which is the sense-data theory. Recall the many problems that this theory encountered in accurately explaining how our experiences are related to thoughts and how our experiences struggle to be interpretable on the sense-data theory.

The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate impacts from outside the realm of thought. But we cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as relations within the space of concepts: relations such as implication or probabilification, which hold between potential exercises of conceptual capacities.<sup>10</sup>

So, the argument is that in order to *justify* any beliefs following from the experience, the experience has to be conceptual. This argument, Brewer's also, that in order that mental act *M* justify mental act *N*, *M* has to be a conceptual attitude, is a familiar epistemological one that features especially in coherentist accounts of justification.

The argument that experiences have to be conceptual is that experiences *justify* the beliefs that arise from the experience. What this means is that experience *M* has to justify thought *N*, and

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<sup>10</sup> McDowell (1994) p. 304

that this can only be explained if *M* is, or provides, a *reason* for *N*. And to provide a reason is to provide something *citable*. "I believe that there is a cup on the table because I can see that there is a cup on the table" means that "that there is a cup on the table, which I can see, is my reason for believing that there is a cup on the table". In citing the content of the experience, or the experience itself, the content must be conceptual for citing is a conceptual act. For this to be a reason or a justifier, is for it to be conceptual.<sup>11</sup> However, there are two notions at play here.

McDowell and Brewer are apt to talk of reasons as the subject's reasons, or reasons that the subject can use in an argument. This is not to say that in transitioning from *M* to *N*, that they run through the argument but that they *could* run through the argument. One is always aware, implicitly at least, of the argument. Davidson also assents to what Pryor calls the 'premise principle', namely that a justifier, a reason, must be a possible premise in an argument for holding the conclusion.<sup>12</sup> It does not matter what kind of argument this is, deductive, abductive, inductive etc.<sup>13</sup> But one has to be careful to separate this point from the other point.

There are two points to separate here. One pertains to the justification of our beliefs in what we could call a content-giving sense. McDowell's concern with the empirical constraint arises from this.

One good argument against sense-data, and indeed anything that shares some of the problematic features of sense-data, mainly its being non-representational, is that if we are trapped behind the veil of ideas, it becomes difficult to see how we can come to be justified in believing that there are external objects. If experiences are mere qualitative happenings, with no content, and these cause our beliefs, it seems hard to see how our beliefs are justified in their content. This, however, presumes that the belief is not justified *in respect of its content*, i.e. that there is a good explanation as to why our beliefs have such content as they do, and why we should not abjure beliefs with such contents and instead become more sceptical.<sup>14</sup> According to the non-inferential foundationalist, there is such an explanation: that the qualitative sensation is reliably caused by

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11 See, especially, Brewer (2005) for a clear statement of this

12 'The only things that can justify a belief that *P* are other states that assertively represent propositions, and those propositions have to be ones that could be used as premises in an argument for *P*. They have to stand in some kind of inferential relation to *P*; they have to imply it or inductively support it or something like that'. Pryor (2005) p. 189

13 Within reason, presumably, as to what can count as an argument. Recall that possession of concepts is related to the relations between propositions which concepts give rise to. Grasping the concepts and apprehending the propositions in which they feature comes with grasping the relations between them. *Merely* satisfying Evans' Generality Constraint without grasping the relations between the concepts is either insufficient for concept possession or (more likely) not possible. "All dogs are goblins, some dwarf is a horse, therefore some goblin is a dwarf" may *arguably* be thought by someone who satisfied a weak reading of the Generality Constraint in that they could apply the different concepts independently of each application. Nevertheless, one would be hesitant to attribute conceptual capacities to this person if *all* of their "reasoning" appeared to be like this, and this was not merely an explicable aberration (e.g., madness, brain injury, etc.)

14 Or, as an alternative, one could move towards phenomenalism.

external objects, and it, in turn, (very) reliably causes our beliefs.<sup>15</sup>

One of McDowell's arguments against this is that it is obscure how the belief could come to have the content that it does, seems weak to me here. What is wrong with the following? Causation is an external constraint. Experiences are caused, and the beliefs they in turn cause hence come to have the content they do as a result of this.

Nevertheless, in respect of whether my belief that there are really such things as computers as we naively conceive of them, the sense-data theory does, I think, run into difficulties with respect to the relation between the belief and the experience.

Although sense-data do not represent *to me*, i.e semantically, that such and such, if they are "natural signs" of external things, and they cause my beliefs as a result of their being caused, then this seems perhaps a pretty good story about how beliefs come to have empirical content if empirical content is a function of such a relation.

However, *this* question, about how we justify the general *contents* of our beliefs, is not the question that I want to press, and it seems to me to be an independent matter from the central one for my discussion, namely whether in order for an experience to justify a belief it has to be conceptual.

Two notions have to be kept distinct. It may be that what we *do* when we justify ourselves, the *process* of justification, allows us to say that we are justified, but that, actually, there is another notion of "justification" on which, regardless of our being justified in the first sense in believing that *p*, we are not justified in the sense that, from a third person perspective, we ought not to believe that *p*. That is, perhaps I believe that there really is a computer on the desk, and from my own standpoint I am justified. Maybe, like Jackson and Russell, I think that the best explanation is that there really is a computer corresponding to my experience.<sup>16</sup> I am justified in the sense that I can give good arguments, the premises seems reasonable and so on: indeed, being able to engage in this process is constitutive of my being justified in this sense, regardless of the truth of what I believe. Should I be asked to account for my belief, I could defend it well. However, perhaps I went wrong in taking inference to the best explanation as my motivation. It turns out that this is not the *best* explanation as it is not the *correct* one, even though for all the world it looks to us as though it is. From this standpoint, I am not justified in believing what I do because, from this standpoint, I *ought not to believe it as it is false*.<sup>17</sup> The negation of this is also true: if there is something, then I *am* justified.

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15 Or we could hold with Russell (1912) and Jackson (1977) that what justifies our empirical beliefs is that this is the most likely explanation.

16 According to McDowell, there is a content that I *cannot* believe. But set that aside.

17 See Ginsborg (2006) for a thorough discussion of this with respect to McDowell (1994).



McDowell is attempting to solve two problems, are we justified empirically and how it works as an internal process, simultaneously, as his account of the rational constraints and the empirical constraint intersect in experience as experiences are propositional *and* externally constrained.

However, there is another, better, argument standing behind this, that which could be called the "integration" argument. How do I integrate a sensing of a sense-datum into the inferential web: it does not have the correct structure or form; it is not a proposition, let alone a conceptual proposition. If this is so, *how do I use it?*

Recall also that not all proponents of sense-data, e.g., Price and Broad, held that experiences were wholly sensational. On this view, sense-data are the objects of experience but only in the sense that they are relata of a qualitative sensing; experiences also have a representational or quasi-representational component which takes as its object something distinct from the sense-datum.

Heck argues that as a non-conceptual experience *itself* is representational, the integration problem does not arise. On the non-conceptual theory, experiences *themselves* have content, and they do represent the world. Furthermore, the content can entail the content of the belief.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, on this view, the experience represents, say, the cup on the table non-conceptually (i.e. it has non-conceptual content in the articulatory sense) and then my belief that the cup is on the table results from this experience with this content. The transition between the experience and the belief is a transition directly between two representational states. It did seem difficult to see how we could use a sensing of a sense-datum as a reason. A reason for what? It just sits there, mute. Further, it is not of the correct structure to be taken up into belief, or for its content to be used as a reason: it has no inferential elements.

Can this circumvent the argument? It is certainly better placed than the sense-data theory. But does it solve the integration problem, and also a further problem that, at least as it seems to me, my belief just seems to go straight through to the actual content of the experience?

#### 4 Non-Conceptual Reasons

If an experience has a non-conceptual content which is logically equivalent to a conceptual content, i.e. they both pick out the same states of affairs and are both equivalent to the same set of possible worlds, and both have these semantic features and the required *structure* to stand in logical relations, where does this leave McDowell's argument? The first point to note is that I think that the

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<sup>18</sup> See Heck (2000) Section 4.

thesis that experiences do justify beliefs is a sound one. Of course one could hold that experiences merely cause beliefs, but I question the plausibility of this: does your *experience* of the cup really *cause* you to believe it? Really? When I see a cup on the table, I *do* think that a judgement is caused, because I think that the best model to sort out the tangle that we find ourselves in is that experiences are judgements. But if I did not believe that, I would find it very odd to hold that an experience *caused* me to have a belief, or make a judgement. This seems to put too much distance between this and what I see, even if I have reason to be guarded about what I see.

If experiences caused beliefs, our beliefs would stand in an odd internal relation to our experiences. There is certainly no introspectible *temporal* distance between my seeing the cup on the table and my coming to believe that it is there. And there seems also to be no logical distance either. Indeed as there seems to me to be no sense-data, or qualia and so on, in experience at all that I can discern, and no compelling argument for non-conceptual content, *and* it seems very much to me that my experience just goes straight through, as a judgement, I find the judgement-theory extremely intuitive.

McDowell's and Brewer's position is (was) that experiences are not beliefs but that they are propositional and hence rationalise and not merely cause beliefs. Here, motivating the thought that experiences rationalise beliefs, is Heck.

I do not just find myself having certain beliefs, such as that there is a brown desk in front of me, having no idea where they came from; it is not as if perceptual experience gives rise to beliefs in the same sort of way a bump on the head might cause me to believe that I am Napoleon. On the contrary, I *see* the desk, and I believe that it is there *for that reason*, not just *because* I see it there. To be only slightly more precise: The formation of perceptual beliefs is a *rational* (not just a causal) process.<sup>19</sup>

The argument turns on the claim that the experience provides a (defeasible) reason to believe its content (and other propositions). There are, however, at least two ways in which the notion of a reason can be interpreted. McDowell's argument is that the relevant sense of a reason must imply that the reason is conceptual for it must be the *subject's* reason, a reason *for* the subject, and that in the case of the actual process of reasoning, independent from the other notion of justification, being a subject's reason is being a proposition, or a propositional state.

Consider first a case of practical reasoning, of deciding what to do. A hitherto happily married couple are sleeping in bed. The husband awakes at 8.59. He reaches over to the bedside

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<sup>19</sup> Heck (2000) p. 510

table, picks up a small statue and kills his wife by hitting her in the head. One question that someone may ask is why he used the statue and not the gun that he has in his safe. The answer to this may be that he wanted to kill his wife quickly, and statue was to hand and fit for the purpose. In cross-examination, these reasons would be good reasons to explain why he used the statue. But they would not explain why he killed his wife. Did he have a reason *to* kill his wife, and not a reason to kill her in the way he did, which itself presumes the other reason?

Imagine that the husband was, even unconsciously, completely unaware of his wife's intentions or thoughts. His lawyer uncovers the wife's secret diary and it transpires that she had planned to kill him at 9. Now, perhaps her husband had an antecedent reason to kill her, perhaps he had many, or perhaps he had none. But crucially, if the prosecutor asks him what his *reason* was, the judge would certainly not accept in mitigation the *fact* that his wife planned to kill him *as his reason*. It is not that this is a bad reason. A bad reason would be that he did not love her any more or that he fancied a change (or something utterly unconnected, such as that he thought it was a full moon). It is that it is *not a reason in the correct sense*.

When the prosecutor asks him the question using the word "reason", the prosecutor is trying to elicit from him something something that he can cite in justification of his action. The judge is not going to accept the statement that "*it turned out* that there was a good reason".

We may say that there "actually was a good reason". However, this is loose language. What we mean by this is that he acted in his best interest, or that he performed an action which was to his overall benefit. But something being in my best interest, or an action being beneficial, are different from there having been *reason for me* to proceed in this way. If I empty my bank account and bet it all on a long shot the day before I am due to go to debtor's prison unless I settle my debt, the fact that I win certainly did not absolve me of acting irresponsibly. And the reason that I acted irresponsibly was that it was very likely that I would lose. Reasons in the sense of justifying cannot be retroactive. When we say that "*it turned out* that there was reason to do it", this means something quite different from there having *been* good reason to do it. The latter attributes the *the subject* a reason, the former makes a statement about the circumstances in which the subject is in, comes to, or came to, be in.

This second notion is not an illicit notion, there is a clear sense in which this distinction picks out something correct, related to the discussion above of content justification. It *was* better for the husband (let us say) that he killed his wife. This was a beneficial action, and it was in his best interest. However, he certainly could not be entitled to claim to have used this *as* a reason, for, as Brewer emphasises, it was not *his* reason. That the wife was going to kill the husband, this fact, could not have been his reason any more than my *winning* a bet on the horse at time *t* could have

been *my reason* for placing the bet at a time before *t*. The temporal case makes vivid what is also true in the other case.<sup>20</sup>

This is the difference between these two types of reasons. And as reasons come with justification, there are two types of justification. As McDowell and Brewer stress, what it is to be a reason, in the relevant sense, to draw a belief, is for the reason to be the subject's reason: they have to possess the reason. This is why, like Davidson, they assent to Pryor's premise principle. A reason is something that it *used* in reasoning, even if it is only implicit that it could be used, to a conclusion. The conclusion is the justified, and the premise a justifier. And the reason that they assent to the premise principle is that they think that in order for something to serve as a reason in this sense it has to be conceptually articulated.

However, if, as Heck claims, experiences rationalise beliefs as they are reasons for them, i.e. the relation is a rational relation of justification between experience and belief, because the experience has *representational content*, then why should we think that the reason cannot be the subject's reason, only it is non-conceptual? The reason is not, like the fact that the wife was going to kill the husband, a reason for the subject *to* believe, it is *their* reason *for* believing.

When we say that the subject was justified in believing that there is a cup on the table because he had an experience, we are saying that they have a good internal reason to believe it, namely that they can see it, and he can use the fact that he can see it to come to believe this. On Heck's view, this rationalisation is a transition between a non-conceptual and a conceptual state. Further this representational state has force, in the way that a judgement has force.

We can accept that if experience *M* justifies judgement *N* then *M* provides a reason for *N*, and that the reason must be *my* reason, it must be possessed by me and realised by me to be such. However, Heck presents a good case that a non-conceptual theory can meet these requirements.<sup>21</sup>

What the McDowell/Brewer argument amounts to is that in justifying my belief that the cup is on the table by citing my seeing it as a reason, I at least have to implicitly be able to give an argument for this, where the experience, or its content, is a premise. Further, I must be able to 'scrutinise' these premises and draw the conclusion.

The sensing of a sense-datum now looks to be in trouble as a reason in this sense. How do I use the sensing of a sense-datum? All that I can believe is that I am sensing a sense-datum. How do I get from this to any belief at all? How do I scrutinise the sense-datum as a reason? All that I can scrutinise as a reason, for all that I can *use* as a reason, is my *belief* that I am sensing a sense-datum.

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<sup>20</sup> Compare Pryor's (2005) distinction between reasons for, and reasons to, or Byrne's (2005) distinction between reasons for a subject, and reasons the subject has.

<sup>21</sup> Peacocke (2001) Section 4 also makes an argument like this. See also Millar (1991) for a similar discussion.

The non-conceptualist is in a better position with respect to this problem. The non-conceptual content represents the external object or state of affairs, and to undergo the experience with this content is to have the object or state of affairs represented to you. Heck explains as follows.

On Evans' view, the judgements I make about how things appear to me – just like my judgements about how the world is – are based upon my perceptual experience: To say how things now appear to me is to say how I would judge the world to be if I were to judge purely on the basis of my current experience, that is, in such a way that the judgement would be *prima facie*, though defeasibly, justified by that very experience. ... So, though the (non-conceptual) contents of my perceptual states do not themselves figure in my thought, in reflecting on how things appear, I still reflect on the contents of my perceptual states, on how they present the world as being. I am, moreover, reflecting on *what they give me reason to believe*.

According to Evans ... for me to say, or think, "It appears to me as if *p*" is for me to report, or make, a *judgement*, one that requires me to conceptualise the non-conceptual content of my experience, just as making judgements about the world does: In making such judgements, I exercise "the very skills of conceptualization" I exercise in making judgements about the world.<sup>22</sup>

So, in scrutinising the relation between experience and belief, I consider what I *would* believe on the basis of the non-conceptual content. The reason for me to draw the belief that *p* from the experience is that I would ordinarily go on to believe that *p* (subject to defeasibility). Thus the rational relation between a structured but non-conceptual experience and a structured belief based on that experience is that *in conceptualizing* this experience, I would normally come to believe that *p*.

This does seem, in a sense, to satisfy the worry that McDowell has that there could be no rational relation between a non-conceptual experience and a judgement, for, unlike the sense-data or adverbial theories, or a full qualia-theory, the transition between a non-conceptual experience and a judgement is a natural, and easily explicable one: it is conceptualization of a content poised to be conceptualised; like a belief, it is made for the role. Hence, a non-conceptual experience *M* can justify a judgement *N* where the former is one's reason for making the judgement, but the experience is non-conceptual. This rejects the premise principle, for the content is not used in an argument but is *conceptualized*. Further, the judgement is not about the experience, but about the very same objects as the experience represents under a content.

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<sup>22</sup> Heck (2010) p. 156-517

However, what, exactly, does it mean to conceptualise one's experiential content? This is rather an obscure notion, for it asserts that experiences have a level of content which is different from the content of judgement, and one comes to the judgement by conceptualising the content and then, if one accepts it, taking the content up into judgement. This is, I think, a significant explanatory commitment.

Further, it means that the content of the experience is, as on the content view of non-conceptual content, not something that can be believed. What is judged is *not* the content of the experience, but a different content which results from the conceptualisation of the content. I literally cannot judge the contents of my experiences. Now, it is unclear exactly what this amounts to in the sense of how it is supposed that this is to "feel" or "seem". But it seems untrue to me, on the basis of reflection that when I look at the cup, my experience has a different type of content from my judgement, and that my belief is a relation to a different *content* than my experience.

I understand that this may not be taken as a strong argument, but what I think is more compelling is the rather mysterious notion of conceptualisation. To conceptualise the content of the belief is to bring the content, through a transition between one type of content to another which *cannot* rest on any notion of a *translation*. Could this be automatic? Is there a level of non-conceptual content which is conceptualised automatically? If this conceptualisation results in a judgement, then I would ask what role the non-conceptual content plays.

This argument, that the experience provides the reason, namely the conceptualisation of its content, for judging that *p* to a significant extent concedes the premise principle. The *reason* that I judge that *p* is not that I experience whatever *p* picks out non-conceptually, but that I can conceptualise this content as *p*. My reason for judging that *p* is that the conceptualisation of the content is not rejected: I assent to *p* because I have good reason to, namely no thought that not-*p*.

In judging that it *looks* that *p*, I *explicitly* conceptualise the content absent any background beliefs ("the stick is bent" – "if I did not know of illusions, I would believe this") and this is what rationalises our beliefs and provides the rational link between experiences and judgement. I then can reject that *p*, if I know of some reason why *p* is untrue. Heck says that normally we do not do this, and this is a standardly made point about the moment where an experiential content is just about drawn into belief, just waiting to be rejected. But there is a difficulty here.

It must either be that I conceptualise *p* straight into judgement, in which case judging that it only looks that *p* is to consider how I *am* taking things at the moment, i.e. what my judgement is at the moment, or I do not conceptualise straight into judgement but into some kind of "holding state" like the one above. But, then, what is the relation between the holding state and the judgement? The holding state is something that occurs automatically, conceptualisation is not a mental *action*,

and so without this being *judging* that it looks that  $p$  which would, unlike its looking that  $p$ , be a mental action, there is an attitude towards  $p$  between experience and judgement.

Further, and I must press this intuition unfortunately, it really does not look to me like there is a level of conceptualisation between experience and judgement in this sense. Hence, I think that Heck should say that we do conceptualise straight into judgement. But, then, as I do not believe the arguments for non-conceptual content, or for sense-data, qualia, etc., it looks like conceptualising straight into judgement is what an *experience* is.

## 5 Experiences as Judgements

So, I find that the integration argument looks promising. It must be, otherwise it would not be so popular in the form of the premise principle. However, the thesis that experiences are judgements, that we conceptualise straight into judgement, is not a popular one. This is despite the fact that everyone admits that experiences provide us with tendencies to believe, and that we almost always *do* believe what we experience, that we "take up" our experiences into belief as a matter of course. And the thesis that experiences have force is now widely accepted. Indeed, to deny that experiences have force is rare. Further, there are well-known problems with the view that experiences give rise to some kind of force-less consideration state, as how does one use an attitude with no force as a reason, and if this state, what I called the "holding state" with respect to Heck, is not playing the role of a reason to believe the content of the experience, then what is it doing? This pushes us back to Davidson's point: only a belief can justify another belief. Justification seems to be a function of the content and the force of the attitude. So, why not settle for the thesis that experiences are judgements?

One reason is the thesis that experiences have non-conceptual content, but I have questioned the arguments for this. The other is that experiences have phenomenal character, and I have questioned this also.

It seems difficult to posit a state with no force between experience and judgement: our experiences seem to automatically transition into judgements at least; moreover, the best theory surely is, like Byrne points out, that literally the content of the experience is the content of the belief. And I have rebutted two reasons for arguing against this. Further, the argument from reasons, interpreted as the "integration" argument, i.e. how concerning something plays a *role* in transitioning mentally between one state and another requires it to look like an inferentially structured state, now piles on the pressure: either we conceptualise the content of the experience and

our reason for moving from experiencing the cup on the table to judgement is as I described above with respect to Heck's argument, which still holds that the content of the judgement is literally not the content of the experience, or we hold, as I think that we should and I think matches well to introspection, that we "conceptualise straight into judgement".

As I have argued against a notion of non-conceptual content in experience, and against the thesis that experiences have a phenomenal nature that thoughts do not, if we *conceptualise* straight into judgement, then experiences are judgements.

My task here is to defend this thesis, and not to elucidate a full theory of internal justification and the implications for this thesis, or anything so ambitious. I am happy just to have made a good case for experiences being judgements, as this is an unpopular theory, despite its obvious advantages. There is one negative implication, though, and that concerns the Müller-Lyer. Nevertheless, I think that this can be explained, and that it is not as damaging as it is often taken to be. The main advantage is that, although there are issues with respect to inferential justification, matters with respect to this are more clear cut than with respect to the relation between experiences and beliefs. To hold that experiences are judgements, is to hold that this is a sub-class of these relations, and this would be a significant result.<sup>23</sup>

So, to the Müller-Lyer objection. This objection is raised by practically everyone who writes on the subject, even Craig (1976) and Pitcher (1971) explicitly reject the judgement-theory on this basis. The argument is as follows. The Müller-Lyer lines are the same length, but the arrows on the edges of the lines make the lines look different lengths. Even though one knows that they are the same length, they still look the same. On any other theory, there is no clash between knowing that they are the same length, and them looking to be different lengths. For seeing and judging are not two states or acts between which contradictory contents are problematic. Things are different with respect to two judgements. Craig, for example, makes the point as follows.

Just because we see something as F we do not have to believe that it is F, and this means that if we go the whole way and speak of perceptions as beliefs we will be involved in great awkwardness if not in absurdity. Suppose I am faced with a visual illusion in which some object, in fact only a few feet from me, appears to be quite a long way off. Suppose further that I know that it is just a few feet distant, having set the experiment up myself only seconds before. If both of these are beliefs in the full sense then I am simultaneously believing that p and that - p. Nor is it that I am just holding two contradictory beliefs - I am holding them whilst clearly realising them to be contradictory. No doubt my rationality has its flaws, but surely things aren't as bad as all that?<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Heck makes this point, but, predictably, says that experiences cannot be beliefs.

<sup>24</sup> Craig (1976) pp. 15-16



Are things as bad as all that? Perhaps. Or perhaps not. In a few moments, I will bite the bullet and say that, yes, things are as bad as all that. I think that we are in this state, however briefly. What is important is, one, that this is not *impossible*, and so I am not solving this problem by appealing to an impossibility. Another is that this does not call into question the conceptual nature of the state. This is the most serious objection, but I think that it can be met.

Beforehand, however, consider the alternatives. The most well-known solution is Armstrong's (1968) and Pitcher's (1971) solution that in this case we receive a suppressed inclination to believe.<sup>25</sup> I return to this in a moment.

Secondly, one could hold that the background belief actually overrides the experience: the lines actually look the same length. This may be met with incredulity, but, at least in the case of the Müller-Lyer, it has some force behind it for the illusion depends on a stationary view of the object. If one casts one's eye over it, the effect fades. However, this does not work, or at least does not work as well, when one looks straight into the diagram. Further, one will always be able to source some illusion or effect where this is not the case.

A third option would be Gluer's (2009) theory that experiences are beliefs about the way that things look. This has the appealing feature that it circumvents the current problem, and it meshes experience into the inferential system very neatly. However, the view surely has problems. For a start, there is the air of circularity. More importantly, a belief about the way something looks is either a belief about its visual properties, which is to say, a belief, or about it looking some way to one. But how could this be the content of an experience? Further, this is a relatively high-level theoretical notion.

It seems clear that this illusion, and if not this one then certainly others are not susceptible to arguing away, and if one holds a judgement-theory, then one has to hold that this is not susceptible to being overridden, and one has to face the fact that one judges that *p* and judges that *not-p*. Can the force of this objection be weakened.

It can be initially weakened to the degree that there is something correct about the Pitcher/Armstrong view. One tries quite hard not to see the lines as being different lengths. This connects to a degree with the "switching" option. The Necker-Cube, for example switches between interpretations, and one sees it as pointing "in" and then "out", but never both (or neither). Now, can one say this about the Müller-Lyer? *To a degree*, I think one can. But the effect is not a suppressed inclination to believe, but more of a desire to stop believing. One knows that one has a false belief, and one wants rid of it. This is why one scans one's eyes over it, trying to detect its flaw, and find out if one can see through the illusion.

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<sup>25</sup> See Armstrong (1968) p. 140, and Pitcher (1971) p. 93. See also Craig (1976) p. 17.

What, then, of the fact that the two judgements are in conflict, *especially* the background judgement? One could hold that, as there is this difference in the behaviour of the two judgements, that this signals that they are judgements of a different type. And this is indeed true. One is an *experience*, and the other is not. The other is a judgement that we have to make. It is a judgement where one has to hold the proposition before the mind. If one forgets that they are the same length, then there is no problem. It is just a false belief.

The difference to the Necker Cube is that both are experiential judgements. Both "fight each" other within the attitude of experience, within a sub-class of judgements. And one always wins out. The reason, I think, that the background judgement cannot win out over the experiential judgement is that the latter is *caused*, and *caused continuously*, and caused with a great level of detail and richness. Perceptual judgements are the most important judgements that we make, they have the greatest role in our cognitive lives, and they are continuously caused. We have control over our background beliefs, and this makes them weaker in a sense: can one really go on *judging* that *p*? When we register that *p*, i.e. take it to be true, the act of judging is very short, for we usually only need to make an actual judgement for a short period of time, maybe less than a second, and then the next thought becomes more important.

That it is continuously caused is the explanation of why the background belief cannot win out: it can match it, when we are occurrently irrational. And this explains the frustrating feeling that one has looking at it. Of course *I know* they are the same length, and yet I cannot help but not believe it.

If experiences are judgements, then they will have qualities that judgements have, but *also* the qualities that experiences have. This, I think, is the key to explaining what is going on. One *is* irrational in the sense that one can be judging that *p* and judging that *not-p*, but this is because one of the judgements is caused: and if something is caused, then it is out with the subject's otherwise rational control. And so the subject is in the curious position of being helplessly irrational.

Consider the following scenarios. Someone is hypnotised to believe that, say, there are penguins dancing on the table. But the hypnotist is skilful, and this does not force out his perceptual beliefs that there are no penguins dancing on the table. When asked he answers "yes" and "no". He genuinely *believes* that there are and are not penguins dancing on the table. Can this be explained? Yes, by the fact that he has been hypnotised.

Or consider a subject who knows a secret and does not want to. They try their hardest to convince themselves that they do not know it, and sometimes they succeed: and yet, all the while in the back of their mind is the knowledge that they do know it. Or consider another scenario. Someone has been fitted up by the police and is being worn down in the interrogation room. They

*know* that they did not do it, but at the same time, they find themselves ever closer to being indoctrinated into believing that they did. There is just a point where they are not sure any more: do they make both judgements at the same time?

Perhaps, but perhaps the objector will say "no". Because it is impossible to judge that *p* and *not-p* simultaneously. If this were true, my thesis would be refuted. However, can I not say that the Müller-Lyer *shows* that this is possible, and shows it regularly? And the reason that it is possible is the one I gave above, namely that it is a caused perceptual judgement; the most important thoughts that we have.

So, I take it that I am on firm, at least not very slippery, ground in holding that it is not *impossible* to judge that *p* and *not-p*. However, the scenarios I gave above are all unnatural scenarios. They involve hypnosis, or very unlikely descriptions of events. However, the fact that these judgements, unlike all other judgements are *caused* is itself a novel scenario with respect to the rest of our mental lives. All of our other judgements are subject to the will, at least *post fact*.

This brings me on to what I take to be a more serious objection, Crane's (1992) §4 objections. Again, I will rely on the fact that these judgements are caused. Crane argues that it is constitutive of a conceptual state that the state stand in relations to other conceptual states. And he argues that the Müller-Lyer shows that this is not true of experiences. Let me try to answer these objections.

Crane argues that, unlike beliefs, experiences are revisable. However, each experience is a caused event: the subject is not responsible for the judgement, as they cannot rationally affect it, and hence revise it. As it is caused it cannot be revised. One can only revise a belief, by judging that the previously held belief was false (or unsupported), but while one knows that one's previous judgement was false, and so one abjures it, there is immediately caused *another* judgement, and the process repeats itself. One *cannot* revise one's experiences, and, if experiences are judgements, then one cannot revise these. However, judgements are revised by a new judgement to the effect that old should be abjured. This is possible, but, again, immediately another judgement is caused.

Secondly, one cannot, as Crane points out, make a deductive transition between experiences. Hence, one cannot make a deductive transition between experiential judgements. But, this should again not be a surprise, given that they are caused. Further, Crane argues that there are no conditions on what one ought to believe on the basis of experience, but there are on the basis of judgements. However, this is to stack the deck against the conceptualist, for one could hold that *unless* one was such that they ought to draw certain inferences or relations from the perceptual content, then one could not be a subject. Finally, Crane argues that experiences contain a predicative content which judgements do not necessarily contain. For example, one cannot experience the colour of the table without perceiving the shape of the table. However, this is easily

explained by the logical form of the content of the experiential judgement: experiences are, as Crane says, richer and more detailed. However, as I argued in chapter 5, this does not preclude us from holding that they are conceptual, and further than they are judgements.

This defence was, in large part, premised on the fact that if experiences are judgements, then these judgements will behave both like experiences and judgements. But, then, this should not be surprising, as they are both experiences *and* judgements. That our visual system can be tricked in the way that the Müller-Lyer tricks it, does not show that experiences are not judgements, because it is in the nature of belief and judgement to be false sometimes.

## 6 Conclusion

I thus conclude my defence of the theory that we can analyse experiences as judgements with a certain type of content. I have explained the representational theory, and why, if it is accepted, the path is open to analyse the different psychology of experiences and thought in terms of judgements with different contents. I have explained why transparency and the representational theory can give rise to the questioning of the intuition that there is particular *phenomenal psychological* property of experiences that judgements (and other thoughts) lack. By arguing that experiences do have an individuating type of content, and defending the thesis that this content is conceptual, and finally motivating and defending the attitudinal claim, I have discharged this commitment.

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